

Total History, Anti-History and the Face that is Other

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But though I cannot *know*, I can yet *think* freedom...

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

Der Mensch ist das Beginnen koennen selbst und hat nicht nur die Faehigkeit zu beginnen. Wir sind im woertlichen Sinne Ursprung der Menschenwelt. Im immer erneuerten Beginnen hat auch – Merleau-Ponty unseren Grundzug gesehen – wir ueberwinden so die unvermeidliche Entfremdung und existieren unseren eigenen Anfang.

– Wolfgang Schirmacher, “Zum Weltbild einer *vita activa*”

Total History, Anti-History and the Face that is Other

Introduction: The Historical, the Ethical and the Timelessness of Body that is *Face*

UNLESBARKEIT dieser
Welt. Alles doppelt.

ILLEGIBILITY
of this world. All things twice over.

Die Starken Uhren
geben der Spaltstunde recht,
heiser.

The strong clocks justify
the splitting hour,
hoarsly.

Du, in dein Tiefstes geklemmt,
einsteigst dir
fuer immer.¹

You, clamped
into deepest part,
forever.

Paul Celan (1971)

There remain questions concerning History, Ethics, and the finitude and infinitude of the body that lead upon the delineation of the notion of a

1. Celan, *Poems of Paul Celan*, trans. Michael Hamburger, 308-309.

Historical, Ethical and a Timelessness of body, within the *human*, that is of the language that is philosophy; as there appear questions that motion towards the violence, peace, enslavement and the separation that is the *body, history, ethics, and time*; as there is the language of the body that is history or the bodies' language that is histories' language; as there is the assignation of an indication that there is more than one Truth in philosophy. That there is more than one truth in *philosophy*, of the thought and the thinking or writing (or *writings*), that are in the "saying" that is (of) *philosophy*, further delineates the existence of more than one *body that is body*, as there is more than one time or, it should be said, another than time that is philosophy's thinking. This project, then, motions towards an indication of a question within philosophy, that is of the question of History, as it fastens upon the figuration of the body, in thinking the *humanbody* of bodies as in the Hegelian notion of "Spirit," folding upon a *philosophy of History that is identically body* or duly Historical, whilst of another than time that is Levinasian: "pre-original" and "an-archic" and *before light*. That is to say, that there is the notion that the body unfurls itself at the "proximity" of History, as it scatters itself upon the body that is Other, folding upon and beyond the body of the Negative, whilst circulating upon a recurrence that is of no return. And within this gesture, there exists further the duplicitous notion of the

perfectcontradiction, that is of the bodies' body (in the plural), pertaining to the Hegelian dialectical method, whilst in Levinasian thinking there is the body on the "hither side" of a *face* that is more or less body, a "*face to face*,"² outside, before and yet to come; a body that is Other's Other.

This project thus motions towards a metaphysics of the body that is identically groundless—ground, as it folds upon the "proximity" and contradiction that is the body, as in a sign or signification, that is of the *human* Spirit that folds upon History, Time, Reason and Freedom (that is, consciousness, self-consciousness and the Negative), whilst it likewise stems from a time that predates and breaks the Western metaphysical notions of Historicity, *light*, Being, and Time, wherein the *delineation of the body*, in separation, before consciousness or the *time that is history*, as the body of a point of departure, assumes the possibility of a duplicity of existences and time(s) that are at once itself (the Same) and its interruption (the Other and/or *Infinity*). This duplicity of times and existences is at once contradictory (Hegel) and paradoxical (Levinas), and yet delineates an extraordinary question upon the *thinking* that is

2. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 207.

philosophy: a *question of or to philosophy* that is of no longer returning (upon the Self) in radical separation, in leave-taking and as in an assignation of an unfastening of Alterity, the very transcendence that is Other, in the *greeting* and ~~un~~*greeting* that is of a “trace,” destitution and solitude that is humility’s strangeness and *Infinity’s* Other.

Chapter one, “Infinite Origin and Exile: What Are We?,” intimates the question of the body as a distance, propinquity and force that is of the secret (Nietzsche) and of the real (Hegel). A body that is at once surreptitious and existent, harboring an encirclement of the delineation of an interior and exterior figuration. Within the first section of chapter one, “The Intimacy of Bodies’ Innerness,” there is an inclination towards a metaphysics of the body that is of a fluidity of an interior figuration that dissolves the notion of a constancy of being in body or of being in time. Pitching the body as of a perpetual escape and devolvement, in a lingering of *nothingness* and *silence*, Sartre delineates the body as a point of departure that sets in motion its very passage towards its point of arrival; a body that is at once surpassing *of body* in attendance and ~~un~~attendance, or of no attendance. That which we denote as of an interior figuration, as in the notion of innerness, inwardness or interiority, is furthermore delineated in Nietzschean thinking as of the notion of an “eternal

recurrence,” an infinite circle of non-origin, endlessly folding upon the night that is the body of a tempestuous Dionysian spirit. Hence Nietzsche twists upon the notion of an internal time that is pure intoxication, a Dionysian force that is of a stillness of body, identically violent and gratuitous in nature. Whilst within the Hegelian dialectic, as in a languishing Negative, the interior figuration circulates and meanders upon the constancy and contradiction that is in beingnot and unbeing, as Hegel states, “not being what it is and being what it is not (*das nicht zu sein, was es ist, und das zu sein, was es nicht ist*).”³ Likewise, that which is the folding-towards itself-of-being, *that is a folding-toward-itself as body*, is further delineated by Aristotle as a breathing of the soul or spirit, an inhalation and exhalation, the very thought that is the breath of desire.

In the second section of chapter one, “Exteriority, However, Not As The Same,” the body is filtered upon its exterior figuration within the delineation of a pronounced outsideness. In the Cartesian delineation, the body marks the pronouncement of a fissure within soul (spirit), body (nature), mind and matter; the corpus itself being designated as

3. Kojeve, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 200.

an impressive instrument or physicality, that is of a relative constancy and pronounced mobility, that is none other than of an alignment of the bodies' perpetual extension, proximity of occupancy and flexibility.

Further along this section, there emerges the discussion of the Kantian notion of the "appearance" and the "thing in itself" (*Ding an Sich*),⁴ that in turn propounds the philosophical notion of *freedom* and *necessity*. While the Hegelian dialectic refers to exteriority as an "unyielding" and "alien reality already present and given,"⁵ wherein the individual encounters otherItself in a world circulating upon the spirit of turbulence, strife and the Negative (that is of the world, the *human*, Time, and History, other and itself or itself and other), that in turn demarcates a point wherein Spirit motions itself towards a displaced passage (or exiled return) that purposively "rests on the alienation of opposites."⁶ In Hegelian thinking, then, that which is exterior rests on an alien outside that is marked in a dialectic of opposition and contradiction, an excessive coming and going of Spirit saturated and raging upon the human ability to extend upon the delineation of an "absolute freedom," a consciousness and self-consciousness of Spirit that propounds human determinate

4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 28.

5. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 294, paragraph: 484.

6. *Ibid.*, 295, paragraph: 485.

Negativity. In the final section of this chapter, the discussion turns upon the Heideggerian notion of exteriority, wherein “encounterability,” illumination and unfamiliarity as in “*Being-in-the-world as its essential state*,”⁷ mark the bodies’ extraordinary arrival (and departure) in the presence of World.

Chapter two, “The Figure of (In)Finite History: *The Reason that is Freedom*,” develops the Hegelian *philosophy of history* as a grounding or foundation upon the notion of the body of (in)FiniteHistory. As a point of departure, building upon Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, this chapter is dominated by an interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic that effectively inverts the *Phenomenology of Spirit* into an interpretation of a metaphysics of the body, History, Time, Reason, and Freedom. Within the Hegelian *philosophy of history*, Hegel builds a radical foundation within an ontological grounding of a determined Historicity of the *human* that is founded upon Reason and the spirit of Freedom through the propagation of a State, its institutions, right and law, and the development of an “ethical life.” The Hegelian body,

7. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 80.

as such, and, in this sense, profoundly pronounces the body to be of a political and determinate force – a “*political body*,” which in its purest philosophical form pronounces itself as a struggling and negating body, both particular and universal, a fantastic creature of thought, consciousness, self-consciousness and political power that, in Negating Nature, forces the *human* Spirit that itself is freedom. This chapter, furthermore, traverses the four epochs of history, as described by Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, and ends with a section entitled: “The Hegelian Third: The Human that is the Body that *folds* History Itself.” This final section focuses on the Hegelian notion of the body as a *perfectcontradiction* that is at once separated and united in its “concept” and “existence.” Both “identical” to the law of nature and “independent” of this law, the Hegelian body demarcates an uncanny flexibility in appearance and disappearance, remarkably double and duplicitous in nature. The Hegelian notion of body furthermore acts as a transitive meeting-point of finitude and infinity, further demarcating an “inherited body” and a “third self” that bespeaks Nature, History, contingent and uncontingent relation, a diffusion of its first and second natures onto a “third” nature that is of a “Spirit that is directly aware of

itself as absolute truth and being.”⁸

Chapter three, “Levinas: Prescient Fidelity that is Speech, (Metaphysics), History and Anti-History,” is focused on two major Levinasian texts:

(1) *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* and (2) *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. It is in these seminal writings (as in numerous others), that Levinas singlehandedly turns Western metaphysics about face in propounding a metaphysics that moves askance of the Hegelian pronouncement of the philosophy of History, Time, Reason, and Freedom. In contestation, Levinasian metaphysics fluctuates upon the notion of another than time that is prior to History, logos, and being, proclaiming an “an-archic” notion of a beginninglessness that circulates upon the notion of the Same in appellation of the *face that is of the Other*, calling forth an ethics that interrupts and uproots the very time that is History. Within *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas unfastens a rethinking of metaphysics that criticizes that which he designates to be the *underside* of History, with its “*arbitrary freedom*” that neutralizes the Other of a return upon the Same in violent *disregard* of the absolute transcendence that is

8. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 384, paragraph: 633.

Other; demarcating the *face of the other* and the language that is *Speech* as a form that disturbs and displaces the totalizing system of “History” and “absolute knowledge,” therein unfastening the subject’s neutrality within the ascension of the power of the State. In *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Levinas further accentuates the desire within the Same for Alterity, strangeness, and the absolutely Other, as in the secrecy of an interior figuration in “proximity” or prophesy, preceding the very notion of “signification” in the very collapse of the phenomenality of the body that is prior to illumination. Within this context, Levinas unfastens upon a radical metaphysics of the *face* (that is more or less body) that precedes the very notion of a presenced appearance. It is here that Levinas builds upon the notion of a *human face* that is in appellation, holding “hostage” the call upon the Same in pure destitution, penury and fear upon the solitude of the death of the Other. Unclaiming the very notion of identity and putting forward the “prior to kinship,” Levinas propounds an alterity, exposedness and “substitution” that gathers upon the Same as the giving of another, of a time that is “unrepresentable” and disordered, beneath and beyond the horizons of History; the body as a “*null-place*”⁹ that provokes

9. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 145.

the very transcendence and “grandest events” that are of a deliverance of the Self (Same) towards an “overflowing” *Infinity* that is in the *face* of the Other. Levinas thus radicalizes the notion of the *face* as an “incarnate” figuration in *passing* and in “*proximity*,” of an “uncommon time” and unrelation in pure separation; a body that *does not show itself*, identically flesh, blood and skin, holding “*hostage*” in utter passivity and unconditionality motioning the *Same* to the “for-the-other.”

Chapter four, “*Between the Opening and the Totality* (the UnGraceful Speech that is Other,” summarizes the previous two chapters and delineates a notion upon the body that is of multiple times and histories. Following the Hegelian dialectic and the Levinasian *unpronouncement* of History, this section discusses the ability of the body to rotate upon a *monumental and profuse History* whilst unfastening and motioning towards an interruption that is of an interior figuration that is *secret in nature*.

A note on the use of combined, invented or inverted words, capitalization, underlining, italics and word crossings. Throughout the text there appear ample instances of an unconventional use of combined words, capitalization and underlining, just as there appear invented combinations

of words, word crossings and an unusual use of italics and capitalization. In all cases, these additions are intentional and act as indicators that amplify the gravity of words or propound the use of a double entendre or negative denomination. It should be further noted that in many cases the alterations keep shifting throughout the text and may reappear more than twice altered. Examples of such alterations follow: (sur)passing; unattendance; trembling(not); (un)trembling; homenot; bodynot; homelessness; ExceptionToNature; worldlyother; homecoming; nonfinitebody; bodynotbody; bodyholding; unbody; illuminateddarkness; *humanhistory*; Reasoned*violence*; *totalHistory*; all(of)Nature; Humanhistory; HumanHistory; inFiniteHistory; eternalTime; noTime; Time(not); aTemporality; particularTime; eternalfinitude; noTimeofTruth; *outside _____ of itself*; proximitylessness, the call; unclaimingidentity; or _____philosophy; ~~un~~*Graceful*; Truth; truth; truths; untruth; truthnot; noTruth, etc. In addition, the word “body” is repeatedly delineated in the plural as “bodies” or as “bodies’ body.” This is in reference to the plurality and extreme delineation that is the provocation of the body as a philosophical concept. Other words that appear in an inverted plural delineation are the words history=histories’, philosophy=philosophies’ and writing as writing(s) or question as question(s).

1. Infinite Origin and Exile: What Are We?

1.1 The Intimacy of Bodies' Innerness ¹⁰

1.1.1 Sartre's Nothingness and Silence

It is the whole body which advances and withdraws... In truth the ensnarement of consciousness in the body normally has its own peculiar result – that is, a sort of particular ecstasy in which consciousness is no more than consciousness (of) the body and consequently a reflective consciousness *of corporeality*.¹¹

And yet the body is what this consciousness *is*; it is not even anything except the body. The rest is nothingness and silence.¹²

The submergence and elevation of body *in* Consciousness, in thinking, in thought, is like a deepening, a drowning, descending and ascending, a coming up for *breath* breathing; it is of *Eros*. The delineation of the bodies “ensnarement of consciousness” echoes forcefully the very possibility of the ensnarement of *Being itself* and the traveling of bodies

10. Bataille, *Erotism: Death and Sensuality*, 25.

11. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 397.

12. *Ibid.*, 330.

in seemingly *infinite directions*. Consciousness moves towards consciousness (of) **itself as itself**, and is reflective of *consciousness as corporeality*. The body *floating falls* to consciousness, to life and to death, *to the world*, and momentarily forestalls, while lingering upon, that which Jean-Paul Sartre denotes as an astonishing splendor (of a) languishing “nothingness and silence.”¹³

The body, too, Sartre denotes, is at a “*distance*,” of a “*surpassing*,” of a “*past*” within “*presence*,” a folding and unfolding of Being; “*a point of departure*” (and arrival), an “*escape*,” an infinite origin and exile of that which we are, are not, or are no longer. It is bodies’ intimacy unfolding and crevassing. A body that expands and retains *profound* intimacy, relegating *intimacy as of a distance, a cannibalizing desire of body as in a flaunting trembling of body, an unfolding of the bodies knowledge trembling*. Sartre writes: “In one sense the body is what I immediately am. In another sense I am separated from it by the infinite density of the world...the body is perpetually... *without distance*. But at the same time it unfolds the distances...”¹⁴ Such *is the body*, a density, a *distance*

13. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 397.

14. *Ibid.*, 325-326.

and languishing desire, advancing and withdrawing, an intimacy and impartiality, *of the secret and of the real*. It is of an excessive privateness, an unfathomable mystery, even mystical, the body is *a secret engagement* and, yet, transiently a pure “facticity”¹⁵ of the world and of the real; in essence, it is of a *pinning* corporeality. It is the body of a secret engagement that facilitates the transience of a passage, (sur)passing and unattendance (that is of an engagement), whilst lurking within Time and atemporality, a folding upon the body of a visitation and abandonment. Sartre *risks, invades, divulges* the Time of body and submerges its time as the unrelinquished, the one and the many. He writes: “Thus the body, since it is surpassed, is the Past.”¹⁶ (And, too, we denote that it is *History*.) Sartre continues: “[the body] is the immediate Past in so far as it still touches on the Present which flees it. This means that it is a *point of departure* – ... a point of departure which I *am* which at the same time I surpass toward what I have to be...”¹⁷

15. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 326.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

The body is fleeting and at the same time it is *fleeing* Time, (that is, it is finite and yet of recurrence and harboring History), of an unfathomable intimacy, in itself *silence and nothingness*, and within its *exodus* and *exile*, the body urges *that which it is not*. The body is of no Time and *all* Time, it meanders and maneuvers *any* Time, a Time *to come and to be forlorn*. That which *it is not* and a spiraling upon *Silences Silence*; the body hastens its essential flight, an ascension, a folding of its secret of that which it is no longer (the Nothing of *nothingness*), the no longer having been, *that* or *this*, many and one, and others' not.

To have a body is to be the foundation of one's own nothingness and not to be the foundation of one's being; I *am* my body to the extent that I *am*; I *am not* my body to the extent that I am not what I am. It is by my nihilation that I escape it. ...for what I am is what I perpetually escape.¹⁸

This hastening of swiftness, racing of suddenness precociously to the fore – it is as if the body held within it a not so secret but sacred mechanism folding itself forward at a dizzying speed of cyclical origin(s)

18. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 326.

and Exiling (of a primordial archetypenot). A forcing of an infinite share of what is yet *to come* and what is yet to be abandoned as in a lingering escape of necessity, psychic and corporeal, measuring freedom and freedom not, the possible, the very possibility of *the living of ones life*, such is the body that bestows and *seizes* its intimacy.

Bodies' innerness is an incessant volatility, a wavering and sliding desire. It is that which is *losing its death* and a death (yet) to come. It is by desire of body, Sartre writes, that "[t]he being which desires is consciousness *making itself body*."¹⁹ The "*making itself body*" is of a furrowing and gathering, but fugitive, and of a renegade *desire*.

1.1.2 Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence

The folding of innerness, as in sinking and flight, harbors not a *beginning* but an infinite circle of nonorigin. In Nietzschean thinking it is of "*eternal recurrence*" ("*ewige Wiederkehr*").²⁰ The eternal primordial,

19. Sartre, *Being and nothingness*, 389.

20. Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, 547, (1063), 1886-1887; Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht: Versuche Einer Umwertung Aller Werte*, 693, (1063).

an eclipsing of the *force of night* that is a tempestuous stillness and solitude of body, in violence and gratitude, a folding upon itself harboring that which harkens to and of itself. This harboring, intimates not of an escape or *flight from the body, or of the real*; but it is, in essence, *that which holds* the recurrent eternal, delineating an anchoring of the body, within *the law of (its) nature*. “The Law of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence*,”²¹ thinks Nietzsche. While equally, *at a secret distance from this law*, at a distance that revels in secrecy, (of) sacredness and Godlessness, “*Dionysian*” in posture. Ruthless and harboring sublime presencing, invisible and visible *no less*, the figure of the corpus in-itself of **interior figuration** dwells upon a Nietzschean *tragic and voluptuous sheltering of a (not yet) promised encircling of body*; that which is impermissible, perishable and secret, of an underhanded and underside manner, yet, too, of a furious and fertile nature, of a promising fecundity of a secret body, a type of toxicity and intoxication of innerness, an incessant *stillness of movement*. The again of the again of the again. Too, innerness is beholden to, and identically *Nature*. For Nietzsche, it is the “eternal recurrence” of an ever-descending

21. Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, 547, (1063), 1886-1887. “Der Satz vom Bestehen der Energie fordert die ewige Wiederkehr.” Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht: Versuche Einer Umwertung Aller Werte*, 693, (1063).

wave of a primordial horizon holding an ascending ocean, the eclipsing of an escalating turbulence of the Heavens of an *empty* Night; it is *this* or *that*, that is *folding upon the mind itself* as of an incessant *interiority* that is of flight and *no flight*, *a movement and repose*, *life giving and deadly*. Innerness is full of regeneration and murder, the secret lawlessness of intimacy that holds upon bodies' innerness, in repose and disappearance, in Dionysian identicalness, harboring "*amor fati*" (*love of fate*).²² It is an innerness of a secret amorousness, tenderness and trembling(not), an (un)trembling of *godlessness*, of No Gods or multifarious Gods, underhanded and blasphemous deities; the inner delineation of the corpus as an underhanded *freedom of bitter sovereignty and enslavement*.

The again of the again; Bodies' intimacy in folding the law of nature (finitude), that is of an *apostate nature*, inhabits that which Nietzsche writes "has never begun to become and never ceased from passing away – it maintains itself in both." And further still: "It lives on itself: its excrements are its food (*sie hat nie angefangen zu werden und nie aufgehoert zu vergehen – sie erhaelt sich in beidem... Sie lebt von sich*

22. Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, 536, (1041), *Summer-Fall 1888*.

selber: ihre Exkreme sind ihre Nahrung).”²³ At crosscurrents, *the body* that is innerness is perpetually and unstintingly in leave-taking and recurring. So, too, it is the body of an advent *intimating the bodies’ ravishing and Relinquishing* circulating upon the departure of an arrival that is awaited. The Nietzschean thought of the eternal recurrence forces a spinning cruelty upon the body that is of Law and *no* Law, a cannibalizing Law. It is as Nietzsche states of the body that feeds upon itself (“*Sie lebt von sich selber*”)²⁴ that *survives itself*, a desiring and unfolding of the very beauty and regurgitation of intimacies’ corporeality: its excrement, a body that desires and unfolds in a fickle avowal. Thus it is within the promise *of the sublime profundity of the ethereal* that Nietzsche states: “Everything becomes and recurs eternally (*Alles wird und kehrt ewig wieder*)²⁵ ...eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence...(ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zuruecklaufend, mit ungeheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr).”²⁶ Therein lingering is innerness’ *interior delineation*, as in a folding figuration, a corpus that is

23. Nietzsche, *Will To Power*, 547, (1066), *March-June 1888*; Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht*, 694, (1066).

24. Ibid., *Der Wille Zur Macht*, 694, (1066).

25. Ibid., *Will to Power*, 545, (1058), 1883-1888; Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht*, 690, (1058).

26. Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, 550, (1065), *November 1887- March 1888*; Nietzsche, *Der Wille Zur Macht*, 690, (1065).

identically *confiscated* and *hostage*, yet promising a recalcitrant profundity of Time *other*.

1.1.3 Hegel: *Reason's unReason of Reason*

Innerness is infamous and delirious *Nature* flaunting Reason's unreason. It delineates fugitive intuition and fathoms a furtive nature, encouraging Reason's unReason of Reason towards a profound interiority of Reason encouraging fugitive Reason. Innerness reeks of an *intimacy of habit*, and of an intimacy that destroys habit (*negation*), the journey being eternally the same and yet exquisitely different. Different in that the Self or the Other are questionably one and yet all Other(s). If we describe this innerness that is wholly private, wholly one, wholly individual and particular, we can be certain that the contradistinction or opposition resides in that which is both of the Other and of the Self, (general), (other)worldly and universal. In Hegelian thinking, that which is in "equality to itself," (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) and "Other-Being" (*Andersein*).²⁷ Bodies' intimacy, a body of intimacy, its inner folding can

27. Kojève, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 200.

reflect upon itself as itself and doubly become *other than itself*. Just as the body can at once intonate darkness and lightness, the sacred and the profane; it embattles itself as in a *lingering of a force of restlessness of* an embittered battle, a sliding and glistening, as in the gesturing of the corpus of a *snake*, the *lingering of* a haunting. It is as if *the body arises gifted* and camouflaged. A mesmerizing gift, yet narrowly a gift, as it can only *exist of itself* through an *eternal* struggle of unstable proportions that foresees, enables and engages the *lingering upon itself* (of body) *at the grace of (an)other, of the real, and of world*. The Hegelian *negative* delineates (harbors) a doubling or splitting (*Entzweiung*)²⁸ that infers “neither (pure)*Identity* (which is Being, *Sein*) nor (pure) *Negativity* (which is Nothingness, *Nichts*);”²⁹ a hovering of body that moves toward a turbulent *dialectic of an unfurled Totality* of Being.³⁰ A totality and a *Universality* that is in constant flux and at a furious stance – an ungraceful stance, a haunting exile.

Alexandre Kojève, quoting a passage from Hegel’s *Logic* reflects upon the

28. Kojève, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 202.

29. *Ibid.*, 201.

30. *Ibid.*, 202.

Hegelian concept of Negativity as follows: “In short,” he comments, “the being of negative or negating Being, dominated by the category of Negativity, consists in “not being what it is and being what it is not (*das nicht zu sein, was es ist, und das zu sein, was es nicht ist*).”³¹ It is as if bodies’ innerness were in a constant twisting of beingnot and unbeing. In our thinking, we dwell upon this notion as of a *lingering, a hovering, a floating, a haunting*, a taunting of bodies that insists, succumbs or ascends upon the restlessness of a *languishing negative*. Bodies’ innerness is at once *of* an unpresence and invisibility, the formidable deluge of a motive force (*producing motion*), dislocation and disruption. The body is of bodies’ *desiring the absolute negative*.

1.1.4 Aristotelian Thinking: Fire, Air, and Breathing

So, too, the intimacy of body equally and astoundingly is of the *Essence* of Fire, Air and of *breathing*, as Aristotle provocatively states, “for body is nourished by body, and the breath is of the nature of the body.”³²

31. Kojève, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 200.

32. Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, “On Breath,” 769.

A breathing, a breath, an exhaling and inhaling. Innerness as an inhaling and inwardness, as Heidegger states, an “insidedness” (*Inwendigkeit*)³³ that refers to an inhabiting, a habitation but vulgar in that the habitation is full of homenot, homelessness, of Exile, bodynot, of presence and a transvisabilitylessness; a homelessness of body harkening exile, a reclination of bodies auspiciousness.

Consciousness and self-consciousness, the fire within, “[a]ll these are” as Aristotle states simply and audaciously, “reducible to thought and desire.”³⁴ Equally, he pronounces “the soul” (that which we shall denote as a double or phantasm of *innerness*, and, too, of the Hegelian notion of *Spirit*, to be: “the source of movement, it is the end, it is the essence of the whole living body.”³⁵ Thus, too, it is death, the very essence of death, of the end, and of *nothingness*; “at any rate” Aristotle continues, “*when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays.*”³⁶ Delineated within

33. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 134.

34. A slightly different emphasis by Aristotle: “Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect, imagination, purpose, wish, and appetite. And all these are reducible to thought and desire.” Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, “On Breath,” 1090.

35. Ibid., “On the Soul,” 661.

36. Ibid., 655 (emphasis added).

the Aristotelian notion of the “Soul” is the ensnarement of the figuration of corporeality, that is of the body’s disintegration and decay, (its finitude), while, identically promising an exhalation and respiration, bearing the very source of its life and its death within its interior figuration, a flushing desire of body that manifests itself as **the figuration of an extreme horizon** that forces itself upon a sublimeNegation.

1.1.5 A Folding-Towards-Itself

Infer that which habituates the motion of intimacy, *a folding-towards-itself* of Being. This folding, and holding itself “in-itself,” is that which in pure violence and pure tenderness forces the body together, *caressing* the mind with body. Innerness “in-itself” other-worldly, at a distance from the law (of nature), plays the eternal coming and going and *ensnaring*, harboring darkness of *light*, reflection of burning and annihilation, the inhaling that makes the exhaling possible, a breath that rages the fire and blows it out. Yet, innerness in all its motioning and keeping of itself, in its erotic gesturing, as body, lives and dies and moves through bodies of energy, matter and physics. Innerness is a traveller that

motions within and without and beyond itself as it enacts a particular transcendence, a *travelling*, that is of an *eternal recurrent* of itself and other, a calling within, which we shall call ethereal, yet sensed, perhaps invisible, but *wholly corporeal*. Interiority and innerness thus manifests itself out of the Energy of Nature's pure "recurrence," just as it manifests itself, identically, as an ExceptionToNature – that is, *outside* of nature. It calls forth a melancholy solitude, an emptiness, an illustrious *Nothingness* of a fathoming *Silence*, profusely physical and excessively psychic. Innerness holds itself at no distance what-so-ever; as Sartre insists: "the body is what I immediately am."³⁷ Interiority is therein identically thinking as it is body at once Bbeing and of an instance holding *these* as its own, as its own-most it-self. We shall state in Heideggerian tongue that innerness is "almost as intimate as the unity of the body itself."³⁸ It is, in truth, the very '~~dis~~'unity of *the thought of the body*. It is thus, that without the very *intimacy* of *thought* the body falls into desolate silencing. Inner Being is thought, is thinking; it *is body*; it "*exists its body*."³⁹ Innerness is that which surrenders exteriority; *the very thought of the body is exteriorities contortion*.

37. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 325.

38. Safransky, *Martin Heidegger Between Good and Evil*, 199.

39. "It would be best to say, using 'exist' as a transitive verb – that consciousness *exists its body*." Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 329 (italics on "*exists its body*" as quoted in the dissertation my emphasis).

1.2 Exteriority, *However, Not as the Same*

1.2.1 *Ego Cogito and Res Corporea*

...if I were to cease thinking for a moment, I would cease to exist.⁴⁰

...for what is doubting if not thinking...⁴¹

An entangled substance of flight and arraignment, not one or the other, but, too, endlessly divisible⁴² *the thought of the body* profoundly sublimates the Cartesian fissure of soul and body⁴³ that is “*ego cogito*,” as of Spirit, and “*res corporea*,” as of “Nature.”⁴⁴ It entangles the Cartesian pronouncement, inverting, capsizing, infiltrating its fissure, yet,

40. Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Volume II, 413.

41. *Ibid.*, 515.

42. Here referencing Aristotle: “[A]nd a body is that which is every way divisible.” Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volume One, “On The Heavens,” 447.

43. This fissure is denoted in numerous passages wherein Descartes crafts the separation. For example, he writes: “And yet it is true that whatever it is within me that is doubting, it is not what I call my body.” Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Volume II, 414. And further: “...I exist and am not body...” (*ibid.*, 412); and “[the body] is simply an extended, non-thinking thing...” (*ibid.*, 54).

44. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 123.

too, remaining *as in a promise* of its infinite *pronouncement*. It is a *thinking* of bodybodynot. Heidegger in, *Being and Time*, referring to Descartes, writes of *res corporea*'s mobility – while recalling its figurability as in a reminiscing with itself, scattering and diffusion – as a dispersion and spreading of itself that mirrors the vestiges and expanse of the *world*:

Thus what makes up the Being of the *res corporea* [also referred to as the body of the world by Descartes and thus referenced by Heidegger] is the *extensio*: that which is *omnivodo divisible figurabile et mobile* (that which can change itself by being divided, shaped, or moved in any way), that which is *capax mutationum* – that which maintains itself (*remanet*) through these changes.⁴⁵

It is a body veiled in a chameleon-like-twisting and turning, “*divided*” in “*motion*,” and intricate in shaping, disguising itself as corporeality, as if it were the trunk of a tree, all the while, occupying, “*existing*” in itself as *the invisibility of the body itself*. *Res corporea* in mutability, while remaining the same (or in its recurrence) harkens back to the

45. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 125.

Hegelian notion of “*Sichselbstgleichheit*” and “*Andersein*” just as it tangles upon Sartre’s nihilation of body and body’s escape, a constant surpassing and *motive force*. Yet, as Sartre states, the corpus is never just *there*, it never just *is*, it is recurrently returning and past, a fleeting pronouncement of an expectation, that is silence and silent, Nothingness.

Heidegger writes of the Cartesian *res corporea* as a fastening, or a strapping of *motion, an alignment of the body as* “a mere change in location.” It is the corpus of a shifting, or shiftability, a repositioning and expandability, an extending or stretching of the body. Heidegger refers to this mutability of the corpus as follows:

If the motion is a property of the *res corporea*, and a property which is, then in order for it to be experiencable in its Being, it must be conceived in terms of the Being of this entity itself, in terms of *extensio*; this means that it must be conceived as mere change of location.⁴⁶

The bodies’ “maintaining [of] itself” is none other than of relative

46. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 124.

“constancy,”⁴⁷ a motive force of changeability and motion; it is of a *thinking skin*. A force that delineates *extension*, desire, a shifting and camouflaging; *res corporea* is none other than an utter shiftability, gifted in its mutability of intertwining Corporeality while flaunting the essence of both “*Spirit*” and “*Nature*.” And, further, it is in this instance that, in Heideggerian thinking, we can refer to “Being” in so wide a sense that its meaning embraces an “*infinite difference*.”⁴⁸ That is to say, that *res corporea* (the body) grasps at that which is (of) *Spirit* and (of) *Nature*; and that in effect, the “body” in the very act of clasping “Being” is **neither the one nor the other of difference**, for in its very essence and essential truth, the body is irresolutely *Thinking and unthinking the experience of Body*, and, so, too, *the experience of body is Thinking unthinking its difference*. The body in finitude and of the eternal, forces contradiction (that is, *difference*), *negativity*, yet soars. It is in its profuse ensnarement neither one nor the other, but of a lingering skin delineating profuse corpoReality.

47. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 124.

48. *Ibid.*, 125 (emphasis added).

The thinking *doubting body* is essentially linked and (not)linked as in the Kantian notion of freedom and freedom not, a reflection upon a doubling of body, object and will. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant demarcates the unfurling of this double and identical force of NatureNotNature as follows:

But if our critique is not in error in teaching that the object is to be taken in a *twofold sense*, namely as *appearance* and as *thing in itself*; if the deduction of the concept of understanding is valid, and *the principle of causality* therefore applies only to things taken in the former sense, namely, in so far as they are objects of experience – these same objects, taken in another sense, not being subject to the principle – then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far *not free*, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and is therefore *free*.⁴⁹

In this sense, the body is both of the law (of nature) and of its notable and unflinching destruction, that is, of its negation. A body harkening to a

49. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 28.

profound separateness, a distinction, of nature and not nature, or of *another Nature*, that in effect acts as its very linkage. In its separateness, it is at once profoundly *engaged* with and against its very own nature. It is a creature of incessant freedom. A presenced freedom alienated to its will, a subject of freedom's sovereignty that likewise invites freedom not. That is, it is beholden of bodies' consciousness, and self-consciousness, of sovereignty and enslavement. It is of world and of worldnot; it is worldlyother, exile, alienation, and homelessness. As in Sartrean thinking, the body is of a "*remaining there*" and "*being there*."⁵⁰ We denote, further, that it is identically of an [un] "*remaining there*" and a [(not)-or-(un)] "*being there*," as of an eternal flight delineating its privilege. This swarming divisibility is evident privilege – a spiraling, *rising* to Nature and Spirit, of *res cogito _____ ego corporea*.

1.2.2 Hegel's Unyielding Reality

Exteriority in Hegelian thinking is of an "unyielding reality" and "of

50. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 211.

being something external.”⁵¹ Equally, it is of an “alien reality already present and given,”⁵² of “ruin,” “dissolution” and “violence”⁵³ – a series of “raging elements.”⁵⁴ It is an unfriendly and unruly place that harkens of a fight, a struggle of warring and peace; a body of warring stance. Hegel states:

Nothing has a Spirit that is grounded within itself and indwells it, but each has its being in something outside of and alien to it. The equilibrium of the whole is not the unity which remains with itself, nor the contentment that comes from having returned into itself, but rests on the alienation of opposites.⁵⁵

The Hegelian world is of a world encountering Historicity, strife and negation. It is a world of work and of struggle, a world that insists on a profuse negative, a stretching towards a body of *the outside* that is of a

51. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 294, paragraph 484.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 295, paragraph 484.

55. Ibid., 295, paragraph 486.

questioned return and *exile*, a clasping of the distance that is its-self. The Hegelian body in the world is one that remains not its-self but harkens towards an outside; it is fraught, engulfed and smothered by the negative. It is of a body that rotates, endures, encircles, recurs, distances, but *not of the same*, and not of a listlessfull return, but rather of a prescient magnification, the returning of an *other* (the world), *cast out* and in banishment; it is of a body of an extravagant inheritance of freedom's crevassing complicity, echoing agitation, alienation and opposition. The Hegelian world is not of a homecoming to the same, but of a returning to and of *something other*, a returning toward an infinite exile of its possibilities. Too, it is of a turbulence harkening toward "pure intellectual insight."⁵⁶ A moving (away) as in a distancing from *Faith* that is religion, marking, in effect, a "hostility" towards *Faith* that in its very turn, or turning, "apprehends" and allows for the comprehension of Being itself.⁵⁷

In Hegelian thinking, this "*apprehension*" of Spirit then spirals toward itself enunciating "the unknowable *absolute Being*,"⁵⁸ and in turn

56. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 296, paragraph 486.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*

positing the *Deifying* of the *human* itself. Hegel thus denotes, that it is “[t]his revolution” that moves Spirit against *Faith*, and which spirals toward a *human god* that accosts and resurfaces – nay, fastens upon – and in effect, “gives birth to the very notion of *absolute freedom*.”⁵⁹ It is the notion of a responsibility that, in effect, destroys Faith’s culpability and fathoms human *freedom* to be of the human’s own determination.

The Hegelian thought of *absolute freedom* and/or “*pure intellectual insight*”⁶⁰ is furthermore delineated by the notion of a pureUniversality that is busied within the notion of *Difference*. The Hegelian usurpation of religion thus marks an *un-restraining* principle (an attenuation of Faith) within the *difference* that is universality and absolute freedom, wherein “both person and objectivity – [are] superseded”, thus conjuring these as a “*purely universal*” form;⁶¹ a conjuring of Universalities’ *greatest difference*, of an excessive dispossession demarcating freedom’s freedom (that is, of a motioning away and a nearing of itself as of *other*) and exterior to faith. Hegel writes:

Spirit is the *consciousness* of an objective real world freely existing on

59. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 296, paragraph 486.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., 295, paragraph 485.

its own account... On the one side, actual self-consciousness, through its externalization, passes over into the actual world, and the latter back into actual self-consciousness. On the other side, this same actuality – both person and objectivity – is superseded; they are purely universal.⁶²

The *movement towards the purely universal of an absolute other of itself*, in turn, enables the force of negation, a pushing of nothingness forward; the nothingness of “the outside” of the world, within the nothingness of “the outside” of the individual. A radical bending of an opposition, a violence that confronts the consciousness of the world and the consciousness turned self-consciousness of the individual. A move towards a radical outsideness, an alienation that is brought forth by the advent of the infinite play of *confrontation* and devouring, an excessive *coming and going* of the individual to the world and the world *returning* to the individual. This to and fro in its excessiveness denotes enmity, altercation and alienation, a pure estrangement. An absolute estrangement or alienation (a duplicitous excess) that is unevenly a reposing, a pure consciousness, a passing over and returning of self-consciousness, an *equilibrium*, a return and departure that “*rests on the alienation of*

62. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 295, paragraph 485.

opposites”⁶³ (that which we shall denote as harkening *Exile*). An outside that, likewise, Sartre refers to as “a sort of phantom of exteriority.”⁶⁴ Thus acknowledging Hegel’s insight that (1) the World, the “objective” and the “real world”, in effect, is no other than our *very own* “essential being”⁶⁵ and that (2) “the negative” is equivocally and resoundingly no other than “the self,”⁶⁶ marking the spirited belief in *man’s capacity of* stretching itself towards and *raging upon that which is truth’s complicity*.

1.2.3 Heidegger’s Illuminated and Encounterable

Exteriority, as in the notion of the possible real that is of *the intangible of the body of the world*, the outside, and the without of *the fortress* (i.e., Schopenhauer), *is in secret allegiance to the folding of the body itself*. Of *the world*, the body (and *in Cartesian doubt*), *in essence* encounters

63. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 295, paragraph 486.

64. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 212.

65. “...acknowledging the real world to be his [i.e., man’s] essential being.” See Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 223.

66. “...they did not grasp that the negative is the self” (ibid., 21).

existence as essential exteriority, or so gestures Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Levinas, too, writes of the Cartesian notion of exteriority as of the *intimately related consciousness* that saunters toward *the real*, he notes: “[i]t is for this reason that Descartes will say that the soul might be the origin of the ideas that relate to exterior things, *and thus account for the real*.”⁶⁷ The irresolute notion of a *thinking Being* that links the world, and meanders towards that which is the real.

That is to say, that the Thinking body, as of a looming desire, exhilarates in fathoming the world. Thinking (*as in desire*), then, manifests the linking of the world to the body, as it desires (or manufactures) the *thinking of the real* of an *a priori* presented World. Heidegger accentuates “Being-in” the world – that is, of *a thinking of the real and* of exteriority – as that which may be “*encounterable*” (*begegnen*);⁶⁸ the “*encounterable*” (and so, too, we may denote, as of the (non)*encounterable*) of existence, of that which is illuminated or of illumination [“*erleuchtet*”]

67. Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 49 (emphasis added).

68. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 81.

69. *Ibid.*, 171.

(*erleuchtung*)⁶⁹ and of being “lit up”.⁷⁰ Heidegger writes:

Has Dasein itself, in the range of its concerned absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, *along with* those entities themselves?⁷¹

In Heideggerian thinking, the world *is of many*, an enormity of finite and eternal *Nature*, a teeming of forces of entities “*ready to hand*” that in themselves *radiate* a dynamic *force of luminescence*, an *exalted whirling of energy* of multiplicative and dynamic forces that *irradiate* each other. And within this world that is of the essence of the world’s entities, lingers *of the familiar* to Being. Heidegger writes: “The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.”⁷² And yet the “*encounterable*” is equally

70. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 102.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*, 105.

desire and finitude; it is a “*worldness*,” that is, in this instance, the world “*announcing itself*“ as of a *familiarity* while in an underhanded manner *harkening forever to the possibility of familiaritylessness*. An encountering of the encounter; a means wherein the body holds and bears desire as the delineation of the existence of body; *a body of the exterior, familiar and unfamiliar*; a body that handles itself and the world, all the things that fashion the world. The thought of the body engulfs *what is out there* or what is *in there, in the world*; a Being that encounters of world (that is body). Heidegger notes: “[T]o Dasein, Being in the world is **something that belongs essentially**;⁷³ its essentiality is a lingering presence an existence *to* body (of a finite and nonfinitebody) so, too, of a passing exterior itself, the familiarless, the outside of outsidedness, an Expulsion. For Being-in-the-world there exists a recurrent tendency of flight, the essence of a body that is a fugitive intimation, at once illuminated and reveling in utter concealment.

Heidegger delineates the notion of “*Being-in*” the world as a non-corporeal thing a force, or non-entity, an invisible that we shall delineate as the *invisibleofbody*. While, in turn, the *invisibleofbody* may

73. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33.

essentially twist the very notion of that which is of “Nature” and that which is “Spirit,” thereby relegating the invisible of body as a *spirit of nature* or *nature of spirit* that is neither one or the other or that is itself and other’s other and itself, or not itself. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger differentiates *the invisible of the body from the corpus itself*, fathoming it as a state of Dasein’s essential Being that effectively **deflects** of the presence of physicality.

Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an *existentiale*. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) ‘in’ an entity which is present at hand. Nor does the term “Being-in” mean a spatial ‘in-one-another-ness’ of things present-at-hand, any more than the word ‘in’ primordially signifies a spatial relationship of more than the word ‘in’ primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind. ‘In’ is derived from “innan”—“to reside”, “*habitare*”, “to dwell” [sich aufhalten]... “*Being-in*” is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has *Being-in-the-world* as its essential state.”⁷⁴

74. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 79-80.

Yet the *invisibleofbody* that resides upon the Being *of body* (that is world), may, in effect, negotiate and dilute the very notion of what could be considered to be bodynotbody, the invisible of body, as *Being's delineation of corporeality*, in a lingering, hovering, or languishing of body; a “*Being-in*” *corpus*. A Being of Body, “dwelling” “inhabiting” and “in residence,” yet moving towards notdwelling, nonhabitation, and non-residence. A thinking of “Being-in” body (in-the-world) as an entanglement, an ensnarement of *a passion of body*, a desired and dissenting that *in its nature* and *of its nature* motions toward intangibility, or invisibility, yet **bodyholding**, a ‘non,’ ‘un’ and ‘in’ body as in a *holding of the body in or at a distance to itself and other*, as in the distance to the itself of bodies’ worldly other.

In Heideggerian thinking, essential existence furthermore calls forth a “clearing” (*and a clearing not or ~~not~~clearing*) in-itself, an illumination (harkening to *darkness*) of being “there” in-the-world. In this sense, Dasein is of an excessive freedom, a lighting up of itself and clearing the way. It is of itself in-itself of *freedom*. This freedom is “disclosedness,” a being-in-the world of “disclosedness.” A being that harkens to the “encounterable” of world. A body of “encounterableness,” of

an encounterability, actionability, negation and Historicity; it is the body of a meeting, a visitation, a gathering, a renunciation and enunciation.

Heidegger notes:

When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the *lumen naturale* in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that *is* in such a way as to be its “there”. To say that it is ‘illuminated’ [“erleuchtet”] means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing...

...*Dasein is its disclosedness.*⁷⁵

This illumination may be of body. A body that falters and twists upon the *invisibleofbody*. It is of a **body** and of an **unbody**. It is such that the body may be its own clearing that is its (own) freedom, its “there.” A twisting itself that demarcates the visibility of the unfounded uncorporeal. And within its disclosedness and its illumination, there lingers in body its opposite, a darkness of the unlighted of Night, a languishing and shimmering otherness, so, too, bodies’ essential Negative or

75. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 171.

veiling. A Negative that complicates, makes evident and frees the bodies' illuminated darkness, fostering a camouflaging of freedom's *unfreedom* and unfreedom's *freedom*; the darkness of illumination and illuminations' *Darkness*.

2. The Figure of (In)Finite History: *The Reason that is Freedom*

2.1 The Hegelian Philosophy of History

2.1.1 Reason's Infinite Power, Material and Form

The only thought which philosophy brings with it, in regard to history, is the simple thought of Reason – the thought that Reason rules the world, and that world history has therefore been rational in its course. This conviction and insight is a *presupposition* in regard to history as such, although it is not a presupposition in philosophy itself.

In philosophy, speculative reflection has shown that Reason is the *substance* as well as the *infinite power*; that Reason is for itself the *infinite material* of all natural and spiritual life, as well as the *infinite form*, and that its actualization of itself is its content.⁷⁶

The Hegelian notion of Reason's *substance, infinite power, material and form*, itself provokes the audacious Reasoning of an enduring trajectory that is of Human Historicity manifesting the quest for its *freedom*.⁷⁷

76. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 12 (Hackett edition).

77. Additionally, Hegel will closely align the concept of freedom within the concept of law, civil society and the state, designating a reserved freedom that ensues precisely of the *human*, due to freedom's lawful delimitations. Rudolf J. Siebert therein denotes that, in Hegelian thinking, "Freedom is the fundamental law of man," for it is "[t]he law of freedom," that in turn validates, makes possible, the very society and the history that man produces. See Siebert, "The Humanistic Dimension," *Hegel's Philosophy of History: Theological, Humanistic, and Scientific Elements*, 55.

For Hegel, human freedom is fundamentally linked to the notion of *humanhistory*, and, Reason itself, demarcating this History, is of a *substance* that does not falter *per chance*; in effect, circumventing the exterior of chance, Reason inhabits the notion of a timelessness and limitlessness that is absolutely True. It is the figuration of the (in)finite *Giving of History*; an excess of truth that ceaselessly battles and Rages upon that which is “unhistorical history,”⁷⁸ that is, of an “unhistorical history” which regresses or devours human freedom and in turn annihilates *humanhistory*.

The Hegelian notion of Reason thus demarcates the entangling of Being within Spirit and forthwith with History, of *aTime* and, too, of an endlessTime (Reasoned Truth). It is of the notion that the human (Spirit) *Gives History* of itself to itself; and within this notion of reasoned*history*, there dwells the Notion of the grasping of a figure, Spirit, or *infinite power*, that is no other than human *freedom*, a pure negation, a trajectory that is of a Reasoned*violence* that befalls and sustains the figure of the body of *totalHistory*. Hence, Kristeva suggests that, in Hegelian thought, the “free subject” is intimately related to the force of Negativity,

78. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 96 (Hackett edition).

as if the subject were attached or locked within Negativity itself, a Negativity bearing freedom or the “free subject itself.”

She writes:

While remaining an intra-speculative notion, Hegelian negativity bursts, as it were, from within its conceptual unity since it links [*enchaine*] – unleashes [*dechaine*] – the “real” and the “conceptual,” the objective and the subjective, and, if one wished to find its representation, it culminates in the ethical order: although it is *objectivity* itself, negativity is at the same time and for that very reason the “free subject.”⁷⁹

Moreover, the Negativity that is of the subject, fosters a *sublimation* which manifestly accentuates the subject’s ethical stance, folding upon its own contradictions, unmaking its very freedom that is “for itself,” and motioning the *free*subject towards an “ethical life” of and for the community, as in a suspension or sublimation that calls forth within the subject the Negative of the freedom that is “nothingness” as it strikes upon its innermost core and therein becomes an affirmation.⁸⁰ This

79. Kristeva, “Negativity: Rejection,” *Revolution in Poetic Language* (1974), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 328.

80. *Ibid.*

“suffusion by Negativity – opened onto and by objectivity, [is] mobile, nonsubjected, [and] free” writes Kristeva.⁸¹ Negativity, then, facilitates the process within which the *human* forces itself upon the activity that foments History, or in Kristeva’s description (of dialectical materialism), of the “*human activity*” which makes possible “revolutionary activity;” a culmination of “*social and natural laws*” a living objective.⁸²

81. Kristeva, “Negativity: Rejection,” *Revolution in Poetic Language* (1974), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 328.

82. Ibid. Additionally, in “The International of Decent Feelings,” written in 1946, Althusser aligns the Hegelian notion of truth and freedom within yet another poignant Marxist interpretation, when he writes: “For the man who is not a Christian, and for the Christian who does not usurp God’s place, the human fatherland is not the proletariat of the human condition, it is the proletariat *tout court*, leading the whole of humanity towards its emancipation. This proletariat has a real content..... For us, brotherhood is no longer to be found in fear of words; it can only be found in truth. See Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel: Louis Althusser Early Writings*, 27. In Althusser’s thinking, then, freedom is the truth of the emancipation of the proletariat and the truth of the emancipation is within the true content that is itself within *human freedom*, in particular, as it manifests itself in the class struggle. Interestingly, Althusser, speaking of the conclusion of the war in 1945, speaks of the freedom that is peace that is “initially a void, and dizziness in the face of this void” (ibid., 29). For the freedom that is peace and the void that is of the unfeeding of war *that is* peace, peace regains the freedom of a void that is, in Althusser’s thinking, freedom’s “*terra incognita*” (ibid). Moreover, upon this void, there remains the freedom of those who died to annihilate freedom, and of the others who died to keep (a hold of) freedom. In a biting critique of ambivalent contemporary French intellectual reactions at the end of the war, Althusser writes: “One truly wonders whether words and deeds still mean something – whether, in the eyes of men, *the act of killing to enslave and killing to set free is the same act, whether man is ultimately defined not by his reasons for living and dying, which are what makes him a man, but by the life and death that make him a dog*” (ibid).

In Hegelian thinking, Reason in and of itself *is*; it manifests Nature and that which *Negates* Nature, that is, *Human* History engendered by the figure of the *human*, transforms, abandons, even invents *an-other* Nature. If, in accordance with the Hegelian notion, Reason simply *is*, then, too, it necessitates and manifests of Reality, the Reality of Nature and identically the Reality of world history. Reason essentially bespeaks *Reality*, the Reality that is its Truth. Marcuse, too, considers the Hegelian notion of Reason to be intimately aligned with the notion of *the human* and Freedom, which in turn enables the provocation of *human action* that is history. Referring to Hegel, he writes, “ [in] Reason [which] presupposes freedom...the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth” motions towards the very ability of the shaping of reality within realities’ “potentialities” and thus, accordingly, the human in turn becomes subject.⁸³

In the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, Hegel notes: “Thus Reason is the *substance* [of our historic world] in the sense that it is that whereby and wherein all reality has its being and subsistence.”⁸⁴ And

83. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 9.

84. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 12 (Hackett edition).

further, “Reason is the *infinite content*, the very stuff of all essence and truth, which it gives to its own *activity* to be worked up.”⁸⁵ Thus, Reason, in Hegelian thinking, bespeaks of a Truth and *infinite power* that demarcates all(of)Nature, Spirit and *human* History. It inhabits Time in the very finitude of the human, whilst engendering immortality in the infinite Time of an eternal and reasoned Truth. Hegel thus infuses Reason with an absolute Truth that is of a delirious *vision*, a *radical and challenging vision* that, too, necessitates an opening in our thinking of the very notion of that which we may consider (human) Reason to be.⁸⁶

85. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 12 (Hackett edition).

86. In this light, Merleau-Ponty states: “All the great philosophical ideas of the past century – the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche, phenomenology, German existentialism, and psychoanalysis – had their beginnings in Hegel; it was he who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason which remains the task of this century.” See Merleau-Ponty, “Hegel’s Existentialism,” *Sense and Nonsense* (1948), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 127. Merleau-Ponty thus renders a highly complimentary view of Hegel. He goes on to state: “There would be no paradox involved in saying that interpreting Hegel means taking a stand on all the philosophical, political, and religious problems of our century” (ibid., 127-128). Merleau-Ponty thus likens Hegelian metaphysics to a metaphysics that is far removed from “contemplative contact,” situating itself in the very motion of the *human*, by facing fundamental structures that bespeak the *life that is human*, be it moral, ethical, religious, aesthetic or political. Moreover, it is a philosophy that situates the *human* at the center of a Spiritual and political struggle that accentuates itself within a process which stresses the responsibility of the *human* in creating and attaining *humanfreedom* through the figuration of full consciousness. Merleau-Ponty therein stresses that, far from ruminating upon pure abstractions, the Hegelian philosophy, effectively tests the “trial[s] of life” that pertain to the most intimate experience of the *human* (ibid., 129).

For Hegel, it is a truth Reasoned through the very thinking of philosophy; the thinking of thought; the very “thinking of thinking.”⁸⁷ Hegel refers to this notion as follows: “Reason is Thought, quite freely determining itself.”⁸⁸ This *thought which determines itself freely*, is none other than the figuration of the thinking of the *human*. That is, it is none other than of the extraordinary notion that Reason is of Freedom’s truth. Thus Hegel notes that “*Man is an end in himself only by virtue of that divine principle within him which we have all along referred to as reason (or, in so far as it is internally active and self-determining, as freedom...)*”⁸⁹ Hegel herein alters our notion of the divine principle, by manifesting the divine as the Idea itself, which in the Hegelian dialectic is the very essence of Reason itself; a dialectic that grasps upon History, Reason and Freedom as purely hostile forces that distinctively manifest themselves as of the *human*. And it is within this very fight, that we shall name History, that a profound shifting of the powers of *Human* subservience to a divine or omnipotent force falls asunder. For in proposing that the freedom

87. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 72 (Hackett edition).

88. *Ibid.*, 16.

89. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 90 (Cambridge edition).

of the *human*(bodies) is not subject to chance, but that the *human*(bodies) is free to determine that which is *reasoned*History, Hegel elegantly raises the Specter of *Human* self-determination.⁹⁰

2.1.2 The Political Body: The State

The Hegelian notion of the philosophy of history establishes the birth of the political body, a body (bodies) that creates itself within the formation of a State. Gauthier thus describes the assumption of the *political body*, in the light of the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as of a body that is manifestly encircled by the figuration of the political, pronouncing the political itself as a force that both accentuates and stresses “the right of the agent to find his interests and desires embodied by the society,” that is, “(for the agent to be ‘self actualized’),” as it is of

90. Commenting on the advent of Hegelian philosophy and the divine that is *human*consciousness, Merleau-Ponty notes: “Human existence, which had been risk and guilt [prior to Hegel], becomes history through him, and mankind’s successive decisions can be concentrated in one single act by which consciousness is made whole, and God becomes man or, if you prefer, man becomes God.” See Merleau-Ponty, “Hegel’s Existentialism,” *Sense and Nonsense* (1948), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 132.

the figuration of a political force, that can instill “radical change” within *the humanpoliticalbody* of knowledge, reason and its institutions, in alignment with its social praxis.⁹¹

Thus when Hegel refers to the notion of human freedom, he is speaking of a freedom created within the *State*, of *Reason*, *Right* and in deference to the *Law*. The Hegelian notion of freedom, ethics and supreme liberty is engendered within a political praxis and therefore entails a community and the creation of *institutions* that engage in safeguarding the free citizen, nation and state. Hegel expounds upon this notion of the State as follows:

*Every state is an **end in itself**, – **external self-preservation**; – its **internal development and evolution** follow a necessary **progression** whereby the rational, i.e. **justice** and the **consolidation of freedom**, gradually emerges. [It is a] system of institutions, a) as a **system** the **constitution**, β) its content likewise, through which the true interests of the state become **conscious** and **fight their way** to reality. In every*

91. Gauthier, *Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism: Justice, Recognition, and the Feminine*, xiv.

*advance which the objects makes, [there is] not only an external coherence and necessary continuity; there is also a necessity at work within the **object itself**, within the **concept**. This [is] the true substance of history.*⁹²

It is within the very object of Reasoned History that there emerges of itself and within itself the progression and development of the State which in turn provokes the working through of a system of justice that *grasps* at freedom; Reason's object is thus its concept; the ethics of its substance. Within Reason *and* History there exists the absolute necessity of gripping Reality at its core. This gripping of Reality manifests itself in the figure of a historical *battle*, a violent navigation that engenders the creation and preservation of the freedom of the Nation, State, and individual citizen(*bodie*). Hegel writes:

Only in the state does man have a rational existence...only as such does he possess consciousness and exist in an ethical world, within the legal and ethical life of the state. For the truth is the unity of the universal and the subjective will, and the universal

92. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 19-20 (Cambridge edition).

is present within the state, in its laws and in its universal and rational properties.⁹³

Human history is thus encumbered by Reason; it is laden with the creation and safeguarding of its *ultimate freedom* that is *human freedom*, an ethics of *freedom*. Marcuse, in pointing to Hegel's *Logic*, denotes "[t]he veritable being...is the universal, which is in itself individual and contains the particular in itself."⁹⁴ This universal or "veritable being," which in the *Logic* is called the Notion, within *The Philosophy of Right* turns to the State as its representative figure, enabling the Spirit of reason and freedom to concretize itself in its "rational actuality," thus safeguarding the individual and the universal as a unified right. In the State, then, according to Hegel, "everything depends on the union of universality and particularity" and their negation, wherein, for instance, the apparent curtailing of individual "abstract freedom" in reality facilitates the manifestation of the individual's "substantial freedom."⁹⁵ The State, therein, facilitates the (rule of) Law as it concerns the "universal person," in contrast to the "concrete

93. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 94 (Cambridge edition).

94. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 203.

95. *Ibid.*

Individual,” thereby embodying freedom “precisely in so far as it is the universal.”⁹⁶ In Hegelian thinking, the State precisely represents the “universality of the law” within civil society, wherein “the universal, ‘appears as a means’” of the law as it *embodies* “concrete freedom.”⁹⁷

Thus Hegel writes: “‘The essence of the modern state is the union of the universal with the full freedom of the particular, and with the welfare of individuals.’”⁹⁸

Moreover, Hegel demarcates that which is History and identically Freedom to be the supposition of the *human* and the *human* alone. Neither the horizon that is Nature, nor animal partake or give History to themselves; History is a purely human construct.⁹⁹ It entails a process of

96. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 207. Thus Hegel states: “‘Man has his value in his being man, not in his being a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, or Italian’” (Ibid.).

97. Ibid., 203.

98. Ibid., 216.

99. Lukacs explains that it is the direct result of negating that which is *immediate* or *natural* which effectively enables the *humanpoliticalbody* to construct “a system of institutions.” See Lukacs, “‘Entaeusserung’ (‘Externalization’) as the Central Philosophical Concept of *The Phenomenology of Mind*,” *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics* (1984), in *Hegel And Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 96. Describing Hegel’s increasing philosophical experimentation, Lukacs writes, “What emerged more and more clearly” in Hegel’s writings, following the Jena period, “was that the primal immediacy, the natural, has to be overcome and is overcome in the social praxis of man” (Ibid). Lukacs thus notes that the *humanlabour* of “social praxis,” in Hegelian thinking, not only yields the development of lawful institutions, but identically brings forward the transformation of the subject itself by sublimating “his original immediacy” and “alienating the subject from itself” (ibid., 96). Lukacs thus delineates, in Hegel, a philosophy espousing the very articulation that is “freedom and praxis” (ibid., 98).

transformation, of negation, a Fight that does not pertain to organic nature. HumanHistory engages in a struggle against Nature by engendering its final goal that is world history in the manifestation of an “ethical freedom” within the jurisdiction of the State.¹⁰⁰ Delineating the demarcation of Spirit by fully realizing the universal consciousness within a substantive self-consciousness, the substance of the Hegelian notion of Spirit is the very process of Historical development. Hegel notes: “The final goal of the world, we said, is Spirit’s consciousness of its freedom, and hence also the actualization of that freedom.”¹⁰¹

100. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 26 (Hackett edition). For a more critical perspective concerning the Hegelian delineation of the state, we turn to Adorno whose writings contemplate the emergence of state corruption and ethical denouement. Referring to the entrenched bureaucracies of communism, Adorno writes, “The institution of a centralized state party makes a mockery of all past thinking about men’s relation to the state.” See Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 49.

101. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 22 (Hackett edition). Concerning the Hegelian notion of Spirit and the actualization of its freedom, Marx writes: “The emancipation of Germany will be an emancipation of man. Philosophy is the head of this emancipation and the proletariat is its heart. Philosophy can be realized by the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of philosophy.” See Marx, “The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 59. At the same time, Marx is overtly critical of Hegelian idealism. In an essay entitled, “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic,” wherein Marx refers to a textual analysis of Hegel by Feuerbach, Marx clearly insinuates that the Hegelian notion of the “infinite,” in effect, demarcates the re-establishment of philosophy as “religion and theology” (ibid., 198). Marx herein criticizes Hegel’s insistence upon motioning philosophy towards the encirclement of human knowledge, consciousness and self-consciousness, absolute knowledge and a “dialectic of pure thought,” in contradistinction to Marx’s discovery of dialectical materialism which situates itself forcefully in concrete actuality (ibid., 202). Still, Marx commends Hegel’s discovery of “the dialectic of negativity,” the importance of alienation, man’s “self-creation,” and his transformation and sublation. And, more profoundly, Marx salutes Hegel’s analysis of the “nature of labour,” and the understanding of “objective man... as the result of his own labour;” a “labour” in Marx’s Hegelian delineation that is none other than the “outcome” which materializes humanHistory (ibid.).

The Hegelian notion of History manifests of a profound Responsibility. It is of a Responsibility that is solely and profoundly human and replete with hindrance and unbearable opposition. In reality, world history signifies the very battle that clutches, nay, grasps at the *possibility* of that which is the freedom of the *human*.

2.1.3 Reason and Reality in History: aTemporality in *excessive* Time

World history only shows us how the World Spirit comes gradually to the consciousness of truth and the willing of it. This consciousness and will dawns in the Spirit; Spirit finds its main points, and in the end it arrives at full consciousness.¹⁰²

Hegel considers History to be the domain of the (*human*)Spirit, of a Spirit that engenders in the *human* the revelation of Thought, the act of thinking, consciousness and self-consciousness; navigating of a Time that is of human finitude and partaking of a Spirit that thrusts itself upon the notion of an eternalTime, that is of the Reason of Truth and its

¹⁰². Hegel *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 56 (Hackett edition).

Freedom.

It is crucial to note that, in Hegelian thinking, Time and the *refusal* of Time are of a marked reality within ReasonedHistory. The *refusal* of Time is the prodigy of the Spirit, a Spirit that dwells upon the “Idea” of freedom and world history which pertains to noTime, an atemporality of Time(not). World Spirit and world history form the revelation of a clasping of the “natural universe” and the “spiritual world” as Reality, and thus gather upon the ideality of Reason and Spirit’s eternity. Hegel writes:

Just as Reason is its own presupposition and absolute goal, so it is the activation of that goal in world history – bringing it forth from the inner source to external manifestation, not only in the natural universe but also in the spiritual. **That this Idea is the True, the Eternal, simply the Power – that it reveals itself in the world, and nothing else is revealed in the world but Idea itself**, its glory and majesty – this, as we said, is what has been shown in philosophy, and it is here presupposed as already proven.¹⁰³

103. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 12-13 (Hackett edition); (emphasis added).

That is to say, in Hegelian thinking, the “World Spirit” remains of a Spirit that is “the Spirit whose nature is indeed always one and the same, but which reveals this one nature in the world’s reality.”¹⁰⁴

The Spirit accordingly is of an aTemporality that transgresses the finitude of Time (that is *the human* that is History) in that it is in and of itself the object of its Truth. Adorno thus comments: “As [Hegel’s] version of dialectics extends to time itself, time is ontologized, turned from a subjective form into a structure of being as such, itself, eternal.”¹⁰⁵ Thus within the Hegelian notion of History, there exists a constant vacillation between finitude, that is, the finitude of the *human*, and *the human giving itself history*, that is of the notion of an infinite Truth, or, for that matter, a *finite* Truth that eternally hovers upon the Spirit of Reason; it is of Spirit determining its own freedom. Hegel continues: “Spirit knows itself: it is the judging of its own nature, and at the same time it is the activity of coming to itself, of producing itself, making itself actually what it is in its potentially.”¹⁰⁶ It is human historicity that in effect challenges, grips

104. Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 13 (Hackett edition) (emphasis added).

105. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 331.

106. Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 20-21 (Hackett edition).

its own object of freedom, History, and entails the clasping of the eternal Spirit, Reason and Truth, to manifest itself as the potentiality that provokes an upsurge of *human*consciousness and self-consciousness. This provocation is marked by history in the clasping of the Spirit *within* the *human* itself engendering its historicity.

It is within this historicity, then, that Althusser remarks: "...the road to man's reconciliation with his destiny is essentially that of the appropriation of the products of his labour, of what he creates in general, and of history as his creation."¹⁰⁷ The appropriation of labour and its products, by the *human*, and the *creation of history*, that is, the *making thatishumanlabour*, that is, its emancipation, then, forms the very notion of the force that is of the truth and freedom of the *human*; a reconciliation that furthers the alignment of truth and reality, that manifests, in Hegelian thinking, the emancipation of *humanknowledge* (total and absolute). Yet, as in a turning, in Althusser's thinking, this emancipation is fundamentally linked to the proletarian struggle that is *liberating knowledge in the liberation of the production and the products of human*

107. Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings Louis Althusser*, 31.

labour, as it grasps and acknowledges the *human* action in the making of history. For Althusser, the emancipation of knowledge is fundamentally funneled through political and economic emancipation as witnessed in the proletarian struggle by the proletariat. Historicity, then, effectively manifests itself as (a) void, the void that is itself of the “*human* condition” [emphasis added on “*human*”] that ends the very thought that is of its “destiny.” Thus Althusser comments, “We look for the advent of the human condition and the end of destiny...”¹⁰⁸ This void (the human), then, that is *fracture itself*, forces the dialectic that is history. In agreement with Hegel, Althusser thus considers the very possibility of History that is the very *giving* that is History, to catapult the spirit of *human freedom* in the development of consciousness to its end (i.e., freedom). In his 1947 thesis, “On the Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel,” Althusser further amplifies the argument for History, in his first chapter, “Origins of the Concept,” as he develops the notion that Hegelian philosophy not only attempts to grasp hold of reality as a totalizing force, but that it itself becomes “the act by which truth is fulfilled or accomplished, *sich vollzieht*, achieves plenitude.”¹⁰⁹

108. Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings Louis Althusser*, 31.

109. *Ibid.*, 41.

That is to say, not only does Hegelian philosophy act as an enfolding sieve for truth and its Spirit, but it fundamentally reveals the “event,” as it *becomes* “the event itself;” a formidable if not contradictory quality, which Althusser denotes as its most potent and manifest ambiguity.¹¹⁰

In a fascinating bending and twisting of the essence of the *eternal*, it is the Spirit dwelling within the finitude of the human, of a particularTime, and *inTime*, that in effect furthers the undertaking of the working out of the project of history that is freedom. The project of *freedom*, which is of its Substance the historical fight, is hence solely possible within the finitude of the *time* of the *human*. It is thus that the *human* within its finitude and temporality, its very beginning and end, is so driven to engage the historical force that itself marks the very substance of the *eternal*. The *human* thus clutching the force of Spirit and taking *eternality* hostage imprisons eternality within its temporality, an act that in turn effectively enables the essence and transformation of the Truth of its Reality. The eternal *Idea* of Freedom, Reason and Reality accordingly requires a *distortion* of Time and of aTemporality in order to come to its

110. Althusser, *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings* Louis Althusser, 41.

fruition. This distortion of the eternal within finitude (that is, of an eternal finitude), is that which *rouses* and inflames History, for, in essence, it is the *Time of the human in the World* that enables the *human* to *give of itself* human History; for no eternality, truth, reason or freedom, the very working of time, the very freedom of time, can be *worked through* without the finitude of the *human*. The *working through of the finitude of freedom*, that is the *human* itself, is furthermore of an excess that incessantly delineates a repetition; generation upon generation that in its turn incites the explicit struggle that Hegel enunciates as the “application of the principle of freedom to worldly reality” and, additionally, “the dissemination of this principle so that it permeates the worldly situation,” this is the Spirit that Hegel delineates as “the long process that makes up history itself.”¹¹¹ The *making of history* itself is the *giving of history itself*; it is the giving of time itself that is delineated in the very finitude of the running out of time. It is within the essence of the finitude and eternality of *Human* freedom that History permeates and escapes itself. Perhaps History demarcates the *escaping* of noTime and allTime; and yet, *it may be that allTime* is a mere side effect of History; a *transparent* effect that permeates History and disappears in History.

111. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 21 (Hackett edition).

For it may be that History is none other than the History of the *giving and escaping of the human*.

2.1.4 The Passion of the Temporal Particular

It is such that History entails a (dialectic) collision between the eternal and the temporal, the mind and the body, Nature and Spirit, the universal and the particular, in order to make itself History. This collision is of the transfiguration of the Historical *human*consciousness. It is a collision that claws at the noTimeofTruth that spills into the temporality of the *human body*; the Truth of the human body; the body that *clutches History between its teeth and holds History hostage*. It is the force of *Reason*, of TimeandNotime, the very Reason of a force that risks the force of (an) infinite Thought; the (in)finite thought of *history*, claspings at the collision of *human*consciousness and self-consciousness. For within the *time of the human in the world* and *the Spirit of the human in the world*, it is the *human*, individual consciousness and self-consciousness of body that *desires* the universal and the particular. It is of a desire that engenders the very *possibility of the birth of its History*. In other words, it is the *universal* and the *particular* and *individual* body (the human body, the individual citizen or citizen to be, nation and State) that is at the very

collision of the Spirit of History. If we consider the human body (nation and state) to be at the center of the collision that is History, wherein finitude and the eternal, Nature and *NotNature* **fasten** upon one another, we can further provoke the alignment of the body that holds itself double and identically *other*; considering the *human* (body) to be at the central axis of the collision of History and taking this notion one step further to enunciate *the human body to be the collision that is History itself*; this is to speak of the figure of inFiniteHistory itself.

The figure that is (the corpus) *the bodies' body* of inFiniteHistory, moreover, holds the force that entangles and ensnares *History* within the *desire of reason that is of the passion of reason*. Hegel states: “[W]e must assert as a general proposition that *nothing great* has been accomplished in the world *without passion*.”¹¹² In Hegelian thinking, *humanPassion* aligns itself with Reason in order to build the fundamental force that is History. Marx, too, equates passion with the suffering (or experience) of the *human*, when he writes: “Man as an objective sentient being is a *suffering* being, and since he feels his suffering, a *passionate* being. Passion is man’s faculties to attain their object.”¹¹³ Later in

112. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 26 (Hackett edition).

113. Marx, *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 208.

the text, Marx indicates that it is History that delineates the origin of the *human*; History delineating a conscious process of *Human* “self-transcendence.”¹¹⁴

Moreover, the passion of the figure of inFiniteHistory, in Hegelian thinking, is of a purely human excess that manifests itself as the passion of the *humanwill*; a passion of the individual and particular *will* provoking an upsurge and fastening upon the universal *Idea* of World History and Spirit. Hegel considers this provocation as follows: “There are two elements that enter our topic: the first is the Idea, the other is human passion; the first is the warp, the other the woof in the great tapestry of world history that is spread before us. *The concrete meeting point and union of the two is in ethical freedom in the state.*”¹¹⁵ In Hegelian thinking, it is precisely the striking *encounter* of the antithesis that calls forth the commencement of an ethical stance wrought with the passion of the *human* will and the Idea that is Reason, Truth, and Spirit, entangled in themselves, and of a force that ensnares the duality or doubleness of the

114. Marx, *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, 208.

115. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 26 (Hackett edition) (emphasis added).

creation of an *ethical life*. The duality or doubleness which demarcates the encounter of the eternal Idea and the finitude of passion in themselves hold the antithesis of the universal and the particular, the very trajectory of the Spirit that carries with it the actualization and creation of an ethical freedom. We can further demarcate the “Idea” as the eternal of Truth (the Universal) and human *desire*, the desire or the passion that clasps and fastens onto the “Idea” of truth, *as the finitude that inhabits the figure of the human corpus*. A trajectory that, in essence, demarcates the running (*out*) of time to timelessness, or to alltime. For it is solely in the *running of Time* and the running out of time, in finitude, that the human may grasp the figure of inFiniteHistory.

The figure of inFiniteHistory and Historicity is none other than the figure of the *human* breathing the Spirit and desire of the *human* that is *body*; a desire that is body that marks the collision between its freedom and enslavement, law and no law (a maligned ethics or *noethics*), the State and no State, its life and its death. It delineates the duplicitous Nature of the eternal Spirit and the pure force of finitude’s physicality. The figure of inFiniteHistory thus engages and twists upon the passion that not only

seeks freedom, but that delineates its freedom within an ethics of freedom (that is of a universal freedom that is of *another* and itself). Ultimately, it is the *universalparticular, the force of the Spirit of History* that engages the Hegelian idea of the very thinking of **WorldHistory** that is the *humanhistory that designates the very liberty and particularity of the Human.*

The particular that is a universal or that grasps the universal is the individual *specifically*. Hegel considers this notion when he states: “What is *there* is the individual, not Man in general, it is not Man that exists, but the specific individual.”¹¹⁶ And further, he states, “I shall therefore use the term “passion” to signify the particular uniqueness of a person’s character...[that essentially] drives and motivates actions of universal scope.”¹¹⁷ The provocation that is History, the body, the human body, the political body, that is History, is clutching that which is claiming the individual, of a human desire and will that in Hegelian thinking then grasps the most intimate notion and individual *character* that essentially moves by and with History itself. The individual in effect marks

116. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 26-27 (Hackett edition).

117. *Ibid.*, 27.

the *desire* of the *instance* of **permeability** wherein the subjective and universal provoke the giving and making of History. Hegel writes of this permeability: “the aim of Passion and that of the Idea are one and the same; passion is the absolute unity of individual character and the universal.”¹¹⁸

History, that is, the *figuration of History*, thus forces a clashing of seeming oppositions into a discursive and violent transformation that breathes History *into life*. It is this desire that indeed forces the *human* to undertake actions that are in their deepening essence of a larger and more profound universal delineation. For Hegel denotes: “the universal can only be realised by means of the particular.”¹¹⁹ History is thus of an encounter that is eternal, universal, finite and particular, wherein the figure (of the body) that is *running of time* and *running out of time*, forces the freedom of its ethical truth upon the ethereal and phantasmal substance that marks the physicality of the Spirit of Truth.

118. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 86 (Cambridge edition).

119. *Ibid.*, 72.

2.1.5. The Spirit in Truth and of Evil

In the appendix additions for the year 1826 through 1827, in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* and the *Introduction: Reason in History*, Hegel makes the following remarks:

It is only by recreating itself that the spirit can realise its destiny. Thus, the primitive condition in which man has not yet entered that state of division from which he must create himself anew is an animal rather than a spiritual condition. Only the child or the animal is innocent; man is inevitably guilty. This does not mean that he ought to perpetrate evil. On the contrary, he ought to do good; but he is invariably responsible for his actions, in that he must have willed them and been implicated in them with his will.¹²⁰

Hegel thus initiates a delineation upon the ambiguities that fathom the human's essential, duplicitous Nature; a Nature of a Nature that is gifted in the contortion of its "*innocence*" that fathoms the pure negative of

120. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 216-217 (Cambridge edition).

thought and History. On this point, Bataille remarks upon that which is the Negative that is *the human* as of its duplicitous Nature wherein the *human Negating Nature* “cannot stop at Man himself; insofar as he is Nature, Man is exposed to his own Negativity.”¹²¹ Accordingly, in Bataille’s thinking, it is this abyss of the *human*, which forces the negative, that delineates itself as a severance from Nature, consequently fomenting “[man’s] isolation in the midst of his own kind, which condemn him to disappear definitively.”¹²² Moreover, it is precisely the *human capacity towards Negativity* that itself awakens the thought of death in the *human animal*, “precisely [a] human death,” writes Bataille; it is in the *human animal* that “the consciousness of being separated” becomes desolately yet presciently evident.¹²³ The *human animal*, then, must live *in spite of its death*, or in Bataille’s words, “he must live with the impression of really dying.”¹²⁴

For the *human* unlike Nature, Animal, Land or Horizon is fettered by the willingness and knowing that engenders the *violation of its innocence*.

121. Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” (1955), in *Hegel And Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 191.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid., 195.

This violation, in effect, we may call the destiny of the *human* and so too of the *Negative*, marking the solitary promise that the *human*, the solitude of the *human*, the solitude which is the eternal of the *human*, harbours within itself Truth's enmity; a truth that cruelly unravels and severs the *human's* First and foremost Identical Nature. An Identical Nature that Hegel interestingly demarcates as potentially fathoming "[a] state of perfection, [that] if it exists at all is a state of animality."¹²⁵ It is, in effect, this "*innocence*" and state of animality that the *human* inevitably flees upon its arrival, resulting in the entanglement of itself within the Negative of Thought, History, Knowledge, and Time. It is an entanglement and flight that unfastens and disengages the pure grounding of Nature, within a bending and contortion that relegates of a *Responsibility* that is of a forgotten innocence. Interestingly, it is the very act of *forgetting* that delivers the *human*, as of a not remembered *first* Nature to the state of an *imperfection* that contains within itself the very potentiality and essence of the promise of freedom; for it is within the *imperfection, the forgetting, and the disengagement* of a first Nature that the *human* is forced to grasp an *other* Nature (Hegel, on occasion, refers to this Nature as of a *second* Nature). In this instance,

125. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 217 (Cambridge edition).

Bataille reminds us of Hegel's keen insight of the contradiction that is of the *human* wherein Reason itself is never separate from or of *an other than* Reason. Bataille quotes Hegel in a famous passage:

In the *Lectures* of 1805-1806, at the moment of his thought's full maturity, during the period when he was writing *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel expressed in these terms the black character of humanity: "Man is that night, that empty Nothingness, which contains everything in its undivided simplicity: the wealth of an infinite number of representations, of images, not one of which comes precisely to mind, or which [moreover], are not [there] insofar as they are really present. It is the night, the interiority – or – the intimacy of Nature which exists here [the] pure personal – Ego. In phantasmagorical representations it is night on all sides: here suddenly surges up a blood spattered head; there, another, white, apparition; and they disappear just as abruptly. That is the night that one perceives if one looks a man in the eyes: then one is delving into a night which becomes terrible; it is the night of the world which then presents itself to us."¹²⁶

126. Bataille, "Hegel, Death and Sacrifice" (1955), in *Hegel And Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 187.

And yet, because the *human* is capable of enfolding upon that which is the *Night* and *empty Nothingness*, that is, *human bodily emptiness*, the *human* in and of itself “contains everything in its undivided simplicity” wherein lies its tangled mendacity and trickery, its truthfulness and unfastening, stretching its emptiness *as if it were daylight forever* as the violence which is of the *human*, a Negativity that lengthens upon unReason’s Reason or Reason’s Unreason. In Bataille’s assessment, it is of a Negativity that grasps itself of another than Nature and that places itself upon “the Judeo-Christian tradition, which emphasizes Man’s *liberty, historicity* and *individuality*.”¹²⁷ Accordingly, the Hegelian subject (that is the *human*) is, in Bataille’s words, a “spiritual” and “dialectical” being that is “necessarily *temporal* and finite,” revealed as the action that forces Negativity here and now – deemphasizing the “hereafter” (in contrast to the Judeo-Christian tradition) – into that which is the historicity of *the human* through “the passage of [its] time ” grasping upon the eternal as the divinity that is of the *human*.¹²⁸

127. Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” (1955), in *Hegel And Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 189.

128. *Ibid.*

And it is within this *other* of Nature that bespeaks division, opposition and Exile, the very essence and concurrence of “both good and evil,” that the promise of *Human* Historicity becomes evident. Hegel denotes this ensnarement of a fecund doubleness and duplicity within the *human* as follows:

Man is a spirit only in so far as he knows himself and has arrived at that state of division and opposition whose destiny contains both good and evil.¹²⁹

It is this duplicity and entanglement of the *human*, of a Nature that devours of the Negative, initiating the trajectory which Hegel delineates as the long and *relentless* struggle in the *human* upsurge towards World History that is a Reality that must be transformed and reconstructed.¹³⁰ In effect, it is the very *Ungrounding* or *groundingnot* of the *human* that engages the violence and Spirit that is of the *human*; for were it not for this violence of the Spirit, the *human* could not grasp the promise of its freedom. Hegel denotes this *Ungrounding* as that which entails

129. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 217 (Cambridge edition).

130. *Ibid.*, 208.

the human. He *comments*: “As soon as man emerges as a human being, he stands in opposition to nature, and it is this alone which makes him a human being.”¹³¹ He complicates the statement by further stating: “Man is not truly a human being until he knows what goodness is, has experienced opposition, and become divided within himself. For he can only know what is good if he also *has knowledge of evil*.”¹³²

The Spirit of the *human*, the *Human of Man*, that is, the very Being of the *human*, is like a *fallen Angel*, freed from the *Garden of Eden*, freed from Divine Providence, and destined towards individual *responsibility*

131. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 177 (Cambridge edition). A similar statement is made in Hegel’s Jena Lectures: “In actual fact the individual spirit can depend on the energy of his own character and can assert his individuality, regardless of nature. His negative attitude towards nature although it differs from himself, scorns its power, and in this scorn he holds nature at arm’s length, preserving his freedom. And in fact the individual is only great and free in proportion to the extent of this contempt for nature.” See Lukacs, “‘Entaeusserung’ (‘Externalization’) as the Central Philosophical Concept of *The Phenomenology of Mind*,” *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics* (1948), in *Hegel And Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 102. This statement is to be understood within the context of the Hegelian belief that the *human Spirit*, in spite of and against Nature, holds the true power of grasping its freedom. A freedom that is “explicitly” or “implicitly” held within the *human* as in the delineation of consciousness, self-consciousness, in the development and intensification of absolute knowledge – a process realized in struggle.

132. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 178 (Cambridge edition) (emphasis added).

(Knowledge) that forthwith engages the Historical struggle within the *running of Time* that manifests *Human* existence on *earth*. This freedom that lives within the *human*, denotes or suppositions that the *human*, in its freedom, must recognize the freedom of evil. Hence, in Hegelian thinking, not only does the *human* engage in the profound *division* that entails the trajectory and or essence of the *human*, not only must the *human* consider what may be of truth or its opposite, but it must acknowledge that its individual freedom can result in the provocation of a maligned truth which unfurls at its very source as an excessive form that espouses *evil*. Hegel thus denotes the duplicity within the *human* wherein it is *free to choose* its project and affectation. The *human* within the gift of its encumbered freedom is evidently fettered in its accountability for its actions.

The Hegelian philosophy is of an unsurpassed radical freedom, a freedom that itself circulates and enfolds the *freedom of its responsibility*. Here again, it is the Hegelian notion of radical contradiction and or negation that itself unifies the very opposition that foments a purefreedom of responsibility.

Hegel writes:

This is the seal of the absolute high vocation of Man, that he or she knows what is good and what is evil, and that it is for him or her to will either the good or the evil. It is the mark of the human, in other words, to be capable of bearing such responsibility, not only for the evil but also for the good; and responsibility not only for this, that, or another thing, but responsibility for the good and evil stemming from his or her individual freedom.¹³³

And it is within this *Responsibility* that we may consider the very notion that it is the *freedom* that dwells within the essence of the *human* that bears the very marking of the delineation of “good and evil.”

2.1.6. The Hegelian Notion of Spirit in History

The trajectory that furthers *Human* destiny is uniquely reflected and

133. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 37 (Hackett edition).

acted upon *within* and *through* the *human* that is of the Spirit of WorldHistory. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel intensifies the notion of Spirit as the ultimate trajectory that engages in Man an absolute Knowledge and absolute power (that is of an insight and illumination into universal consciousness). Addressing this particular Hegelian notion, Marcuse ascertains that the pure content of the historical trajectory is the “universal” and not the “individual,” it is the universal “realization of the self-consciousness of freedom” in replacement of the interests or needs of the individual that comes to the fore in History. And yet it is, at the same time, through the *passion* and the action (negation) of the individual that the “realization of self-consciousness of freedom” asserts itself as “historical reason.”¹³⁴ Moreover, in the *Philosophy of History*, as Marcuse denotes, Hegel announced the development of history as a state wherein “the freedom of the subject is in conscious union with the whole;” and thus that ““The history of the world is the discipline [*Zucht*] of the uncontrolled natural will to universality and to subjective freedom.””¹³⁵ Herein we discover the power of the negative in the free subject that

134. Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, 229.

135. *Ibid.*, 241.

belongs to the universal.

It is this trajectory or development of Spirit, its profound and ultimate power that is furthered on a *universal* scale within the delineation of WorldHistory. The arc of Spirit, which is identically the arc of the *human*, is of an incessant trajectory that seeks an empowerment that is of a pure knowledge and pure freedom. It is of a knowledge and freedom that harkens to no other than the Reason of History.¹³⁶

In Hegelian thinking, the *human*, retaining the promise of a freedom that is bequeathed upon its arrival, demands as of its destiny, freedom's essential manifestation in the delineation of an *extreme force or struggle* that aims at the transformation of its Reality. Thus Hegel notes:

Freedom as the ideal condition of what is as yet purely immediate

136. In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno will further delineate the Hegelian philosophy of history that provokes *the freedom of Reason* to be a philosophy of a dazzling if not furtive "transcendence," as Adorno states, "By Hegel, however, notably by the Hegel of *Philosophy of History* and *Philosophy of Law*, the historical objectivity that happened to come about is exalted into transcendence..." Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 323. Yet this transcendence, Adorno notes, is to be considered in a critical light, as one forces supremacy and delusion, a forged universal that eternalizes time itself in an imitation of History. Referring to German Idealism, Adorno states, "They [the Idealists, with Hegel in mind,] glorify time as timeless, history as eternal – all for fear that history might begin" (ibid., 332). Whilst Schopenhauer will note: "What history narrates is in fact only the long, heavy, and confused dream of humanity." See Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, III, 233.

*and natural does not itself possess an immediate and natural existence. It still has to be earned and won through the endless mediation of discipline acting upon the powers of cognition and will.*¹³⁷

That is to say, that although the *human* is “free by nature,” it is uniquely or identically free only within “[its] implicit destiny,” a destiny that in essence is there to be *constructed*.¹³⁸ And it is within the *extremestruggle of Spirit* that the Spirit of the *human* must “work up” History, just as it “works up” freedom; in Reality, the two are inseparable, for the working up of History results in the working up of the *human* that is freedom. This very struggle, as of a *turning*, contains within itself the division of the underside of freedom’s duplicity. It is the freedom within the *human* that Hegel has noted must carry with it a deepening and profound sense of *Responsibility* and *ethics*. The unfurling of “*good and evil*” that necessarily unveils the struggle of the *human* that is encumbered by the very advent of WorldHistory within the figure of inFiniteHistory that is

137. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 98-99 (Cambridge edition).

138. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 43 (Hackett edition).

the *human*. Consequently, the path that moves towards the ultimate freedom of the *human* must of itself hold the division and opposition that is held within freedom itself, and so it is the *human* itself that must fight within this struggle that *gives History*. For it is within the very struggle for *History* that the *human* encounters within itself the most formidable of enemies.

In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, Hegel notes this inhospitable opposition within that which is *human* and *that which is History* in illuminating detail:

Thus Spirit, within its own self, stands in opposition to itself. It must overcome itself as its own truly hostile hindrance. The process of development, so quiescent in the world of nature, is for Spirit a hard and endless struggle against itself. What the Spirit wants is to arrive at the concept of itself; but it itself hides this concept from itself – and it is even proud and filled with joy in this self-estrangement.¹³⁹

The *human's* “implicit destiny,” the struggle for freedom, is waged on the

139. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 58-59 (Hackett edition).

one hand within the *human's* own subjectivity (individuality and particularity) while at the same time being hurled at the objective nature of Reality; it is a freedom manifested within the *subjectivity* of Reality that is universally transformed through the trajectory of Spirit and History. The *movement* of transfiguration is itself a cumbersome *encircling* crowded with undue delusion, violence and malicious intent. Hegel notes that Spirit essentially demands a process of movement and alteration that is *initially rejected* by it, a rebuffing and slighting of itself that in turn enables Spirit to *devour* and *nourish* itself, therein furthering the development of its content. The nearing of Spirit's consummation entails a spectral and seemingly endless *surrounding* of a perilous Nature that bespeaks *division* and *entrapment*. And yet, within the Hegelian dialectic, it is precisely and most specifically the active force of a *division* encumbered by a centered disorientation or the untying of Spirit that itself unfurls the movement that facilitates the transformation of Spirit to become itself and other.

For unlike Nature that bespeaks an infinite cycle of *regeneration*, the *human* trajectory demarcates an embattled *travelling* towards a universal

consciousness and apprehension of freedom that strains against an invariable and recalcitrant alteration *against* Nature, a bursting forth in a *revolution* of an *other* Nature. Hegel describes the relentlessness of this process as “a severe and unwilling working against itself. Further, it is not a merely *formal* process of self-development in general. Rather, it is the fulfillment of an aim that has a specific *content*. What this aim is we established at the outset: it is Spirit, and indeed Spirit in conformity with its essence, the concept of freedom.”¹⁴⁰

In the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, Hegel will call this encirclement of Spirit a determinate form unfurling “its necessary self-manifestation.”¹⁴¹ In *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, Nancy describes this delineation as being of a “[r]estlessness [that] is itself already thought at work, or at stake.”¹⁴² For what, we may ask, is “at stake” within the *restlessness* of the negative that is of the *human*? It is none other than that which is incessantly and relentlessly grasped and ungrasped, developed and transformed, within the very writing that is the

140. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 59 (Hackett edition).

141. Nancy, *Hegel the Restlessness of the Negative*, 6.

142. *Ibid.*

Phenomenology. An insistence upon Spirit, world and the *human* that convulsively fathoms itself from its ending to its beginnings, motioning disruption, transcendence, and dissolution, as it forces itself “into work and into history.”¹⁴³ A travelling or *passage*-ing, wherein the Divine is violently exhausted, sublimated, and buried, to become other than itself, in self-consciousness, duplicity, ~~un~~freedom and *Historicity*~~no longer~~. A “*passage*[ing],” in Nancy’s words, of a Negativity “as never experienced before” that is of a History-yet-to-come; in a future that is truthfully as it is untruthfully amorously intertwined, revealing itself “as other, infinitely in the other.”¹⁴⁴

Spirit thus works through its content while undergoing “prevalent *change*.”¹⁴⁵ The struggle of Spirit is of a consumption that, devouring itself, spits out of itself and Other a new and transfigured Reality that still *holds all that which it has consumed or negated*. The notion of the *holding of itself and other* (*Aufhebung*; Suspension; Synthesis),¹⁴⁶ in the

143. Nancy, *Hegel the Restlessness of the Negative*, 6.

144. *Ibid.*

145. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 76 (Hackett edition).

146. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p.79

dialectic, delineates a pivotal point in the demarcation of “Spirit” as a fundamental *motion* delivering a profound understanding of that which we may consider to be the *Difference within Spirit itself*. It is the difference in the *content of Spirit* that incessantly holds division and opposition; the *very opposite of itself in itself* – a dialectic that essentially negates *the annihilation of the other, by holding the other as near as itself*. This nearing of *itself and other*, can further be demarcated as the grasping of Spirit’s *Identity* (its particularity) and *Difference* (its universality). For it is precisely within this *fateful gathering*, that is of an unpromised and *inauspicious* Nature, that Spirit of *itself and other* may in effect transfigure History and *freedom* into itself.

Referring to this Historical challenge, Marx will delineate the contradiction between necessity and freedom by enumerating the very immensity of the considerable *past* that is history. Marx writes:

Men make their own history; but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen themselves, but under

circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.¹⁴⁷

This statement brings to the fore significant questions concerning the inner and exterior force that is of the Negative, which circulates upon the generating of history in its assignation of Timepresence, *pastime*, and actuality. As it were, the inheritance of the past, of a past engendered by the *human as history*, forces the ongoing promulgation that is history itself, identically or paradoxically as a past that is profoundly present, a *history* that accedes advancing and receding actuality in the-now-of-its-past-history. For it is the notion of Spirit, Reason, and History that brilliantly forces this contradiction in the form of a negation, propounding the very force of the Negative as that which is gifted upon the human, usurping the dilemma, in Žižek's words, by *positing* "*the sign of equality*" to each side of the equation.¹⁴⁸ A negative development of Spirit that prophetically calls forth the regressive contradiction and negation

147. Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, 141.

148. *Ibid.*

that is of history and the *human* itself – of a contradiction that is no other than the very pronouncement of history itself. Zizek thus insists that “[f]or Hegel, external circumstances are not an impediment to realizing inner potentials, but on the contrary...[history presupposes]...*the very arena in which the true nature of these inner potentials are to be tested...*”¹⁴⁹

Hegel considers this contradiction as follows:

When Spirit consumes the outer shell of its existence, it does not merely go over into another shell, and it does not merely arise rejuvenated from the ashes of its embodiment; instead, it emerges as a purer Spirit, exalted and transfigured. It does, indeed, go against itself, and consumes its own existence. But in so doing, it reworks that existence, so that whatever went before is the material for what comes after, as its labor elevates it into a new form.¹⁵⁰

149. Zizek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, 42.

150. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 76 (Hackett edition).

It is the figure of inFiniteHistory that holds this trajectory near.

The figure of inFiniteHistory that is the *human* is of a nature that holds within itself a Knowledge that unremittingly struggles towards a universal Truth of an infinite and reasoned freedom. It is a figure, in Hegelian thinking, that must be at once capable within its individual singularity to apprehend an absolute universality, while, at the same time, be capable of relinquishing the essence of its particularity. This conflagration of entangled oppositions may indeed appear as a remarkable feat, the very encounter of the *individual* Spirit that catapults the *human* into the infinite sphere of a knowledge that grasps the human that is of a fundamental and universal and eternal truth, which is that the *human* is remarkably double in finitudes'*Eternality*. Hegel writes:

His [thinking] consciousness entails this: that the individual comprehend himself as a person; i.e., **that he grasps himself as intrinsically universal in his very singularity**, as capable of abstraction, of renouncing all particularity, and hence as being inherently infinite.¹⁵¹

151. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 74 (Hackett edition).

Thus Hegel considers the very singularity of the human to be of a *singularuniversal* consciousness that holds the gift of transforming the Reality of its Being, a transformation that is of a profound exaltation and transfiguration that manifestly elevates the *human* into a revolutionary form of Spirit and *determined History*.¹⁵²

2.1.7 The Division of History: *The Giving of History Itself*

2.1.7.1 The universalNature(alone): *The Oriental World*

World History is the process by which the uncontrolled natural will is disciplined in the direction of the universal, the direction of subjective freedom. The East knew (and knows) only that One person is free; the Greek and Roman world knew that Some are free; the Germanic world of

¹⁵². Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 76 (Hackett edition).

Europe knows that All are free [as persons].¹⁵³

The Hegelian *Philosophy of History* while acknowledging the relentless eruption of so called “unhistorical history”¹⁵⁴ – in the conflagration of the seemingly endless emergence of empires that extend upon *space* but

153. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 73 (Hackett edition). In 1946, at the culmination of the Second World War, Althusser will offer a notably different reflection upon European and world history as he notes the shifting of powers, while, at the same time, acknowledges an exhausted Europe as it turns to face or unface that which he radically calls “[a] peace that is still more terrible” than the “clamour” that encircles war. Althusser writes: “But in this world that provides us shelter, it is becoming a little clearer every day that men are, in ever increasing numbers, breaking the ties which silently bound them to their fate, and cursing it. Two years after the most atrocious of wars, on this earth covered with peace and ruins, in the midst of the winter that is drawing nigh, silent assemblies are taking place. The murmurs stifled by the clamour of arms, the protests that went unheard amidst the din of war – we can hear them now that calm has been restored. Remarkably, it is from the old lands of Europe that the plaints of peacetime arise. To the east, the immense Russian people has gone back to work, and is reconciled itself to history through work. ‘Anguish is a bourgeois state of mind. We are rebuilding’ (Ehrenburg).³ To the west, America, intact, counts its dead and its victories, tests its future strength in the air and on the seas, takes up its place in the world as it settles into its future: the American century lies before it, stretching outward to the horizon, like a long summer holiday: ‘our destiny is to be free Americans.’ To be sure, the optimism of effort and freedom continues to mean something to the French and British, most of whom seek it in the justification⁴ for the hard life they are leading.⁵ Yet it is in the midst of the ‘Western’ ruins that men are beginning to see that the war waged with arms has not brought the war for souls to an end, and that the peace is as murderous as the war, and still more terrible; for now, in peacetime, murder no longer has the clamour of arms for an excuse.” See Althusser, “The International of Decent Feelings,” in *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writings Louis Althusser*, 22. In yet another instance, Heidegger will denote *WorldHistory* as an “erring [*Irren*: erring, going astray]”, in *Holzwege*, he writes: “Every epoch of world history is an epoch of erring.” See Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in *Writing and Difference*, 145.

154. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 94 (Hackett edition).

that in themselves negate *Time* or of states that initially *hang about* in Time but that essentially form what may be considered *unchanging spheres* that initiate their own destruction – solely and uniquely delineates the creation of a State that embarks upon a “political and legal framework”¹⁵⁵ and an ethics of freedom, to be counted in the true activity of the generating of History.¹⁵⁶

In the *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, Hegel delineates *four* specific *divisions, worlds, and political forms* that demarcate a series of *stages* that initiate such a History. Within these divisions, Hegel engages the *Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic Worlds*, and in turn subdivides their political forms into *Despotism, Democracy, Aristocracy* and *Monarchy*.

155. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Introduction: Reason in History*, 214 (Cambridge edition).

156. Schirmacher refers to the notion of “anti-historical history” as that which is “*unbegriffene Geschichte*” (ungrasped history), that is a formless history with neither reason nor freedom behind it. See Schirmacher, “Nach dem Weltgericht: Hegel als Philosoph des kuenstlichen Lebens,” 1 (emphasis added).

The first *division* of WorldHistory, Hegel asserts, is reflected within itself as an “*unmediated consciousness*” (of Spirit) wherein the subjective will of the individual and nation relates itself “primarily in terms of faith, trust, and obedience.”¹⁵⁷ Within this initial stage, there develops a “realized rational freedom” but without the substantive advancement of Spirit’s “subjective freedom.”¹⁵⁸

This stage marks the very beginning of History, a History that Hegel accords to the “*Oriental World*.”¹¹⁹ Hegel describes this world, not without undue admiration:

The splendid structures of the Oriental empires form substantial configurations in which all the categories of rationality are present – but in such a way that the human subjects remain merely incidental...That which in our [Occidental] world belongs to the sphere of subjective freedom proceeds there from the universal totality. The splendor of the Oriental vision is the One Individual, as the

157. Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 93-94 (Hackett edition).

158. *Ibid.*, 93.

substantial being to which everything belongs, so that no other subject can distinguish itself as individual and reflect upon itself in its subjective freedom.¹⁵⁹

Within the notion of the “*One*” there persists the essence of an uninhabited *universality*, yet, uninhabited only in dialectical terms, for it is of the notion manifesting itself as the “*One*” of an *entire Nature*, propitiously *inhabited by all*, or everything; an *entire Nature* that is of *One Nature and no Other*. In essence, it is of a *sign representing* a *nonparticular UNIVERSALITY* that is, unequivocally, of a *universal Nature (alone)*. This accumulation of the *universal Nature (alone)*, in effect, delineates a Nature that isolates and estranges singularity and the Negative. Effectively, it is a Nature that, **flooding** the particular, **saturates** and **inclines** the *individual* of subjective freedom into that which is *many, all or everything*, thus efficiently disengaging the very notion of its antithesis.

The notion that is the *many, all, or everything* in itself provokes a

159. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 95 (Hackett edition).

circular assembly that initiates a revolving center of *power*. Hegel writes of this circularity as follows: “[t]he subjects [within this world or structure] revolve around a center, the ruler, who stands at the head like a patriarch, though not as a despot in the sense of imperial Rome.”¹⁶⁰ It is within this instance that there is manifested, within the state, a series of commandments and laws that appear intrinsically **predetermined** and that require absolute servitude of the individual. Hence the first division of *History* demarcates, as it were, the absolute servitude of the particular to the universal *Patriarch* and *God*, thereby marking out what is the appearance of an undivided and unreflective consciousness within the very constitution of the individual, nation or state.¹⁶¹

Hegel furthermore describes the first division of History as a *revolving (or spinning) sphere* of a “substantial culture” that has not *moved to enter* the subjective realm of self-consciousness and consequently has failed to “take up its antithesis into itself.”¹⁶² For, in Hegelian thinking, it is of

160. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 94 (Hackett edition).

161. *Ibid.*, 93.

162. *Ibid.*, 94.

the essence that Spirit *engage* the Negative so as to dispose of it and overcome it.¹⁶³ Accordingly, it is within the notion of the universal Nature (alone) that a splitting or doubling of elemental forms takes place. In the Hegelian dialectic, this splitting or doubling of elements delineates, on the one side, a preoccupation with *Space* and Nature, while, on the other side, it demarcates an estrangement with *Time* and History. Hegel writes:

World history in general is thus the unfolding of Spirit in *time*, as nature is the unfolding of the Idea in *space*.¹⁶⁴

It is at this instance that Hegel aligns the notion of Space *to* the element of Nature and the eternal (Idea), and History to fold upon the solitude of the *human that is (of) Historical Time and finitude*. This alignment of *space and Nature* in contradistinction to *human History = Time* initially plays upon the classical metaphysical rift demarcating the eternal

¹⁶³. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 94 (Hackett edition).

¹⁶⁴. *Ibid.*, 75.

and the temporal (the body versus the mind, and so forth). Yet within this doubling there ensues another division. For if there is such a thing as *History* (the Negative and Time) then there equally exists its antithesis that which is of **noHistory at all** (that is of Space and Nature); an “unhistorical history”¹⁶⁵ that is markedly “prior to actual history.”¹⁶⁶

Following this logic, it is the nations that fall upon the despotic order of the “One Power”¹⁶⁷ that, having deflected the Negative, exhibit a tendency of falling asunder *outsideof time and out of History into Nature*.

That is to say, they fall into the eternal *sameness* that is Space, whilst on the other hand, if they deem to engage Time, they explicitly partake in the *distraction* of **Time** through the endless shifting and enduring altercations with neighbouring states that eventually marks their utter desolation.

Hegel describes this condition as follows:

On the one side we see duration, stability; we see empires of *space*, as it were – an unhistorical history [i.e., a history without development in time] – as, for example, in China, with its state based on the family

165. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 94 (Hackett edition).

166. *Ibid.*, 102, paragraph 349.

167. *Ibid.*, 94.

relation and on a paternal government. This government maintains institutions of the totality through providential care, with admonitions and punishment, and disciplinary actions. It is an altogether prosaic realm, because in it the antithesis of form (in regard to infinitude and ideality) has not yet arisen. On the other side, this spatial durability is countered by the form of *time*: the states, without changing in themselves or in principle, undergo endless change with regard to each other; they are ceaselessly in conflict, which soon brings them to ruin.¹⁶⁸

The first stage of History thus marks the very beginning of an **intimation** towards that which contends WorldHistory; a History that delineates a *humanTime* that is of the *finitude* that is History and the *human*, and Reason, and freedom itself. It is the Spirit of WorldHistory that in its essence is *not unlike* the *Aufhebung* (transformation)¹⁶⁹ that the individual encounters in coming to a full and reflective consciousness in the attainment of an *absolute Knowledge* that is, in Hegel's words, of a pure

168. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 94-95 (Hackett edition).

169. *Ibid.*, xi.

“synthesis of Knowledge and the Real.”¹⁷⁰ Yet still, in its beginnings, the first stage of History is of a History wherein the individual remains *estranged*, merely invisible, in the *activity that is of a History still to come*.

To reflect upon the notion of “unhistorical history” is to consider the very idea or essence of *Time, Space, and History* within the Hegelian dialectic and it is Alexandre Kojève, in his *Lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, who renders one of the most fascinating reflections upon this uniquely Hegelian construction. In his lectures, Kojève essentially demarcates the rudimentary metaphysical distinction between that which is (of) Nature and that which is NotNature. Reflecting upon the particularly Hegelian premise of the antithesis, he proposes the following: *That which is Nature remains within Nature* (i.e., the Hegelian notion of a *first*Nature) and *that which is NotNature abandons Nature* and descends into that which is *identically*History. Following this principle, as NotNature belongs to History, so History, emphatically turning as of the *human*, descends into *itself*. Within this idea, then,

170. Kojève, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 153.

Nature identically *remains* eternally itself and the same, whereas History, in contrast, *reconstructs* and *exists* as a negative, an undoing, as a *transition* and *passage*, essentially circumflexing and *deflecting* (of its) Nature. Furthermore, this deflection and undoing of History is none other than the untying or undoing of Time (*and of space*). Kojève comments as follows:

Sein [Being] or *Raum* [Space] is eternal, or rather nontemporal, Nature. The opposite entity, which is *Selbst* [Self] (that is, Man) or *Zeit* [Time], is nothing other than History.¹⁷¹

And further:

...the free individual, *is* Time; and Time is History, and *only* History. (Which, furthermore, is *das wissende Werden*, “the *knowing* becoming” of the Spirit – that is, in the final analysis, philosophical evolution.) And Man is essentially *Negativity*, for Time is *Becoming* – that is, the *annihilation* of Being or Space.¹⁷²

171. Kojève, *Introduction To The Reading Of Hegel: Lectures On The Phenomenology of Spirit 1933-1939*, 159.

172. *Ibid.*, 159 -160.

“Unhistorical history” thus *fixes upon space as its navigator; it is of an enduring and eternal recurrence that is of a recurring sameness outside of Time*. Whilst *History*, of the human, *propels the incessant thought of an Action that forces Time that is of a human untying of Time* (of the negative or negation and *Aufhebung*). Furthermore, it is merely within the *untying of time* that the human provokes the essential movement that is delineated as the Spirit that gives itself the *infinite Negative* or that which gives History itself.

2.1.7.2 The Realm of Beautiful Freedom: *The Greek World*

[T]he state is the universal spiritual life, to which the individuals who are born into it relate with trust and habitual acceptance, so that they have their essence and actuality in it. This being so, we must ask above all else whether their actual life involves them in the unity of unreflective habit and custom, or whether the individuals are persons who reflect, as independent subjects.¹⁷³

173. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 93 (Hackett edition).

It is the very trajectory of WorldHistory, in conjunction with the universal Spirit that drives the *human* desire to alter a *given Nature* and to endeavor in the construction of a transfigured Nature. This construction is none other than the deepening *reflection of Spirit in its passionate fulfillment of freedom*. In the beginning of worldHistory there exists a universal unreflective and unmediated consciousness of Spirit that rotates within the sphere of the servitude of the universalNature(alone) that is of an unrealized freedom. The second stage in History demarcates a shifting of Spirit wherein the *universal* essence of Spirit is differentiated by the notable encounter of the universal with the particular. The second *division* of WorldHistory, which is the “*Greek World*,” is thus denoted by Hegel to be of “the realm of Beautiful Freedom.”¹⁷⁴ Within the Greek world, as in the “*Oriental World*,” there exists ethical custom and principle, but in contrast to the first stage of History, there bursts forth the notion of an ethical existence that is of a particular and individual Nature that is more specifically related to individuality itself; this *turning to*, or *facing* of that which is the particular initiates the notion of “the free volition of individuals” within the polis that is the Greek city-state.¹⁷⁵ Whereas the

174. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 95 (Hackett edition).

175. *Ibid.*

first stage of History demonstrated the singular Universal One **declining** the subjective particular, the second stage initiates the first intimation of a gathering of that which is the *universalparticular*. Yet this second revolution of Spirit provokes a relatively “naïve unity with the universal aim of society,” explains Hegel, for it is a unity that remains outside of itself as a divided principle.¹⁷⁶ Hence, it is solely an *immediate* union in a limited sense. And as such, it is a union that effectively provokes an intense contradiction within its very form. That is to say, within its constitution, the individual subject is as yet not wholly sovereign as it fastens upon the sovereignty within the ideality and/or unity of a city (e.g., *Athens, Sparta, Corinth, etc.*). The displacement of an extensive subjective sovereignty here functions as a *replacement* for the *missing* tryst between the State (that is universality or substantive freedom) and the individual will (that is subjective freedom); a will that has as yet not reached the subjectivity that denotes an independent self-consciousness, but still binds itself to an elevated exterior power (i.e., Alexander the Great).¹⁷⁷

176. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 95 (Hackett edition).

177. *Ibid.*, 104.

In reference to the development of Spirit, it is within the second stage of History – that is, within the “*Greek World*” – that Spirit edges towards the beginnings of an *encounter* with its antithesis. It is within this instance that the State (being that which demarcates universality) acknowledges the *presence of the subject*. However rudimentary this first intimation of acknowledgement may be, it here marks the beginning of a reflection upon the Negative that in a *turning* catapults itself onto the next formation of History.

2.1.7.3 The Worldly Power of *One Overlord: The Roman World*

The third division of WorldHistory demarcates the emergence of an “abstract universality.”¹⁷⁸ Accordingly, this period is designated by Hegel to be of the “*Roman World*,”¹⁷⁹ a world wherein the State has its beginnings and emerges in an abstract form facilitating the initiation of its own aspirations. Yet while individuals may share in the State’s

178. Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of History: with selections from The philosophy of right*, 96 (Hackett edition).

179. Ibid.

aspirations, their alignment is nonetheless of a constrained and imprecise nature. In effect, the State is of a universal aspiration or end that suppresses the individual and adeptly demands the subject's subjugation. Hegel further denotes that individual nations suffer a similar fate, as do individual subjects, as the Roman State aggressively incorporates them into its expanding empire.

Yet, in turn, it is within the Roman State that individual subjects accede a universal account of themselves by attaining the "status of persons;"

Romans thus become "legal *personae*, having a private status."¹⁸⁰

Within the Roman Empire there appear a series of contradictions that manifest themselves in an extreme division between the public and the private sphere. Within this altercation, the Hegelian antithesis appears in the form of the emergence of a "personal self-consciousness" that moves against "*abstract universality*," a contradiction manifesting itself within the aristocratic class in its pursuit of the democratic principle of a "free personality."¹⁸¹ Thus materializes – for the first time in *History* – within

180. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 96 (Hackett edition).

181. *Ibid.*, 104, paragraph: 357.

the formation of the Roman State *a stated antithesis* that is of a *reflective* Nature that is of an “abstract universality itself” wherein Hegel, denotes, in due course an “arbitrary individuality” gains the upper hand.¹⁸² Hegel describes this movement within the Roman State as follows:

Rome passes into the utterly contingent and thoroughly worldly power of *one overlord*, the emperor. Originally there is the antithesis between the common good of the state (as the abstract universal) and the abstract person. But then, in the course of history, the element of personality becomes predominant; the community then begins to break up into its component atoms, so that it is only held together by means of external power...[I]nasmuch as abstract legality has come to power, this power is merely arbitrary, as the contingent subjectivity of one mover, one ruler.¹⁸³

As a result of the usurpation of the political state – through the excesses of a despotic force embroiled in an abstract and arbitrary form of power – the individual subject here searches for a double reconciliation of the

182. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 96 (Hackett edition).

183. *Ibid.*, 96-97.

antithesis. Accordingly, in a “*worldly*” reconciliation the individual subject undertakes the consolation for the loss of its freedom in the pressing forward of “*private right*,” whilst in a *Spiritual* consolation it seeks to abandon the exterior chaos of the world by moving into the inner depths of its Spirit, therein marking a pivotal point in the development of Spirit. For it is in this very turning (of the negation) that the inner power of the individual is realized, forming the negative force of the antithesis that in turn propels the inner life of Spirit to move toward a profound unraveling that delineates an absolute inner essence that in itself provokes in Spirit the evocation of a transfigured and purified universality. Hegel describes this nearing or ascension of the particularuniversal as “its own implicitly universal subjectivity – transfigured into divine personality.”¹⁸⁴ The “divine personality” marks the beginning of a grasping of the *universalparticular* or the *singular universal* that provokes the initiation of the fourth and last stage in WorldHistory. Hence it is the third stage in History that marks an essential moment in actualizing History itself by intimating the oncoming struggle as it appears in the final stage of worldhistory that in turn forms the antithesis between the eternal

184. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 97 (Hackett edition).

(religious) and temporal (secular) realm. For within each successive transformation of Spirit, there is a revelation of the Spirit that demarcates the decisive grasping of *the eternal that is of the very finitude that is the Human*. It is thus that the *grasping of History* itself provokes the delineation of a secular apprehension of freedom that manifests the very Spirit that apprehends itself as the determined Reason of History.

2.1.7.4 The Universal Particular that is Freedom's Hostility:

The Germanic World

World history goes from East to West: as Asia is the beginning of world history, so Europe is simply its end. In world history there is an absolute East, *par excellence* (whereas the geographical term "east" is in itself entirely relative); for although the earth is a sphere, history makes no circle around the sphere. On the contrary, it has a definite East which is Asia. It is here that the external physical sun comes up, to sink in the West: and for that same reason it is in the West that the inner Sun of self-consciousness rises, shedding a higher brilliance.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 92 (Hackett edition).

As we enter the final epoch of History, Hegel delineates a series of profound conflicts that *transfigure* Spirit itself. There is the notion of a deepening sense of the *human individual*, of the particular subject that provokes the desire of a reasoned Knowledge. The Hegelian *Philosophy of History* hence demarcates the ever-ascending Spirit that is the *human* grasping the *divinity* that is *knowledge* and harbouring it within the human itself. For what is the *human* if not the very arc that is of a singular rising and sinking, the pure *Negative* that delineates the remarkable feat of the universal/particular Nature of the *human* demarcating of the understanding that the very Nature of the human is of (an)other Nature that harbors or recollects within itself the altercation that is of its own opposition and negation? The Negative being summarily versatile, a Negative bursting with the antagonism of (an)other and itself, so it is that Human History may be none other than the grasping of *freedom's hostility of (an)other* Nature that is *Human*.

The “*Germanic World*,” in Hegelian thinking, represents this final stage in World History. In essence, it is of the epoch that is representative of the moment that delineates the antithesis (between the *religious* and the *secular realms*), culminating in the decisive *separation of church and*

state. Hegel demarcates this antithesis as the opposition between “the other-worldly vs. the this-worldly” or as “Church vs. Empire”.¹⁸⁶ It is of an opposition that will – in its final culmination – designate of the human the divine of its Nature.

[T]he Spirit driven back into itself, grasps the absolute *turning point* in the extremity of its absolute negativity: the *infinite positivity* of its own inwardness, the principle which asserts the unity of the divine and the human natures. This reconciliation (of divine and human) as the objective truth and freedom – that appears within self-consciousness and subjectivity – is a reconciliation entrusted to the northern principle of the Germanic peoples to fulfill.¹⁸⁷

This reconciliation, which calls forth the assignation of the divine upon the *human*, although subdued in its relative beginnings, gains a more concrete Nature as it unravels its initial essence of Reasoned strength.

186. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 105, paragraph: 360 (Hackett edition).

187. *Ibid.*, 105, paragraph: 358.

Hegel denotes that, as Spirit delves deeper into its interior life, it must first reconcile itself in “*faith, hope, and love*” thereby delineating the initial gesture that motions towards the resolving of its antithesis.¹⁸⁸ This preliminary gesture, in turn, shifts Spirit towards a further secular passage wherein the principles of “*faith, hope, and love*” solidify into the ideals of “the heart, loyalty and the fellowship of free men.”¹⁸⁹ Hegel describes this transformation of Spirit as “[t]he principle [that] unfolds its content, elevating it to actuality and self-conscious rationality...”¹⁹⁰

Having raised the subjective principle to the *secular* realm, Spirit nevertheless there encounters a dominion that is as yet of coarse uncertainty and barbarian habit. Furthermore, in shifting its subjective consciousness to the “*intellectual* realm,”¹⁹¹ Spirit not only gathers opposition within the secular realm itself, but moreover suffers an extreme assault from its opposing camp, the religious realm (demarcating the authority of the church). In Hegel’s Lectures on *The Philosophy of*

188. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, p.105, paragraph: 359 (Hackett edition).

189. Ibid.

190. Ibid.

191. Ibid.

Right, he describes this authority “as an unfree and frightful force” that besieges Spirit in its movement towards its determined secularization.¹⁹² It is at this decisive moment, within the *dialectic*, that Hegel makes a critical discovery in recognizing that, in their essence, seemingly opposing forces are *identical in unity and Idea*. So it is precisely within the dialectic that proposes the gathering of the *identical* that the movement of a duplicitous union (that is within Church vs. Empire) provokes a double turning in Spirit, wherein the Spirit of the “other-worldly” realm (the Church) is able to descend towards “*the earthly here-and-now*,”¹⁹³ whilst the “this-worldly” (the Empire) in *turn* ascends towards the notion of an “*abstract independence*” of thought, that bespeaks of “the rationality of *right* and *law*.”¹⁹⁴ The transfiguration of Spirit thus marks a powerful example of the force that is Negativity and the upsurge that is Reason by grasping two contradictory forces and suspending their opposition in such a manner that their transformation effectively manifests itself in the creation of the State.

192. Hegel, *Introduction to the philosophy of History: with selections from The philosophy of right*, 105, paragraph: 359 (Hackett edition).

193. *Ibid.*, paragraph: 360.

194. *Ibid.*

It is significant that the trajectory of negation (that is, the trajectory of the antithesis itself) provokes an underlying principle that is *contradictory* in its own turn, for it must be borne in mind that the movement of Negation necessitates a conflicting force to effect its actualization. So it is that Hegel describes the involvement of the Church *within the state* (as an authoritarian power) as the very *essence of the corruption* that leads to its precipitous decline, a precipitous fall within its divine Ideality culminating in the ultimate separation of church and state, Whilst, on the other side, the *duplicity* within the barbaric (secular) realm suffers from an infiltration that harbours rationality, knowledge, and the pursuit of an Ideal Truth of Spirit, therein effectively revealing the ascendance of the barbaric realm to a purer (secular) realm forcing its essential Truth.

Thus the antithesis between them [i.e., church and state] withers away to nothing. The present world has stripped off its barbarism and unjust arbitrariness, and truth has put aside its world of beyond and its casual power. Thus the genuine reconciliation has become objective fact, revealing the State to be the image and actuality of Reason.¹⁹⁵

195. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 105, paragraph: 360 (Hackett edition).

Hence the Negative (that is Reason) pertains to a force that duly navigates and encircles itself upon “absolute negativity” and “infinite positivity,”¹⁹⁶ as it promises ascendance and descent, a roaming and twisting of a vertiginous nature, an impressive delineation that marks the complexity of the nature of Spirit’s transformation and permeability, acknowledging the very Nature of its content, as it is worked through Spirit to descend upon the negative of the *human* that is History, wherein Hegel will denote that it is ultimately within the Reason of the State that the *human* that is self-consciousness has found the certainty of its “substantative *knowing* and *willing*” that is of a *Truth* identically gathering upon the *human*, the *State*, *Nature*, and the *Ideal World*.¹⁹⁷

2.2 The Hegelian Third: The Human that is the Body that *folds* History Itself

2.2.1 The acceleration of the Negative

The concept and its existence [Existenz] are two aspects [of the same

196. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 105, paragraph: 360 (Hackett edition).

197. *Ibid.*, 106.

thing], separated and united, like soul and body. The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one another. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa. Thus the existence [*Dasein*] of the concept is its body, just as the latter obeys the soul which produced it... If the body does not correspond to the soul, it is a wretched thing indeed. The unity of existence [*Dasein*] and the concept, of body and soul, is the Idea. It is not just a harmony, but a complete interpenetration. Nothing lives which is not in some way Idea. The Idea of right is freedom, and in order to be truly apprehended, it must be recognizable in its concept and in the concept's existence [*Dasein*].¹⁹⁸

It is doubly remarkable that the Hegelian *dialectic*, in pursuing the trajectory of Spirit, Reason, Historicity and the notion of *Human* absolute Freedom, be the source of a profound shifting, not only within the notion of Spirit, History, and Nature, but equally, in designating a radicalization that spurns a turning upon the inception of a knowledge or thinking concerning the idea of the body, a *human* body that is itself identically

198. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, 25-26, paragraph: 1. Schirmacher further substantiates this claim in noting that, according to Husserl, "Only the desire of knowledge, of the amor Dei intellectuallis accords with the most realized bodiliness." See Schirmacher, "Monism in Spinoza's and Husserl's Thought: The Ontological Background of the Body-Soul-Problem," 2.

corporeal and *otherthanbody* (*Ding an Sich*). Notably, Hegel radicalizes the notion of the body as of a decisive conflict, which itself holds and holdsnot that which is conflicted.

Perhaps, Hegel's premonition of the bodie(s) divergence should not come as a surprise, for as Gadamer notes, Hegelian philosophy is essentially of a thinking that delineates upon the very notion of the "necessity of *transitions*."¹⁹⁹ Thus, just as the notion of a substance, considered as being of the Real world, necessitates its explicit negation, such as an other or "inverted world", the body, too, is of a figuration mastering or unmastering its incessant circulation. So it is that we may not only consider the body to be delineated as a circulation but, more precisely, to be of "a force" that inadvertently transitions and bodies itself as it *plays at itself* outside of itself, a consciousness that motions towards self-consciousness.²⁰⁰ In effect, the Real in Hegelian thinking exists nominally

199. Gadamer, "Hegel's 'Inverted World,'" *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies* (1971), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 273.

200. *Ibid.*, 275.

in its *movement*, as in a *play of forces*, that gesticulate consciousness to self-consciousness or self-consciousness to consciousness. Our consideration of the Hegelian body thus calls forth the Hegelian notion of *transition* and movement between that which is the consciousness or self-consciousness of *bodybodies*. Thus Gadamer can state: “But the assertion that there “exists” a force by itself apart from its expression and isolated from the context of all forces is also a false abstraction. What exists are forces and their interplay.”²⁰¹ We may denote the Hegelian body to be of this interplay that situates the ground of a figuration, just as it ungrounds this figuration or force that is the consciousness of its self-consciousness. We may thus fathom an insight in the reconsideration of the knowledge of the body(bodie) as the delineation of a “force field” that *plays, transitions or passages* its positive and negative field(s) therein manifesting its contradiction as the very law of its appearance.²⁰²

In folding the body upon the Negative (Time, History, and Reason)

201. Gadamer, “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World,’” *Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies* (1971), in *Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 276.

202. *Ibid.*, 279-280.

through the self of consciousness, that is itself the Negative of thought, Hegel entangles the body into becoming or coming to be of the force of the Negative. And in speaking to the *human*, or of the human, Hegel denotes both spirit and nature, body and thinking (and, too, that which opposes or *contradicts* the negative) to be decisive in the course of its development. In delineating *Human* determinate historicity, Hegel not only radicalizes the notion of that which we may consider to be of *the human*, but the very notion of *the human itself*, in its replete ~~non~~existence that is of a “concept” unbinding upon that which is pure Idea, the “general” and the “particular,” and, too, of the *human* that is Reason and unreason descending upon (~~un~~)Freedom and *Freedom*, whereupon, invariably, his thinking profoundly shifts the very notion of that which we may consider the *human body* to entail – a body that, in the plural, camouflages into a bodies’ body: the *many bodies of body*. Magnificently denoted by Kant in his critical discussion pertaining to the notion of unfreedom (object and appearance) and freedom (*Ding-an-Sich*), it is Hegel who, grasping the Kantian concept, builds upon it a *knowledge of the human corpus that is unwittingly thinking the body itself*. It is Hegel who will denote that the body and soul are identically or equally

united, just as they are identically and equally *separated*, whereupon in their ultimate *Aufhebung* (suspension) they engender the double felicity both of “maintaining” and of “bringing to an end.”²⁰³

The Hegelian notion of the body calls forth a plurality of bodies as of a bodies’body that within its disposition *folds* upon Spirit, Reason, Historicity and Freedom, the temporal and the eternal, just as it aligns itself with that which is unreason, *prior to* History and unfreedom. It is a body that folds the existence of its Spirit onto manifest corporeality, just as it unbinds the body to a mere spectrality or phantasm that manifests its figuration. It can be thus stated, that *the body in its essence folds upon existence itself*, an existence that **exists the interior of the body itself**, whilst roaming to an(other) exterior itself, of a presence or appearance (and, too, of its disappearance), falling upon the world, other, and to nothingness. Within Hegelian thinking, *the body* provokes Existence or folds upon the “*existence*” of the “*concept*,” as it aligns itself within the force of immediacy and the reflective. Hegel thus writes: “Existence is the immediate unity of reflection into self and reflection into another,

203. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 114.

and thus it is not only as unity or reflection into self but different in these two determinations. *As the latter it is the thing, and fixed in its abstraction it is the thing in itself.*²⁰⁴ It is such that the body is duplicitously equal in the positive as it is to the negative of itself and other, folding upon this duplicity as its essential pronouncement. The body, in actuality, is representative of the purest of contradictions, as it is, ultimately, that which is of a *perfectcontradiction*, identically body, spirit, ethereal, material, life and death. Hegel expounds upon this contradiction by stating the following: “Reflection into another is, in the ground and in truth, also reflection into self. Hence the properties of the thing are not merely different from each other, they are also *self-identical, independent, and relieved from their attachment to the thing.*”²⁰⁵ Of the law of nature and *against this law*, “identical” and “independent,” the manifest body reeks of the promise of a superb flexibility that calls forth the pronounced existence of its fleeting appearance and so, too, of its disappearance. It is thus that *existence, essence, and appearance fall upon one another. In effect, they hold each other near*, as Hegel

204. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline and Critical Writings*, 87, paragraph: 75 (emphasis added).

205. *Ibid.*, 88, paragraph: 77 (emphasis added).

states: “Essence accordingly is not behind or beyond appearance, but rather, precisely because it is the essence which exists, the existence is appearance.”²⁰⁶

Moreover, in Hegelian thinking, appearance folds upon its own contradiction. As Gadamer states, “reality is also the law of appearance. It is both: the law and the perversion of the law. It is the opposite of itself.”²⁰⁷ If we replace the word *appearance* with the word *body*, the following thesis emerges: “reality is also the law of [body]. It is both: the law and the perversion of the law. It is the opposite of itself.”²⁰⁸ Thus, the body in its Reality folds upon a perversion or inversion of itself, just as it identically lingers or holds upon a Real that remains upon the uninverted or unperverted that is the contrariness of itself. Gadamer writes, “the world [i.e., the body] in and for itself is the inversion of the world [i.e., body] *which appears*.”²⁰⁹ Moreover, this shifting of the

206. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline and Critical Writings*, 89, paragraph: 81 (emphasis added).

207. Gadamer, “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World,’” *Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies* (1971), in *Hegel and Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 282.

208. *Ibid.*

209. *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

negative of appearance motions to a “supersensible world” as that which is the “true world,” that is of “*what remains in disappearance*,” and further, “what remains is precisely what is real where everything is continually disappearing.”²¹⁰ That is to say, the disappearance of the world and its body persists as the Real precisely because it manifests itself in this disappearance. And so it is that “constancy,” as Gadamer sees it, “is the truth of disappearance.”²¹¹ Not only is the Real manifested in the constancy of disappearance, but it “exists precisely as continual change” that is of a recurring *disappearance*. Within the notion of the body, we may thus fathom the disappearance of the body as the Real which continually changes. Just as it is of a “supersensible world [i.e., body]”, that is, of the Real as it is True and that which “remains in disappearance”²¹² not of a “beyond” or of emptiness, but rather coming “from appearance”; such as it is “the truth of appearance.”²¹³ We may thus state that the body that is itself of *bodies*’ can be thought of as the

210. Gadamer, “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World,’” *Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies* (1971), in *Hegel and Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, p. 277 (emphasis added).

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.

213. Ibid., 278.

“still[ness]” of an “image” (*imagen*) that is in “constant change.”²¹⁴ This constancy of movement that is *stillness* itself, then, is the body, as it is also of the constancy of the Law (of the Real), which identically residues or remainders in its dis-Appearrance.²¹⁵ And therein the body is replete with the promise of its *existence (appearance)* that is identically *essence*, evidently straddled as of a fecund *roaming*, that is the force of an interior and exterior reflection and the “the principle of alteration.”²¹⁶ Thus, the *roaming of the body* may be delineated as of the law of its nature, in Gadamer’s delineation, of a body or world wherein “**everything moves because it contains the origin of change itself.**”²¹⁷ So it is that the body in its essence demarcates the excessive pronouncement of a circumfluent *reflection folding* upon itself as reflectivity (or constancy of motion). A reflectivity or stillness that can be denoted, as it were, a force that redirects, reverses, exiles, returns and moves away from itself, to itself, and other, and in returning to itself, returns of (an)other; it is of this world and, too, of an exiled beginning.

214. Gadamer, “Hegel’s ‘Inverted World,’” *Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies* (1971), in *Hegel and Continental Philosophy*, edited by Dennis King Keenan, 279.

215. *Ibid.*

216. *Ibid.*, 280.

217. *Ibid.*, 281 (emphasis added).

As such, in signifying the decisive contradiction, the human body is reflective of that which it is, and that which it is not; and in its purest of contradictions it calls forth the Negative that is of the *human* – its determinate Historicity. Ultimately, it is the force of conflict, contradiction, opposition, and suspension (or sublimation), that is critical in raising the specter and power of the Negative that engages the *human body*, that is *the thought of the body* that is of a violent force and upheaval in History and of its Freedom. Hegel thus defies the classical mind/body conflict, not so much in denying its conflict, but in ascertaining its necessity by confronting the Historicity that is of the *human*, purposively delineating the malleability of the Negative that falls upon the consciousness of the body itself. It is thus that the body, as of a razor's edge, folds upon the negative itself.

2.2.2 The Hegelian Body:

(1)Necessity, Possibility and Reality

(2)Substance and Accident

The body is identically beholden to the universal and the particular, just

as it holds and folds upon that which is *History and Time*, a body that folds upon its *freedom* and its **necessity**. In the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, Hegel describes the notion of Necessity to be “[the] *identity of possibility and reality*,”²¹⁸ and, too, to be the necessity of the relation between that which is substance and accident.²¹⁹ The Hegelian notion of body is thus identically filtered within an *excess of the possible* that motions towards that which is (the) Real, just as it is of a relation that efficiently fastens upon both accident (or pertinent chance) and its substance. Substance as in a particular type of matter or spirit, that is material or immaterial denoting its un(changing) essence, that is, at the same time, *individual and caused*, or of a “substance that remains the [~~not~~]same *through change*.”²²⁰

In this sense, we note, that the body is the nascent relation that facilitates and entangles that which unfastens *possibility* into action. This unfastening of the body details a swaying from interior to exterior and exterior to interior, that is, it is of a *substance* that identically pertains to

218. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 95, paragraph: 96.

219. *Ibid.*, paragraph: 98.

220. Flew, *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, 344 (emphasis added).

the vehicle that engages **contingentReality**, just as its antithesis or Negation builds a suspension that twists upon the **Reality of the body** itself, that is, the Negative. It is such that the body, within its contingency and firstNature, intrinsically magnifies the Necessity that is of the Real. Hegel thus notes that this identity of the contingent and the Real presently “makes [what is] the real into the necessary”²²¹ and, further: “In its truth, then, it is the **relation of necessity**.”²²²

There is a remarkable double allusion within the Hegelian notion of “Necessity” and its *relation* to the notion of the “body.” For, in effect, if we strike the word “Necessity,” and place the word “Body” in its stead, we may detect a near *identical* correlation between the two concepts (keeping in mind, that is, the Kantian notion concerning the object, its *appearance* and *Ding an Sich*). Hegel comments on the notion of necessity as follows:

221. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 96, paragraph: 97.

222. *Ibid.*, (emphasis added).

Necessity is therefore unity with itself, identical, but full of content, essence which shines in itself so that its differences have the form of independent realities, and thus is identical at the same time as absolute form, the activity of suspending immediacy into mediation and mediation into immediacy. Necessity exists through an other that has collapsed into the mediating ground, into immediate reality, and into a contingent entity which is at the same time condition. Necessity that is through an other is not in and for itself, but merely posited. This mediation, however, is just as immediately the suspension of itself. The ground posits itself as ground, and is suspended as contingent condition into immediacy, through which the former positing is, rather, suspended into reality and converges with itself. This identity makes the real into the necessary. In its truth, then, it is the relation of necessity.²²³

By folding the notion of “Necessity” towards the “Body” we gain a fecund reading of the multiple engagement that is Body. For Hegel, *Necessity*, that is, what we delineate to be identically the Body itself, is then in accord with itself, indistinguishable or equal, yet replete with substance, and of an essence which radiates in itself, wherein its distinctions contain

223. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 96, paragraph: 97.

the identity of autonomous realities. In this sense, necessity and/or the body is equal to “absolute form” in that it is identical (with itself) as pure object – that is, in the act of “suspending immediacy into mediation and mediation into immediacy.”²²⁴ Hence, the body is capable of facilitating movement or becoming the movement itself that marks its essential immediacy and mediation, just as it facilitates the dialectical notion of suspension. The body, moreover, in its essence **perseveres throughout an other**, as an *exterior and interior figuration* – that is, identically Time, History, and Spirit collapsing into its mediating ground, which itself identically engages and forms or forces Time, History, and the body into an excessive reality – whilst maneuvering a contingent body that is markedly fastened upon the *condition* that *is* identically the Time, History, and (first)Nature *that itself accosts or infiltrates of body*. The Body, further, relinquishes of itself, in its mediating process and suspension, that which is itself of *another* necessity (or *itselfbodyitself*) that is of the notion of *Ding-an-Sich* forming itself_other doubly in an uncontingent and free manner. A mediation, however, that identically suspends itself as the negation of its negation – that is, a *third negation*,

224. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 96, paragraph: 97.

forming itself as the object of its appearance and disappearance (creation and destruction), *Ding an Sich* (thing-in-itself) and other.

This suspension, as Hegel states, takes the form of “[t]he ground [that] posits itself as ground, and is suspended as contingent condition into immediacy, through which the former positing is, rather, suspended into reality and converges with itself. This identity makes the real into the necessary.”²²⁵ Here we shall mark a shifting of this reading to say: *This identity makes the real into the body* (the “body” replacing “necessity”), and where Hegel writes that “[i]n its truth, then, it is”, that is, in our thinking, *the body is* “the relation of [its] necessity.”²²⁶

The body vacillates, as in the swaying from the material that is immediacy to the immaterial that is mediation, on the ground of a reality that carries and aligns Spirit to the physical force that is the bodies’ body. The body

225. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 96, paragraph: 97.

226. *Ibid.*

is, then, simultaneously a (1) **physicality**, (2) **necessity** and (3) **reality** that offers itself as a “*relation*” to the real and to the necessary, that in turn is the real.

The idea of the body as a “relation” that is aligned to the *necessary* and the *real* is further considered by Hegel as he develops the notion that Spirit moves its body as a **Sign**.²²⁷ In effect, according to the Hegelian dialectic, it is the very corporeality that is of a “sign” that propels Spirit towards that which we may call the **site of the Real**.

Spirit is at first this immediate submergence in nature: (a) the soul in its determination as nature; (b) as the soul is particularized, it emerges in antithesis to its lack of consciousness; (c) in the process it acquires corporeality, and thus becomes real.²²⁸

Within the Hegelian dialectic, the body is identically precise (real and/or natural, a firstNature) as it is imprecise (~~un~~real, that which is

227. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 212, paragraph: 326.

228. *Ibid.*, 205, paragraph: 310.

~~otherthanbody~~, Spirit and the Negative). So it is that Hegel will describe the body as the pronouncement of the *reality* that is *consciousness* (or, in other words, the soul), even as he delineates the body as an **indirect Sign**, or indiscreet “relation” indicating that which is *other than itself* an *otherthanbody*, as it were, as an “indefinite sign for the spirit.”²²⁹

Yet within the dialectic of the body, it is precisely that which is “indefinite,” *indiscreet* and *imprecise* that promises the force of the exceptional flexibility that is body. For the body is of a body that languishes and maneuvers a presence that is identically an absence, just as it is an absence that is itself present. It is this *presence of absence*, then, that is of the body itself that in an elegant feat fastens upon the *existence* of the “individual subject” and “achieves being in the body...as historical authenticity.”²³⁰ And in Hegelian thinking, it is within its very indiscreetness that the body appears as a “thoroughly formed instrument” that is, moreover, extravagantly “dominated” by

229. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 212, paragraph: 326.

230. *Ibid.*, 212, paragraph: 325.

consciousness.²³¹ The extravagance of this consciousness that is body itself lies upon its permeability that identically folds upon its *first and second Nature*. The folding of the body is not without strife or contradiction, twisting upon the duplicity that is itself, for and against Nature and Spirit. The body can thus be denoted as a twisting of duplicitous forces that fasten upon Historicity and the Negative. That is to say, the body is of an inheritance and a *haunting* that folds upon Spirit. Principally, the *haunting* calls forth the inheritance and future that is of a History that professes Freedom and the Negative that is the *human itself*.

2.2.3 The Hegelian Body:

(1)The Inherited Body

(2)The Third Self of Body

The body is thus a pure (free) or (uncontingent) and impure (unfree) or

231. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 212, paragraph: 325.

(contigent) *Relation* that folds upon accident and chance, necessity and the Real, that manifests the human figuration.²³²

It is a Relation that itself is of a remarkable difference and diffusion, that is and is not what it is, manifesting the pronouncement *of the relation that is the Body itself* (i.e., the human itself). This *Relation* fastens upon that which we may denote as the third body of the negative itself. It is the Necessity of the Body that infiltrates its *History, Time, and the very reason of its Freedom* encumbered by *actionability, infiltration, and the Real*. As Hegel remarks, that which is Idea delineates the complete *diffusion (or unity) of body and soul*. Hegel thus radically intertwines Nature and Spirit, insisting upon the bodies' severe passage and

232. In this instance, Nancy, moreover, identifies the Hegelian notion of necessity and freedom within a freedom that gesticulates upon nothing(ness). Nancy writes, "freedom is the position of...nothing" and, in turn, is "the liberation...of everything" See Nancy, "Freedom," in "*Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, 68. This notion, then, allows us to effectively reposition the body as the locus of this nothing(ness) (just as this nothing(ness) enables or even anticipates the bodyhistory or the bodyofhistory that in effect forces its liberation. In Nancy's words, freedom is the "Necessity and anarchy of the absolute" (Ibid.). Wherein we may further posit that in its Absolute contradiction – that is, Negativity and negation – the body becomes the Anarchy that is freedom's Nothingness. In this instance, Nancy remarks, one may not ask for freedom, for one has to *become freedom* itself (ibid., 69). That is to say, one has to become freedom "starting from Nothing" (ibid., 71). And lest we forget "what is at stake" (ibid., 74), freedom is nothing other than that which foments or even insinuates the very struggle, acquiescence and infiltration of *freedom* and *necessity*, a freedom that itself gestures unfreedom, or that which we may call, in Nancy's words, the struggle against a "liberation for nothing" (ibid., 72).

circulation; a passage that likewise folds within it the spirit of negation, opposition and expulsion. Within this notion, the body pertains to an enclosure that is identically enclosed and notenclosed, folding upon itself and other, incessantly, as in a motion that itself creates and destroys its very own being. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel thus writes: “To the outer whole, therefore, belongs not only the *original being*, the inherited body”²³³ – (the “*inherited body*,” which we shall denote to be *identically the body that folds upon its firstNature, just as it may fold upon its **ancestry** that folds over to History, that is of its secondNature, the Negative*) – whereupon Hegel continues, “but equally the formation of the body resulting from the activity of the inner being; the body is the unity of the unshaped and of the shaped being...”²³⁴

According to this notion, the body is *inherited* by and/or of Nature as it is inherited by and/or of History itself (the negative and freedom). This inheritance is of a first and second Nature, and its suspension harkens a third force that infiltrates History and Nature. It is thus that the Hegelian

233. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 186, paragraph: 311.

234. *Ibid.*

notion of the Idea (the unity of body and soul) in effect, carves out a *third* body (an absolute negative) that manifestly lingers upon the infiltration of the negative that tumbles upon the figure that is *the human*. It is the notion of a figure that beckons Being itself. This unity that motions towards a totality and or absolute Knowledge is *the human*, as it is, likewise, *the Time of Infinity* and the “The Concept” (as both object and subject and absolute negativity);²³⁵ manifestly marking the unity that constructs the Notion: the *totality* that is *human existence and identically that which delineates in the human identity and difference*.

So it is that Hegel will reference the notion of an identical other as a Self that has reached a new stage in Spirit. He notes: “This self of conscience, Spirit that is directly aware of itself as absolute truth and being is the *third* self.”²³⁶ A “third self” which we shall delineate to be no other than a *third body*.

235. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 200, paragraph: 299.

236. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 384, paragraph: 633.

2.2.4 The Hegelian Body:

(1) *The Meeting-Point that is Transitive*

(2) **Of Finitude and Infinity**

In essence, that which is *the human* struggles to become “*other to itself*”²³⁷ in order that it may transform otherness as itself and to itself. Hegel refers to this acceleration of Spirit, as it were, as the manifestation of the “actuality and truth” of Being.²³⁸ This acceleration is essentially *mediated* as a rumination that ferments consciousness and its *body* and the consciousness of body. It is the rumination of an alienation that forestalls itself, returns within itself and disparages itself, so that it may accentuate Reality, that is, Being’s Truth. And Being’s truth contains in itself the unity that grasps the antithesis that is individuality and universality. Just as its truth is neither that of Nature nor that of Spirit, but of its movement, Hegel therein indicates, “**Neither the one or the other has truth; the truth is just their movement...**”²³⁹

237. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 20.

238. Ibid.

239. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 472, paragraph: 780 (emphasis added).

The Body itself is then the *movement* of its truth. A type of dissolution of itself that “makes itself a moment of the whole.”²⁴⁰

And yet the whole is that which exists within its *identity* and its differentiation, a dissolution that calls forth its difference. The body is thus capable at once of holding and unholding itself with-in and out-side itself as a “subsistence or substance” or “Subject” that vigorously grasps its *identity as self* as its “content.”²⁴¹ The Body is thus a subsistence and dissolution that delineates the motion that holds “pure self-identity in otherness.”²⁴² It is a motion that folds the body into a particularuniversality, but not without expressing its contradictions. The body, in this sense, forms the focal point of a *meeting* that folds itself upon the *engagement* of an *estrangement* that forces the meeting and ungathering of seemingly opposing forces. Just as the body clasps upon consciousness and self-consciousness, that which is *possible* and that

240. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 32.

241. Ibid.

242. Ibid.

which is *necessary*, it grasps itself as if it were Other (which it is) and engages this contradiction itself as the motion that is of a *third self*, which provokes the suspension, the very activity, that calls forth the Idea of its Truth. The body in consciousness then accentuates the excess that folds upon History, Time, and Pure Knowledge, just as it divulges or engages that motion that is *against*History, *against*Truth, and *against*Reason.

Thus, the body itself demarcates the essential contradiction and opposition necessary in the delineation of Truth. So, too, it possesses the movement eliciting the contradictory forces of *another than truth*, which in and of *themselves* belong to Truth. Within this delineation, then, the body itself is demarcated by the incessant movement of its *contradictions; that is to state that its contradiction is its truth.*²⁴³ We may further state, then that not only is the body saturated within movement and contradiction, itself and other, but that in its finitude, that is, in its running out of time and with time to death, it pertains to that which is ethereal and transitory. And according to Hegel, it is precisely that which is in transition, contradictory, and finite which in due course

243. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 64, paragraph: 32.

provokes the passage towards that which is of “true infinity.” Hegel hence writes: “**Therefore it follows that something in transition only joins with itself, and this relation to itself in transition and in the other is the true infinity.**”²⁴⁴ Hegel further expounds upon this notion as follows: “As the contradiction of realizing itself in particularity and yet finding satisfaction in the generality from which it at the same time derives, the will [which we consider to fold upon or with the body] is in the first place the process of dispersion and the suspension of an inclination through the other, and the partial gratification which it entails, **through another to infinity.**”²⁴⁵ This notion as it is folded upon the body delineates that the very motion of the finitude of the body, that which is in transit, transitory or ephemeral, to be the very force that falls upon itself, as of another, to itself, and beyond itself to the infinite. The body, folding the in-itself (*Ding-an Sich*), delineates the force of *immateriality and materiality* as of a substance that falls upon the world and other. And upon this falling of the body, that is *ofanotherbody*, the finitude that is

244. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 74, paragraph: 48 (emphasis added).

245. *Ibid.*, 240, paragraph: 398 (emphasis added).

the human *reflects upon Another as the force that is the Negative, upon time, as of a reflection upon world, other, and itself.* The body being itself what it is and what it is not, is not that what it is, that is to say, the body being identically free as it is *unfree*, within its duplicity, transition, and consciousness of body, moves towards a self-consciousness or “*third Spirit*” that effectively “*exists its body,*”²⁴⁶ thereby grasping the *possibility* of its freedom.

It is the gift that promises pure exteriority as it delineates deference in absolute interiority, a body of “doubled forms of existence.”²⁴⁷ Hegel notes:

That which exists in truth, therefore, is an entity for itself, which immediately exists as another. It exists immediately as mediacy. It is therefore one and the same, which is the distinction and relation between these **doubled forms of existence**. These forms have, more over, determinacy as the difference of the reflection against each other, so that

246. “It would be best to say, using “exist” as a transitive verb- that consciousness *exists its body.*” Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 329.

247. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 89, paragraph: 82.

the one is reflection into itself, whereas the other is reflection into another.²⁴⁸

We may thus state that the body is “the difference of the reflection” that is of the reflection of and to itself and other. In Hegelian thinking, this difference that delineates the reflection of difference that is of a “reflection into itself” and “into another” is precisely the difference that is determinate History.

248. Hegel, *Encyclopedia Of The Philosophical Sciences In Outline And Critical Writings*, 89-90, paragraph: 82 (emphasis added).

3. Levinas: Prescient Fidelity that is Speech, (Metaphysics), History and Anti-History

3.1 *Totality and Infinity: The Disruption of History and the Face that is Other*

3.1.1 At Home With Oneself “chez soi” - (Translating the Hegelian *bei sich*) - and “hors-de-soi” (outside-of-oneself)²⁴⁹

“The true life is absent.” But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi. It is turned toward the “elsewhere” and the “otherwise” and the “other.” For in the most general form it has assumed in the history of thought it appears as a movement going forth from a world that is familiar to us, whatever be the yet unknown lands that bound it or that it hides from view, from an “at home” [chez soi] which we inhabit, toward an alien outside-of-oneself [*hors-de-soi*], toward a yonder.²⁵⁰

Levinasian metaphysics traverses upon that which Hegel enunciates as the advent of a determined History of *the human* that is Reason and Freedom

249. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 33.

250. Ibid.

and casts upon it an exiled pronouncement. That is, it considers the effectuation of the *underside* of Reason to actualize itself, as it were, within the absolute abstract totalitarian neutrality of the State, whilst habitually the Spirit of Freedom to be none other than the accession of an “arbitrary” Freedom,²⁵¹ leading an “existent”²⁵² (that is *the human*) to “cruelty,”²⁵³ *(dis)possession*, and “inhumanity”²⁵⁴ – in other words, a metaphysics that in its very denial of subjectivity suffocates and annihilates the Other by systematically neutralizing the return of the subject “Same”²⁵⁵ to “selfsameness.”²⁵⁶ In this sense, Levinas notes that

251. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 302. Curiously enough, Hegel will dispute this very point, in the *Philosophy of Right*, when he writes, “The commonest idea [*Vortellung*] we have of freedom is that of *arbitrariness* – the mean position of reflection between the will as determined solely by natural drives and the will which is free in and for itself. When we hear it said that freedom in general consists in *being able to do as one pleases*, such an idea [*Vorstellung*] can only be taken to indicate a complete lack of intellectual culture [*Bildung des Gedankens*]; for it shows not the least awareness of what constitutes the will which is free in and for itself, or right, or ethics, etc.” See Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, 48, paragraph: 15. Moreover, he states, “The common man thinks that he is free when he is allowed to act arbitrarily, but this very arbitrariness implies that he is not free. When I will what is rational, I act not as a particular [*partikulares*] individual, but in accordance with the concept of ethics in general: in an ethical act, I vindicate not myself but the thing [*die Sache*]” (ibid., *Addition* (H), 49).

252. Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, x.

253. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 223.

254. Ibid., 46.

255. Ibid., 21.

256. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 11.

“Western philosophy has most often been an ontology; a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that insures the comprehension of being.”²⁵⁷ In effect, Levinasian metaphysics undertakes the perfidious and onerous path that descends upon the *outside of history*, precisely moving *against* the Hegelian dialectic, by creating an other than History, a casting upon anti-history the transcendent motion that calls forth the thought of the *Infinity of the Other, to the I, the subject, the Self or the Same*. Levinas will denote this rupture as a motion or force going “beyond history,”²⁵⁸ beyond dialectics, and beyond the negative, towards an “otherwise than being.”²⁵⁹ In effect, by shifting ground, Levinas builds a metaphysics of the Other and “Alterity,”²⁶⁰ dislodging and extricating the thought that crosses the Hegelian negative,

257. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 43. See also Adorno’s critique of Hegelianism, in *Negative Dialectics*, wherein he states, “The individual, Hegel tells us, ‘has his being in that substance,’ in the universality which to him was still coinciding with the popular spirits. But its positivity itself is negative, and the more negative its bearing, the more positive it will be; unity gets worse as its seizure of plurality becomes more thorough. It has its praise bestowed on it by the victor, and even a spiritual victor will not do without his triumphal parade, without the ostentatious pretense that what is incessantly inflicted upon the many is the meaning of the world.” Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 328. In a similarly critical note, Nietzsche writes: “Overproud European of the nineteenth century, you are mad! Your knowledge does not complete nature but only kills your own... Your manner of moving, that is, of climbing as a knower, is your doom...” See Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, 50.

258. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 22.

259. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, “Book title”

260. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 34.

that is, according to Levinas, the *underside* that is history and reason,²⁶¹ and in its stead, in a provocation, motions towards an undialectical, anti-historical, “an-archival” “(non-origin)” of “separation” and no return, that is of the *Infinite Other*.²⁶² Levinasian metaphysics thus figures upon a metaphysics of *Infinity* that delineates of a pure separation, thereby contesting the Hegelian metaphysics of unity that delineates the return upon the self, “systematic” totality, historicity and “absolute knowledge.”

Whilst in Hegelian thinking, the notion of Suspension (*Aufhebung*) and/or synthesis calls forth the demarcation of the passage of a *deliverance* that is of a duplicitous and identical kind, that is at once “*bringing to an end*” and equally “*maintaining*” the subject,²⁶³ in Levinasian thinking, it is

261. In a prefiguration of the Levinasian critique, Adorno likewise criticizes the Hegelian notion of “Universal History,” as “the all-subjugating identity principle” in a “frightening retribution for the calamity which identity brought on the nonidentical.” See Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 320. Equating Hegelian dialectics with a dangerous acquiescence to the supremacy of a universalism that suffocates the *separation* of the individual, Adorno herein reflects on a frightening reversal of a *realized absolute totality* and *absolute knowledge*, which considers the very possibility that history may itself accelerate as “a piece of prolonged natural history”, infinitely repeating the “arbitrary” activity “of seizing power” in a promiscuous and false formulation that is Universality (ibid., 321). Nietzsche echoes this sentiment when he writes: “*there is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of historical sense which injures every living thing and finally destroys it, be it man, a people or a culture.*” See Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, 10.

262. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 11.

263. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 79.

precisely this (dialectical) synthesis that is seen as the force that unduly “integrates,” neutralizes, occupies and seizes the Other as a possession facilitating the *return upon the subjectSame*. In contrast to Hegelian unity and or suspension,²⁶⁴ the Levinasian metaphysic will gesture towards a displacement or upsurge, *in pure separation*, that calls forth the human desire towards Alterity, forming itself as in a revelation that propounds in the *face of another* an ascension that calls forth the motion of Infinity for the subjectSame (the Self and the I). Derrida therein denotes the disparity of the Levinasian “Alterity” as that which must be understood and considered to be of an “absolute *solitude* of the *existent* in its existence,” a solitude that is essentially unapproachable and “secret.”²⁶⁵ In other words, that is of a displacement and unmarking of Alterities’ *Other* in which “its presence (*is*) a **certain absence**,” unfathomable and unknowable, as in a distant nonalignment.²⁶⁶ Levinasian thinking thus

264. See, for example, Marcuse’s comment on the Hegelian notion concerning the *Aufhebung* of the subject in its otherness. Referring to this movement, Marcuse writes, “As an ontological category, the ‘subject’ is the power of an entity to ‘be itself in its otherness’ (*Bei-sich-selbst-sein im Andersein*).” See Marcuse, “*Reason and Revolution*”, 69. Yet, even this form of Hegelian suspension is contrary to the Levinasian metaphysic which motions towards a deunification or fissure of self and other, in opposition to its gathering unification in contradiction. Marcuse, moreover, notes that Hegel, in effect, will align this notion of a gathering unification in contradiction, to the idea of true or “real infinity” (*Jenenser Logik*), as that which “is not something behind or beyond finite things, but is their true reality” (ibid). Levinas, in contrast, considers infinity as that which is ungathered, beyond historical time, and before logos, an “otherwise-than-being,” that is of an “an-archical” metaphysics that divests itself from the notion of a negative return.

265. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 89.

266. Ibid., 91 (emphasis added).

inauspiciously unravels the very ~~un~~thinking of history, the very motion of a pre-deflection that is an other than History by identically precipitating an “overflowing” experience of an other than time of a subjectivity that gesticulates towards a “responsibility of the other,”²⁶⁷ that is of an exiled beginning and expulsion, whilst lasting or keeping of the subjectSame (Self), whilst motioning towards “*hors-de-soi*,” (the outside-of-oneself), without return, precisely lingering upon an ethics that is Other.

267. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 5. In contrast to Levinas, Althusser describes the Hegelian notion of dwelling “at home,” that is of being “*bei sich*,” as a radicalization of philosophy, as in a grasping of philosophy, that is unfolding upon the universal and particular self, whilst identically motioning towards an inner circle of itself. Althusser describes the “*bei sich*” as an intimacy of knowledge that circulates upon the object, subject, and self (in Levinasian tongue: whilst lasting or keeping of the SubjectSame not returning). Althusser writes: “For Hegel, thought must not remain on the threshold, but should rather step into the house; it has to dwell ‘at home’, *bei sich*, that is, in its object, its own content: ‘Philosophy is the thought of the content.’⁶³” See Althusser’s thesis, “On Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel,” “II: Cognition of the Concept,” in Althusser *The Spectre of Hegel: Early Writing Louis Althusser*, 61. In a still more complex delineation, Althusser will motion toward the Hegelian notion of discovering truth *as that which is lost through its discovery*: “the truth of Paradise lies in the losing of it” (ibid, 73). Althusser therein bestows the “myth of eve” as the positive aspect of the negative that marks a “passage to the outside” wherein “*la verite du Paradis est d’etre perdu*” (ibid.). Thus in Hegel, truth circulates *bei sich* even as it motions to the outside. Althusser therein argues that within the Hegelian Negative, History, and Spirit, “henceforth, truth would be exile, would dwell outside, would itself be the outside” (ibid). In this sense, Althusser comments, the search for truth, in Hegelian thinking, is “the truth of what [the truth] destroyed” (ibid). This destruction which, is itself of an *exile*, thus lingers upon what could be a first intonation of the forging of the other as the distancing of truth that is the exile of truth which Levinas will later transform or separate upon the concave notion of the Same as the very separation of its truth. In Hegelian thinking, by contrast, Althusser motions this separation as a movement towards “the outside of this outside” therein motioning towards a recurrent or circulating notion of exile, yet still fathoming a return to the Hegelian reflection of *the Self that is Other*.

3.1.2 The Before that is Something Else Entirely: Interiority and Dead Time

[W]e propose to describe, within the unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence (as we shall call it), a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or human totality, that is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity. Such a relationship is metaphysics itself. History would not be the privileged plane where Being disengaged from this particularism of point of view (with which reflection would still be affected) is manifested. If it claims to integrate myself and the other within an impersonal spirit this alleged integration is cruelty and injustice, that is, ignores the Other.²⁶⁸

In *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, Levinas demarcates “[o]ntology [...] as first philosophy” to be a “*philosophy of power*,”²⁶⁹ delineating a desolate ravaging of an *unlimited* freedom, a tyrannical propulsion of the State grasping upon a violence that succumbs the Other to the Same. Against the *underside* of History, Levinas offers an

268. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 52.

269. *Ibid.*, 46.

other than History that is of a desire for alterity, not returning, still recurrent; a thought that breaks upon the circle of the Same. The Levinasian notion of desire hence harkens towards “*something else entirely*, towards the *absolutely other*” that marks pure alterity.²⁷⁰ The *absolutely other* ascends towards a prior to History and a prior to Being, signaling a *before*, and something else entirely, of a “remotness,” strangeness, and “separation,” that is “prior to kinship.”²⁷¹ Levinas thus proposes to unfasten History by stepping outside of the Hegelian notion of the Time that is History (or the history that is time and the *human*) that is of the “ontological ground” that is the time of “universal history,”²⁷² in accessing *another thinking* of time that oversteps and overturns Historical Time, a beyond historicalTime that identically passes through, against and outside historicity, proposing an Infinity that neither runs adjacent to history nor evades it, but that is of an interiority and expulsion that effectively “uproots” it.²⁷³ Levinas thus professes a time that provokes the instance of an “interval”²⁷⁴ accented in no beginning or ending,

270. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, 33.

271. *Ibid.*, 34.

272. *Ibid.*, 55.

273. *Ibid.*, 52.

274. *Ibid.*, 58.

designating this recurrence of time as an interruption and a “dead time,”²⁷⁵ a time that is before History where “[e]ven its cause, older than itself, is still to come.”²⁷⁶ Levinasian metaphysics will therefore disrupt our very notion of a considered *existence* in motioning to the possibility of a *before, within, in-between* and *beyond* History, just as it insists upon an *existence that* designates an “an-archival,” “non-origin” of no beginnings; that is to say, it gestures to a metaphysics that profoundly dislocates the notion of a “divine” or “absolute totality.” Levinas notes:

The non-reference to the common time of history means that mortal existence unfolds in a dimension that does not run parallel to the time of history and is not situated with respect to this time as to an absolute.²⁷⁷

Mortal existence thus falls upon a breadth of force that is neither historical nor divine, motioning to a “dead time” that gestures towards a “distance” or “separation” of time that circulates upon an “inner life” that is, accordingly and identically, “psychism.”²⁷⁸

275. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 58.

276. *Ibid.*, 54.

277. *Ibid.*, 56.

278. *Ibid.*, 54.

Expanding upon the Levinasian notion of “dead time,” we may likewise consider Bracha L. Ettinger’s concept of “matrixial time” as a parallel notion that weaves its way in and out of the Levinasian concept. For Ettinger, the “*matrixial time*” harkens both male and female subjects to a radical “feminine” time, passaging, or spacing that fathoms itself as a “*border linking*” or “*borderspacing*” “intrauterine [...] prenatal” and/or art encounter encountering.²⁷⁹ Ettinger’s notion of the “feminine,” which may likewise be aligned with the Levinasian notion of the *face*, and the *other*, ruptures Freudian and Lacanian notions of “female sexuality” that are bound by the “Phallic Structure,” and offers another or radical “feminine” that, not unlike the Levinasian *other*, pronounces a divergent and shifting notion of a *time that is before arrival(prenatal)secret(moreless)travelling*.²⁸⁰ Ettinger writes,

Female subjects have a double access to the matrixial sphere in the Real because they experience the womb both as an archaic out-site and past-site – out of chronological time as “anterior” (this is true for males as well) – *and* as in-side and future-side – as an actual, future, and “posterior” time (whether they are mothers or not). Too-early or too-late

²⁷⁹ Pollock, “Introduction,” in Bracha L. Ettinger’s *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 1; for references to “borderlinking” and “borderspacing” encounters, refer to page 11.

²⁸⁰ Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 123.

time-out-of-time is a potentiality that may become present for a woman.²⁸¹

Ettinger further specifies this variance of time-within-the-*feminine* or the matrix, when she notes that “[f]emale subjects have a privileged access to the paradoxical time, the matrixial time, where the future traumatically meets the past, as well as to the paradoxical matrixial space where the out-side meets the inside.”²⁸² Ettinger motions upon a feminine that is paradoxically gendered as it is anotherthan ungender(ed) of a *feminine* that *partakes of a future past bordering upon an exteriorinteriority fathoming the psychic of body, itself history, and otherthanbeforeHistory, so, too, deathbeforeAfter (birth).*

In Levinasian thinking, a disEmbarking upon the demarcation of a breaking or broken time, delineating an “interiority,” that is of a “psychism” that extends the very possibility of “the feat of radical separation”²⁸³ whilst, at the same time, denoting that which is *still before*

281. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 143.

282. Ibid. Ettinger goes on to note that males, too, may access “this time and space through compassionate joining-in-difference with others in transference relations” and through art working (ibid). As Ettinger describes it, the *matrixial borderspace* and its *time*, offers both female and male subjects, a “positioning,” however delicate, “vis-à-vis their I, the Other, and the world” (ibid).

283. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, 54.

or *prior* to the subject, “interiority” and “psychism,” “whose abstract formulation harbors a paradox.”²⁸⁴ This paradox and separation calls forth a “metaphysical asymmetry” that is “[a] separation of the I that is not the reciprocal of the transcendence of the other with regard to me...”²⁸⁵ An intense disjunction in the “separation of the Same”²⁸⁶ distorting historical Time, calling into question the very notion of *human* commencement and its conclusion, effectively promulgating disorder upon that which we may consider to be the finite and the infinite. Levinas writes:

[F]or there to be a separated being, for the totalization of history to not be the ultimate schema of being, it is necessary that death which for the survivor is an end be not only this end; it is necessary that there be in dying another direction than that which leads to the end as to a point of impact in the duration of survivors.²⁸⁷

In Levinasian thinking, distance and separation manifesting themselves as interiority, and psychism – through the *provocation of the face* in the

284. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 54.

285. *Ibid.*

286. *Ibid.*

287. *Ibid.*

Infinity that is of the Other (and through procreation), in the subjectSame and within the separation of the subjectSame and the I, to the Other – contests the metaphysical notion that birth and death derive their meaning from “the time of universal history.”²⁸⁸

Similarly, Ettinger’s notion of *matrixial borderspace* as *prenatal encounter*, which speaks of “metramorphosis” as “*co-naissance*—knowledge of being-born-together—which is not cognitive and does not enter direct representation” motions towards Levinasian notion of a distance_procreation, and calling.²⁸⁹ This notion fits in duly with the Levinasian thought, which emphasizes the movement towards the other as a call or commandment that is a prior to light (i.e., representation), therein emphasizing the psychic, unconscious and corporeal element or encounteringbefore which resides as in a secret both within the Levinasian *calling(beforebirth-future-before-history)* as within Ettinger’s notion of “*co-naissance*.” Additionally, Ettinger refers to “metramorphosis” as a “nonphallic *erotic co-response-ability*...” and as “Opening a distance-in-

288. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, 54.

289. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 144.

proximity while separating-in-jointness with/from an-other, or borderlinking while differentiating...,” delineating this aperture as “a passage to the *non-I*,” harkening the Levinasian passaging to a paradoxical secretless other’(s) in proximity’s separation.²⁹⁰

In pointing to another site or dimension wherein the (im)possible becomes possible as “an order where everything is *pending*, where what is no longer possible historically remains always possible,”²⁹¹ Levinas propounds a *radical distancing from historicity* that defies the negative and further professes a primordial beginning that designates “the birth of a separated being that *must proceed from nothingness*,”²⁹² of an absolute or pure beginning or beginninglessness, a pure beginning, that itself marks in the historical moment, “at each instant [...] the point of a new origin.”²⁹³ Levinasian metaphysics, then, does not only fall upon that which is “beyond” or outside of History, but determines itself equally within, in-between, and against “historical objectivity” through the delineation of an “interior” figuration (in the subjectSame) demarcating in

290. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 144.

291. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 54.

292. *Ibid.*

293. *Ibid.*, 56.

the existent a *subjectivity* that is of a secret *inner life* or *psychism* that is or *has been called to or upon the subjectSame* by the desire of a pure alterity and the Other.²⁹⁴ Hence Levinas denotes: “The real must not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from interior intentions, from the *secrecy* that interrupts the continuity of historical time.”²⁹⁵ It is thus that the Levinasian concept of Infinity reveals a further eruption that is of an estranged “third”²⁹⁶ anterior dimension that travels upon the passage in excess of that which is being and nothingness, or as Levinas denotes between “[t]he interval of discretion or of death” as that which delineates an other than the absolute foundation and birth or closing that is the death of the existent.²⁹⁷

This anterior dimension which shifts the time that is history and which travels upon the passage as in excess to history motions upon the *subjectSame* as if in a secret *some-thing*, *some-thing-Other*, *some-thing-*

294. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, 58.

295. *Ibid.*, 57-58.

296. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 184.

297. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, p.58

strange, and some-thing-infinite. Ettinger's notion of the *feminine* or matrixial "metramorphosis" offers an interesting counterpart to the Levinasian notion of "distance," "separation" and "interval," wherein "foreignness and feminity represent and are engaged in a continual negotiation *without exhausting recognition, without claiming full understanding, without even expecting love and harmony, and without definite resolution.*"²⁹⁸ That is to say, if the passage toward the *Infinite* and the *death (of time)* that is *outside* history and/or *UniversalTime*, in Levinas, is marked through separation, distance, and interval, in Ettinger's consideration, the "interval" may be alluded to in a manner that is "without expecting definite resolution."²⁹⁹ Or, too, as a "prehistoric" condition" which Griselda Pollock, referencing Ettinger, articulates as a "prebirth encounter."³⁰⁰ Therein we may motion the Levinasian *Alterity, Separation, and Infinity*, to harkening, as of a *withoutness* and an *inbetween-ness*, that in Ettinger's thinking, coincides with

298. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 111 (emphasis added).

299. Ibid.

300. Pollock, "Introduction," in Bracha Lichtenberg-Ettinger's *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 11.

the Levinasian concept of non-assimilation, other-than-fusion, in addition to passing towards and within a *between-ness that is of* “being and nothingness.” Thus Ettinger notes, “In the matrix, the stranger, neither cut out from the system nor assimilated to it, *cannot* be articulated as a parasite and cannot be rejected. Along our metramorphosis, the others and I share a destiny in which each of us is partial and relative “between being and nothingness.”³⁰¹ Still, it should be noted, in contradistinction to Levinas, Ettinger’s *matrixial borderspace* proposes or pronounces a metaphysics or psychoanalysis of “severality” or “subjectivity-as-encounter,” circulating upon a “*moment of jointness*,” which Pollock describes as being or finding itself “in the shared borderspace of several becoming subjectivities, unknown and unknowable to the other, whose becoming the non-I other mutually co-affects in unpredictable and yet *subjectivizing ways*,” in what further entails, in this instance, an unconscious *encountering in severality* – a motion that speaks to the instance of the “I” and “non-I” as Relation in contradistinction to the

301. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 111.

Levinasian notion of Separation.³⁰² Ettinger thus aspires to the notion that “[t]he several comes before the One,” which itself may motion to the notion that the *several comes before the Same* or the *several comes in or as of the Other, other(s) others*.³⁰³ Ettinger’s *Relation-as-Severality* therein motions towards a more complex Levinasian relation than is first evident, as may be witnessed in the matrix’s strong parallel relation to Levinas’s concept of separation. Ettinger notes:

From the moment we speak of the subject, we may also speak of an *enlarged subjectivity*. In the Matrix a meeting occurs between the co-emerging *I* and the unknown *non-I*. Neither assimilates or rejects the other, and their energy consists neither in fusion, nor repulsion, but in a continual readjustment of distances, a continual negotiation of separateness and distance within togetherness and proximity. *Matrix is a zone of encounter between the most intimate and most distanced unknown*. Its most internal is an outer limit, and the limits themselves are flexible and variable. They are potential or virtual thresholds.³⁰⁴

302. Pollock, “Introduction,” in Bracha L. Ettinger’s *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 3.

303. *Ibid.*, 14.

304. *Ibid.*

That which is “distance,” “separation” and “interval,” then, persists in its remarkable ability to be flanked by more than one time.

Essentially, the notion of *separation* demarcates an interiority that lives “between two times,” of the dimension of a “dead time” that ruptures the duration of historical and totalized time.³⁰⁵ In effect, the death of *time*, for Levinas, marks the “rupture of historical and totalized duration...” and portends to “atheism” – and by “atheism” Levinas denotes a position that is “prior to both the negation and the affirmation of the divine” that is of another time than History.³⁰⁶

It is within the before, *in-between* and beyond that the very notion of being falls asunder, for even death pertains to an other of time, as Levinas notes: “...death is consequently not reducible to the end of being. What “still remains” is totally different from the future that one welcomes, that one projects forth and in a certain measure draws from oneself.”³⁰⁷ This escaping of death, is not such that the I continues after death, but that

305. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 58.

306. *Ibid.*

307. *Ibid.*, 57.

the notion of *Infinity* grasps an *interiority* that in “separation” and “interval” moves outside of the *totalization* of so called *universal time*. The Levinasian “interval” thus erupts from a separation that is critical in the consideration “to the first person of the I”³⁰⁸ by proposing that each existent “*has its own time*, that is, its *interiority*,”³⁰⁹ an “individual” and *singular time* that defers its absorption into the notion of a “universal time” or “universal *history*.” This is to say, the delineation of interiority that marks the psychic life of an existent is fundamentally of a discontinuous motion withdrawing, halting or breaking the universal and historicalTime, in essence, offering the notion of a “*secerecy*” that professes an interior psychism that reconfigures our very notions of that which we may consider to be the Real. Hence Levinas states: “The real must not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from interior intentions, from the *secerecy* that interrupts the continuity of historical time. Only on the basis of this *secerecy* is the pluralism of society possible.”³¹⁰ It is thus that an “interval” has been established

308. Levinas, *Totality and Infinty: An Essay on Exteriority*, 57.

309. Ibid.

310. Ibid., 57-58.

within metaphysical thought that provokes the notion of a doubled and independent time that circulates upon that which is between “being and nothingness,”³¹¹ marking, as Levinas states, “[t]he interval of discretion or of death.”³¹² The Levinasian metaphysics thus gestures towards a distancing that in separation, exteriority and psychism harkens towards an exiled *recurrence* of a non-beginning that is of *another than* death and no other than the discretion of a responsibility to another of an uncompromising ethics, an approach and proximity that is of a metaphysics of unsheltering the very ethics that is Other.

3.1.3 The Gleam of Another: The Face as the Unextinguishable Insomnia of Consciousness³¹³

But without substituting eschatology for philosophy, without philosophically “demonstrating” eschatological “truth,” we can proceed

311. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 58.

312. *Ibid.*

313. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 30.

from the experience of totality back to the situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other... this transcendence is expressed by the term infinity.³¹⁴

...the Before *appears* and is only welcomed.³¹⁵

The “Before” is then the face that “is only welcomed;”³¹⁶ that which motions between attendance and departure, historicity and divine ascent, that is no other than *the face of another*. It is the face of another that languishes and overflows upon the body of the same in revelation of the Other. The face marks precisely a call towards an “unextinguishable insomnia of consciousness;”³¹⁷ a call that precedes and therefore precisely refutes the call to murder, answering to that which is “hospitality,” and “welcoming,” all the while motioning the subject *Same*

314. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 24-25.

315. *Ibid.*, 54.

316. *Ibid.*

317. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 30.

towards the site of an Exile and no return.³¹⁸ The call of the face is prior to its very representation manifesting itself in severance, seclusion, and unsheltering; delineating the very sign or signification³¹⁹ that is the Infinite. The face delineates the incomparability of ethics that questions *the subject that is the Same*, as the turning that faces the Same or as the Same that turns upon the Other intimates another site that is an “immemorial” beginninglessness, that is “the trace of an immemorial past.”³²⁰ The “proximity” that is at once distant and strange demarcates the profoundest intimacy and the “grandest event”³²¹ within the *human encounter: the Infinite that is the face to face of ethics*; a haunting “responsibility overflowing freedom”, writes Levinas.³²²

318. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 27.

319. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 136. Buber’s influence on Levinas is self-evident when considering Levinas’s development of the notions of the “face,” “alterity,” and “infinity.” See, for example, Buber’s reference to the word, voice, or gesture that is “You” in relation to Levinas’s notion of “infinity,” in the following quote: “Whoever says You does not have something for his object. For wherever there is something there is also another something; every It borders on other Its; It is only by virtue of bordering on others. But where You is said there is no something. It has no borders.... Whoever says You does not have something; he has nothing. But he stands in relation.” See Buber, *I And Thou*, 55. We should here note a slight variance to Buber’s wording “But he stands in *relation*,” to be precisely considered or reconsidered *in relation* to Levinas’s notion of the “face,” “alterity,” and “infinity,” as, for example, of the relation that is of the *face-that-is-You*, or *the-having-Nothing-that-is-the-You*.

320. Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 136.

321. Levinas, *Is It Righteous To Be?*, 234.

322. Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, 136.

It may be of interest, at this instance, to retrace Fichte's consideration of freedom in "*Grundlage des Naturrechts*," (1796), wherein he ascertains that a subject's freedom – not unlike the Levinasian "call" or *calling* – is intimately linked through the "summons" ("*Aufforderung*") of another.³²³ Still, it should be noted that, for Levinas, this "summons" or *calling* is neither related to "freedom" nor "consciousness," as the *calling* escapes or simply *befalls* the subject, selfsame or existent, prior to or beyond, the subject's (or existent's) freedom or consciousness, thus predisposing of itself before Logos and remaining asymmetrical.

Notwithstanding this point of contrast, however, there appears in Fichte the notion that the other is the source of the subject's *conscious freedom*, already setting the stage for Levinas's consideration of the face of the other as an ethical "call" to responsibility. For Fichte, too, considers the "summons" to be an ethical "call" or "*Anstoß*," a "summons to autonomous freedom," which may "be accepted, declined or ignored" by the one who is summoned.³²⁴ And yet, as in exact reversal of the Levinasian pronouncement, the Fichtean "call" is a "summons" that, in

323. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 36.

324. *Ibid.*

a turning, or about face, is a “call” towards *delimiting the summoner’s freedom* by observing the freedom of the summoned.³²⁴ Still, as Williams notes, Fichte’s consideration of freedom brings forth the radical notion that “*freedom has a devided ground,*” in that freedom itself delineates the provocation of the very “outside” that is of a freedom externally summoned, whilst, at the same time relegating a consciousness of freedom to the interior self or subject as the self-consciousness of the summoned that is a “freedom as a response to and for another.”³²⁵ In other words, Fichte’s freedom is of a determined exterior that is summoned upon an interior, as the “self-consciousness of freedom” that is yet again motioned towards an exterior other. Whilst in the Levinasian delineation, the commandment is principally unfastening itself in separation of an other *and in excess of a Return*. Still, the Fichtean calling of freedom is a *freedom* that is first and foremost *determined by the other or an other*. Referring to Fichte, Williams notes, “This new self-consciousness of freedom points to the other beyond the subject as the ground of its

325. Williams, *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition*, 37.

determination” and as such rotates upon an ethical distancing or disruption or breaking of the subject that effectively pronounces the “*decentering of the subject*,” a motion that is effectively echoed in Levinasian metaphysics.³²⁶ Still, Williams notes, Fichte’s notion of the “decentered subject” is seen in a negative light as in the possibility of the restriction of the subject’s freedom by the community with its potentialities towards authoritarian abuse. Which therein prompts the question, whether the summoner is to be considered as an Other (Alterity, Difference, or *nonidentity* as in Adorno’s words) or to be the phantom other of a community that stands to “coerce” and restrict the freedom of the subject summoned.³²⁷ Notwithstanding this point of divergence, and with Levinas in mind, it is of particular interest that we quote Fichte directly:

Everyone can say: Whoever you may be, because *you bear a human face*, you are still a member of this great community. No matter how countless many intermediaries may be involved in the transmission,

326. Williams, *Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition*, 36 (emphasis added).

327. *Ibid.*, 39.

I nevertheless have an effect on you, and you have an effect upon me. No one whose face bears the stamp of reason, no matter how crude, exists for me in vain.³²⁸

And yet, in contrast to Fichte, for Levinas, Infinity – that is the very *bearing of the human face to yet another-human-face* of ethics – is that which overflows the very thought that thinks it, which takes flight upon discovering that which is *not*Other. It is a metaphysics that desires an Alterity that incites the desire for the “elsewhere or the other” that is of an Other and another than *Reason and at_the outside of Community*;³²⁹ a metaphysics of a *home-less-ness, and state-less-ness*, that is insomnia and the not-at-home (*nicht-bei-sich-sein*) as in a motioning “*hors-de-soi*” (outside-of-oneself). It is something *other*, like that of “a relationship whose positivity comes from remoteness and from separation; for it nourishes itself, one might say, with its hunger.”³³⁰

328. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 38 (emphasis added). Here again, it should be noted, that the Fichtean reference to reason and community is in stark contrast to the Levinasian metaphysic that motions towards the call of a singular other, that is of an other-outside reason, or consciousness.

329. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 33.

330. *Ibid.*, 34. It is of interest to note, that Levinas does not consider love to form an ethical concept or solution to the face of the other. As Williams denotes, “Levinas is critical of the concept of love, fearing that it involves fusion, loss of limits and boundaries.” See Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, 409. In this sense, contends Williamson, Levinas would likewise be apprehensive “of the *We*,” being of a “universal consciousness” and/or “totality,” in considering the face to be of an occurrence that “cannot be cognitively or emotionally mastered” (*Ibid.*, emphasis added). Thus Levinas considers the “face to be prior to power”(ibid).

In Levinasian thinking, the motion towards exteriority that is called upon the *subjectSame* (as the Other) is to be “understood as the alterity of the Other and of the Most-High.”³³¹ Infinity thus overflows the *subjectSame* as humility and discretion as an absolute call towards the one who is neighbor, destitute, forbidden (outcast), stranger, and enemy, towards the face of the one who is the absolutely Other, that is Alterity and destitution; the Other that is suffering the indiscretion of a violence that rouses death. The face that harkens towards infinitude that is *Infinity*, thus protracts the motion wherein the *subjectSame* “leaves itself”³³² whilst equally upholding “the I who welcomes it.”³³³

Referring to the Levinasian delineation of *exteriority*, Perpich will note, that the movement toward the other – *outside or exterior* – forestalls knowledge or discernment in a separation that well “escapes” or “overflows” the act of “comprehension.”³³⁴ In his early writings, such as

331. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 34.

332. *Ibid.*, 39.

333. *Ibid.*, 51.

334. Perpich, “From the Caress to the Word: Transcendence and the Feminine in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” in *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Tina Chanter, 33.

Time And The Other and *Existence And Existents*, Perpich notes, this other is often aligned with the notion of the “feminine,” a feminine that is unlocated or dislocated outside of a totalized and systemic structure, and therein of/the side (outside), distanced and separated from *Knowledge*.³³⁵ So it is that it is within or through this very act of the sidestepping of *Knowledge*, that Levinas’s Other (and the feminine) *escapes, even flees*, the *knowledge of occupation*. The other *feminine*, then, neither occupies itself or another, for it is of a feminine that is presciently availed and radically Other “irreducible and “absolute;” a feminine neither provoking

335. For an additional perspective on the coming near of the other, and the “feminine”, we refer to Chalier who further describes this rapture or turning towards the other, of the Levinasian metaphysic, as a turning that is accentuated in a “movement without reserve or postponement.” See Catherine Chalier in “The Exteriority of the Feminine,” in *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Tina Chanter, 171. Just as it is a motion that is unoccupied, or unoccupiable, precisely of an “ethic unsituatable” (ibid., 173). Chalier continues, “[T]he passage into the time of the other [autrui],” is that passage, that, too, is of an Other time, the *passage Again*, and “of the surpassing of one’s time...” (ibid., 175). It refers to “disinterested-ness,” alongside “the suspension of essence,” of Woman (or a feminine), as referred by Levinas, that is “for-the-other-person [*pour l’autrui*]” (ibid., 176). Maternity, then, is that “*exceptional quality of woman [that] must leave her without words*” and which circulates upon a profound immemorial “*pour l’autrui*,” delineating a substitution lessness of the one for the other that is of an other than language (Ibid). This other, Silence, that is of *Woman*, then, is no other than *the beneath of language*, as the silence of language which extols, as in excess anarchic responsibility and the very delineation of a “persecution” that falls away from the “*logos*” (ibid). This movement toward the other that holds within itself of the “feminine,” in Levinas’s words, may speak of “original language, its language without words or propositions, its pure communication” (ibid., 178).

“negation” nor motioning towards any form of deficiency or lack.³³⁵ In effect, the Levinasian feminine that is *_Alterity or radicalOther*, Perpich notes, folds upon “withdrawal,” “modesty,” “mystery”, and the secret, insisting upon “withdrawing elsewhere” “irreducible to comprehension” in an anarchic notion of unfolding (Husserlian) “intentionality.”³³⁶

Interestingly enough, Perpich notes, the concept of radical Alterity and the feminine, loses its emphasis in Levinas’s later writings, where it resurfaces solely within the notion of *infinitiesface*, and the Other.

In its alterity and estrangement, the relation of the face is one that passes “beyond” object, the knowledge of reason and perception. Levinas will thus state that the “relation of the face is not an object-cognition. The transcendence of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into which it enters, the exiling [depaysement] of a being, his condition of being a stranger, destitute, or proleterian.”³³⁷ And, he continues: “The strangeness that is freedom is also strangeness-destitution

335. Perpich, “From the Caress to the Word: Transcendence and the Feminine in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” in *Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Tina Chanter, 32.

336. Ibid.

337. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 75.

[étrangeté=misère].” The face turns upon that which is its indication or “signifyingness”³³⁸ of a distancing and estrangement, of no other place here, yet, the estrangement or “strangeness” that delineates the other denotes both the freedom that is of the other, whilst at the same time, paradoxically, calling forth the stranger’s destitution. It is a face that in its very freedom delineates the very notion of alterity and *Infinity*, provoking a “nakedness”³³⁹ that signifies alongside its freedom, its forlornness and privation a peculiar freedom that is suffering *the freedom of the human*.

That which is naked is unadorned, thinks Levinas. It is also that which thrives upon excess that is of a remainder to itself and its finality.³⁴⁰ The nakedness of the face that *remains* upon or over itself is likewise a *madness*, and a “uselessness,” as of a remainder that “itself appears only relative to the form against which it contrasts and of which it is deficient.”³⁴¹ That which is “always an opacity, a resistance, a ugliness”

338. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 136.

339. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 75.

340. *Ibid.*, 74.

341. *Ibid.*

is the very “absurdity” and madness that is the object of its possession; the object that has no light of its own is the object of a possession that, so to speak, receives a “borrowed light.”³⁴²

Yet the nakedness of the face, its “opacity” and “ugliness,” its very madness, reveals itself upon something other than occupancy. As Levinas states, “[i]t *is* by itself and not by reference to a system.”³⁴³ An absurdity and madness that is of a destitution of the “absurdity of the thing losing its system or the signification of the face breaking through all form.”³⁴⁴

This break delineates an ethical stance that is prior to signification, manifesting a *relation to the subjectorself* Same that inculcates the *repetition* of a question and an accusation; that is of the nudity that is “precisely the epiphany of the face as a face;”³⁴⁵ a *gaze that hungers and shames* and, too, that recognizes *hunger and shame*. So it is that the Levinasian metaphysics delineates the very notion of recognition and

342. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 74.

343. *Ibid.*, 75.

344. *Ibid.*

345. *Ibid.*

offering to one that is *higher*, the penury that calls forth in the Same *hospitality to the stranger*.³⁴⁶

The nakedness of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give. But it is to give to the master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as “You” in a dimension of height.³⁴⁷

Within the metaphysics of the face, Levinas gravitates towards an ethics of *giving* that displaces power and occupation. This procurement preceding benevolence gestures towards revelation and *Infinity*, marking an approach toward the other that in distance and separation neither instills violence or annihilation upon the Other, nor does it transport the I of the *subjectself* Same *outside* _____ *of itself (hors-de-soi)*, for as Levinas

346. The notion of the Stranger, which permits an ethical unrelation, is furthermore accentuated in Levinas as that which motions towards “the *infinite distance* [that is] of the Stranger.” See Robert Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace Of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 64 (emphasis added).

347. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 75.

denotes, the Same “remains separated and keeps its as-for me.”³⁴⁸ Insistent upon this separation the relation of the Same to the Other, at once, “*absolves*” and releases itself from the relation that is its encounter.³⁴⁹ In this sense, Levinas writes that in “metaphysics a being separated from the Infinite nonetheless relates to it, with a relation that does not nullify the infinite interval of the separation – which thus differs from the interval.”³⁵⁰ The “interval,” then, itself pronounces a passing towards Infinity that is inscribed in *separation*. This separation that is “absolved” and released in its very unrelation provocatively propounds the notion of something other or further that is of a *before knowledge*, a release that is both “*foreign*” and “*present*,”³⁵¹ it is, in essence, that which Levinas will name as the breadth of the divine (or *infinity*) opening forth “from the human face”³⁵² that is Other.

348. Ibid., 77. In *Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence*, Levinas will further accentuate the *remaining* and *the still keeping*, when he states, “To revert to oneself is not to establish oneself at home, even if stripped of all one’s acquisitions. It is to be like a stranger, hunted down even in one’s home, contested in one’s own identity and one’s very poverty.....” See Robert Bernasconi, “The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace Of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 78.

349. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 77.

350. Ibid.

351. Ibid.

352. Ibid.

3.1.4 The grace that is the Speech that Is Other

History as a relationship between men ignores a position of the I before the other in which the other remains transcendent with respect to me. Though of myself I am not exterior to history, I do find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history – not by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him. History is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is borne upon it. When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from history.³⁵³

That which is distance, separation and insomnia is identically language, the approach of the other through Speech. The face, we may state, Speaks of an announcement and pronouncement that is its revelation. The face speaks of an “interval” just as it denotes proximitylessness and disaffection, the very separation that in humility demands the speaking of a speech that is (of the) “face to face”.³⁵⁴ Language, then, is rupture, a pronouncement, as it were, of the very ruptures of History. Levinas

353. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 52.

354. *Ibid.*, 207.

delineates Speech as being capable of *leaving itself*, leave-taking the *time* that is History, and to pronounce neither *negation* or affirmation, but to cross upon the very distance permitting a separation, wherein, Levinas states, “neither the no nor the yes is the first word.”³⁵⁵ Infinity and or Speech is thus prior to the “first word” just as the face is prior to any signification.²⁷⁵ Language, then, itself, is thus *pending* and *lasting* as the Speech (or speaking) that remains possible, whilst remaining “secret” or unpronounced.³⁵⁶

So it is that the “secret” that is language, delineates (of) the force of transcendence; it is none other than “radical separation [and the very] strangeness of the interlocutors, the revelation of the other to me,” that itself calls forth the Other’s *independence*.³⁵⁷ It is of a Speech, then, that is unoccupied; announcing the self-sufficiency that delineates Alterity.

355. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 42.

356. Derrida notes, that Levinas, in essence, “places sound above light” or against it as in liberating nonphenomenality to *speech*. In effect, Levinas will state that, “[t]hought is language and is thought in an element analogous to sound and not to light.” See Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in *Writing and Difference*, 99. Derrida then describes this analogy as the “sound of thought as intelligible speech,” as in an unrequited *hearing*Speech of the “irreducible” other that pronounces *infinity* (ibid., 104).

357. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 73.

Buber, too, proposes a language that is bestowed upon the human, as in a promise, which, however, does *not* belong to the human itself, but rather forms the gift of a promise of the truth of language which the human may inhabit, yet not acquire. Buber thus denotes that “in truth language does not reside in man but man stands in language and speaks out of it....”³⁵⁸ In Buber’s thinking, Language or Spirit is likewise intimately aligned with the notion of *relation*, as in the notion that language or Spirit does not spring forth from within the “I but between I and You.”³⁵⁹ Moreover, unoccupied language in Buber is likewise a language that is *silent*, a “prelinguistic” language or “tongue” which circulates upon the “You” outside occupation. Buber writes, “Only silence toward the You, the silence of *all* tongues, the taciturn waiting in the unformed, undifferentiated, prelinguistic word leaves the You free and stands together with it in reserve where the spirit does not manifest itself but is;” a silent language that is without “response” which thus unbinds the “You” from the “It-world.”³⁶⁰

358. Buber, *I And Thou*, 89.

359. *Ibid.*

360. *Ibid.*

Levinas, too, will pronounce language as that which displaces the world of “possessed things” that is a gift that bestows the impossible relation that is *still possible*. Language as a paradoxical gift that calls forth the *universality* that is separated, as it marks “the very passage from the individual to the general, because it offers things that are mine to the other.”³⁶¹ Language thus motions the gift, the offering, and the dispossession that is of an unoccupied site or *interval* that calls forth the *transcendence that is Other*. It is of a language that overflows itself as language, a gesture that motions towards *Infinity*, marking the language that is in effect the “[L]anguage of the Other” and that which is Truth.³⁶² Thus, writes Levinas: “To put speech at the origin of truth is to abandon the thesis that disclosure, which implies the solitude of vision, is the first work of truth.”³⁶³ Exteriority that is language and the “face to face” forestalls occupation. For Levinas, language as the *Infinite* is “inexhaustible, infinite exteriority.”³⁶⁴ Language is everything else but a

361. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 76.

362. *Ibid.*, 92.

363. *Ibid.*, 99.

364. *Ibid.*, 296.

monologue, it is a language that is absolutely naked, a language that is an “astonishment,” Other, foreign, strange, and free.³⁶⁵ Language, that is Speech, therein presupposes an Other.

At this instance, we may recall Buber’s delineation of language and his insistence upon the very difference that is within the *relation* that pronounces the human in language, in contradistinction with Nature, which accordingly recurs outside of the word, or more precisely, in Buber’s thinking, “*below language*”.³⁶⁶ Buber writes:

Three are the spheres in which the world of relation arises... The first: life with nature. Here the relation vibrates in the dark and remains *below language*. The creature stirs across from us, but they are unable to come to us, and the You we say to them *sticks to the threshold of language*... The second: life with men. Here the relation is manifest and *enters language*... The third: life with spiritual beings. Here the relation is wrapped in a cloud but reveals itself, *it lacks but creates language*. We hear no You and yet feel addressed...³⁶⁷

365. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 73.

366. Buber, *I and You*, 57 (emphasis added).

367. *Ibid.*, 56-57 (emphasis added).

Buber continues: “[I]n every You we address the eternal You, in every sphere according to its manner.”³⁶⁸ Buber’s language itself harbors a Levinasian address as he insinuates upon the *remaining that is below the threshold that is language* that empties and yet fathoms language. Yet the Levinasian consideration of speech, it should be noted, in contradistinction to Buber, solely addresses or pronounces the language that is of the *human* and forestalls Buber’s delineation of Nature and Spirit that inclines upon the exterior threshold that is the beneath of language. And yet, the address and or speech that speaks of an other, that is of “the eternal You” in Buber’s delineation, does intermingle with the Levinasian delineation of a fecund *infinite* as the “eternal” address(ing) beyond or of anOther in silent manifestation.

3.2 *Otherwise Than Being: The Immemorial Body that is Passing and More or Less Face*

3.2.1 “The very locus of the-for-the-other”³⁶⁹

Thus it is not as a freedom, impossible in a will that is inflated and

368. Buber, *I and You*, 57.

369. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 77.

altered, sold or mad, that subjectivity is imposed as an absolute. It is sacred in its alterity with respect to which, in an unexceptionable responsibility, I posit myself deposed of my sovereignty. Paradoxically it is qua *alienus* – foreigner and other – that man is not alienated.³⁷⁰

...(and the whole human body is in this sense more or less face)...³⁷¹

Levinasian metaphysics calls forth the magnificent notion of the immemorial *body* that is *before*, a *body* that is a *preceding* that is always already prior to or *sooner or earlier than* phenomenality, that is an *evident “proximity”*³⁷² motioning *the body*, as it were, “*more or less face*.”³⁷³ The Levinasian *face* calls forth a prior to representation, ontology, or logos, diverting itself of the very thought that suffices cognition, manifestation and confiscation. A face, as such, is that which *calls* forth a prophesy in revelation, a disturbance, a crack

370. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 59.

371. *Ibid.*, 97.

372. *Ibid.*, 67.

373. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity*, 97.

and fissure, an *outside* totalization that states: “This *way* of the neighbor is a face.”³⁷⁴ A face that in its “signifyigness” precedes its very “signification.”³⁷⁵

Ettinger likewise references the notion of a preceding *time*, “beginninglessness” and/or “immemorial” forgotten of a *before* when she speaks to desire, and of a desire within the “Psychic” with a capacity “to hold the phantom of an-Other’s experience in its own space...”³⁷⁶ This psychic space allows the SubjectSame in a transference to navigate upon a space(s), time(s) no-Time, onto and of the trauma of another or even several others (whereas, in Levinasian thinking, as in the *faceofanother* that hails the call to responsibility for the Other, the face and call is but of a singular Other, the-only-other.) The Levinasian *face* which fathoms an “immemorial” of a before *time*, distant and strange, may thus be aligned to Ettinger’s “enigma of transsubjective memory.”³⁷⁷ In Ettinger’s description, this passage or threshold coincides with the

374. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Ethics*, 88.

375. *Ibid.*, 136.

376. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 164.

377. *Ibid.*, 165.

provocation of a forgotten, remembered, *nevercarried* and *neverlost*. Ettinger writes, “I need to remember what *I* have never forgotten, and to find inside me traces of memory that *I* have never carried and have never lost.”³⁷⁸ And she continues, “Such a Thing and event of the other are waiting to be remembered by me...”³⁷⁹ Still, it must be noted that for Ettinger, a particular emphasis resides within a “co-spasming” and “co-engendering” of an *I* and *non-I* that weaves upon or encircles the *I which nevercarried* and *neverlost the forgottenremembered*, whereas the Levinasian *face*, in turn, refers to an excessive solitude, without return or co-hability, effectively pronouncing the suspension of an *I*, in Solitude, Alterity, distaNce and prOximity that is Other.³⁸⁰ We may thus state that, as in Ettinger, something is “*already* shared,” in Levinas it is already called *for another*.³⁸¹ Ettinger therein specifies, “On the Ethical plane, the matrixial accessibility to the other implies becoming vulnerable in the Levinasian sense: being exposed to the Other, to the point where the Other becomes traumatizing to me. But in the matrixial sphere, what this

378. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 165.

379. *Ibid.*, 166.

380. *Ibid.*

381. *Ibid.*, 167.

vulnerability implies is not a sacrifice of myself in a disappearing for the sake of the Other, but rather *a partial disappearing* to allow jointness.”³⁸²

For Levinas, the face, then, in its “*very collapse of phenomenality*”³⁸³ forthwith collapses the very notion of the *human body* into an extreme “singularity without appearing” and therein forestalls its manifestation.³⁸⁴

And herein is called forth an “interval” of body that breaks upon the “*trace*” that is “*nudity*,” and “*poverty*,” an *unconditional* responsibility that precedes the time that is manifestation, representation, consciousness and history. Indeed, the thought of nonphenomenality and the “singularity without appearing” call forth the audacity of the Levinasian metaphysics which entails a radical usurpation or breaking of the code (*ground*) held in Western metaphysics that is a radical usurpation reconsidering the very *reality and truth that is held within the notion that is Light*. The Levinasian thought is one that counters this very history by eluding or rupturing its notion of phenomenality (light), thereby creating

382. Ettinger, *The Matrixial Borderspace*, 145 (emphasis added).

383. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Ethics*, 88 (emphasis added).

384. *Ibid.*, 86.

a vacuum that affords its *banishment* or circumvention and thus reconsiders the very profundity of the face that is *other-than-light*. Derrida comments on the Levinasian philosophy that is without light when he writes:

Henceforward, the heliological *metaphor* only turns away our glance, providing an alibi for **the historical violence of light** [emphasis added]: a displacement of technico-political oppression in the direction of philosophical discourse...³⁸⁵

And he continues:

If there is no history, except through language, and if language (except when it names Being *itself* or nothing: almost never) is elementally metaphorical, Borges is correct: “Perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors.” Light is only one example of these “several” fundamental “metaphors,” but what an example! *Who will ever dominate it, who will ever pronounce its meaning without first being*

385. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p.92.

pronounced by it? [emphasis added] What language will escape it? How, for example, will the metaphysics of the face as the epiphany of the other free itself of light? Light perhaps has no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night.³⁸⁶

Therein in particular lies the courage and audacity that underlies the Levinasian thought. For in enabling a language that profoundly disengages itself from Light, as in a *lightlessness no longer*, Levinas recuperates an other that is no other than *Darkness, and, still, precisely, Not Its Opposite*. Levinas thereby dissembles, stretches, and circumvents *this light* that is the very ground of Western ontology and metaphysics. That is to say, in the shattering of a separation that fathoms alterities' language, Levinas gestures towards the possibility of a physicality that is as yet nonphenomenality, of a language (bodies) that (im)possibly, and as yet, momentarily *has no language*; that is to say, of No Language Common To Philosophy. This gesture then remains, as it were, a lightlessness of another *profundity* that is uncommon and *free from, before occupation or dispossession*, an abyss fathoming *not subject not object* (the invisible of invisibility), a contravention or infringement that is excessively and infinitely other.

386. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, p.92.

Levinas thus writes:

The face of a neighbor signifies for me an unexceptional responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract. It escapes representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality. Not because it is too brutal to appear, but because in a sense too weak, non-phenomenon because less than a phenomenon. The disclosing of a face is nudity, non-form, abandon of self, ageing, dying, more naked than nudity. It is poverty, skin with wrinkles, which are a trace of itself.³⁸⁷

It is no other than a face that gives prior to its beginning or arrival, a face in volatility, uncertainty, and destitution *that is face*. The face that is *more or less* body, then, is absolutely *other than* its luminescence or its coming into sight, just as, according to Levinas, it is *other* than its biological distinction: “The concept of the incarnate subject is not a biological concept. The schema that corporeality outlines submits the biological itself to a higher structure; it is dispossession, but not nothingness, for it is a negativity caught up in the impossibility of evading, without any field of initiative.”³⁸⁸ A body that gestures

387. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 88.

388. *Ibid.*, 109.

“signifyingness” inbetween, beyond and preceding itself as it falls outside of the figuration *that is its very contour*, is, as it were, no phantasm of another nor of an appropriation or distinction, but the very “responsibility” or “proximity” that is the call “for the freedom of the others.”³⁸⁹ The face then provokes an ethics that is an appeal, an appellation, “*from-the-other* [that] *is already for-the-other*.”³⁹⁰ And if the face appeals its very contour, then the body itself delineates this *proximity and responsibility*, and profoundly escapes that which is illumination or representation.

We are here reminded of the Levinasian thought that delineates in the face that which is “going beyond being or transcendence toward an immemorial antiquity we call the idea of infinity.”³⁹¹ In his essay, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” Newman accentuates the Levinasian notion of the immemorial as an indication of the face that is already and

389. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 109.

390. *Ibid.*, 111.

391. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 91.

recurrently motioning to “before the start, before any beginning – in a [un]relation with the Other...”³⁹² Furthermore, this other than light that is encountered or addressed as of the face is that which Newman delineates as “the Other [approaching] the subject without context or horizon, as “stranger,” and without any reasons...” emphasizing the Other’s “absolute” status absolving itself from any relation, and, in particular, “from any order of reason;” in other words, an indiscretion that is far from having been chosen.³⁹³ The bodies body that is of the face, then, is of an indeptedness and emptiness, and excessive “passivity” in recurrence, that is “prior to all reflection.”³⁹⁴ It is the body of an emptiness and passivity that in its profoundest assumption heeds the call that is *in the subjectselfSame*³⁹⁵ as it is of the face that is Other, marking upon the bodies body an appellation towards *Infinity*. The appellation circulates upon the subjectivity of the Same as of *another*, as of a body that empties itself of object. So it is that Levinas referring to Husserl will denote an appellation that is of the body emptying itself and “passing to

392. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 93.

393. Newman, 94.

394. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 110.

395. *Ibid.*, 147.

the emptiness of hunger.”³⁹⁶ Thus it is that the body, in *passing* and in “*proximity*,” is the “signifyingness”³⁹⁷ of this very hunger.

Husserl himself imperceptively introduces into his description of intention an element that is different from pure thematization: intuition fills (that is, contents or satisfies) or deceives an aiming emptily as its object. From the emptiness that a symbol involves with respect to the image which illustrates the symbolized, one passes to the emptiness of hunger. Here there is a desire....³⁹⁸

The face that is body that hungers and desires *before light*, that is of an interval and another than time is of the bodies’ immemorial inscription and exiling that dissuades – nay, foils – the *identity* of the *subjectself* Same by preventing the Same “from coinciding with itself;”³⁹⁹ it is the inscription of a dislocation that is insomnia and unrest, a “between sleep”, “panting” and “shivering” of the psyche that is perpetually unfastening and unclaiming identity.⁴⁰⁰ The Levinasian metaphysic thus uncoils the very notion of an absolute identity in a

396. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 66.

397. *Ibid.*, 71.

398. *Ibid.*, 66.

399. *Ibid.*, 68.

400. *Ibid.*

revelation that contends a delineation and usurpation that motions difference, alterity, exposedness and exile – the very unfastening of identity other than itself.

In Levinasian thinking, that which is other than likeness, identity, phenomenality and representation is “the body being inverted into a for-the-other.”⁴⁰¹ And therein in *perpetuity* and recurrence, the relationship of the Other and the *subjectself* Same is of the relation that is an unrelation that crosses upon “absolute difference” that is Alterity itself;⁴⁰² an inflection upon the Same that delineates its unrelation as in an assignation between unequal terms, extemporaneous, and of another than time, that is of no common time with history or totalized time and *outside of being*. It is thus that Levinas will describe “the-one-for-the-other” as arriving at a relation that is “non-objectifiable” and “without any common time” a relation that breaks “non-indifference.”⁴⁰³ Levinas thus places the body as an animate figurability that is of an “incarnate identity” that is

401. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 72.

402. *Ibid.*, 70.

403. *Ibid.*, 70-71.

the very “signifyingness of this non-indifference.”⁴⁰⁴ A signifyingness that is other than or escapes the common time of being’s totalization.⁴⁰⁵ Non-indifference here perpetuates “the gravity of the body”⁴⁰⁶ as of a revelation and “exposure” that is “prayer” and “passivity,” “outpouring” and “effusion,” that which is the taking of one’s bread out of one’s mouth and giving it to another.⁴⁰⁷ An intensification that is of the body as the hand that empties its bread to the mouth of another that is the very ungathering of the figurability that is giving. Newman will therein delineate the figure of Levinasian passivity to be “at once a relation and an absolute rupture – *a rapport sans rapport* – [relation without relation] ...”⁴⁰⁸ That is to say that, for Levinas, “the ethical relation with the Other is fundamental, in that it is prior to, and the basis of, the relation to beings and the world.”⁴⁰⁹ Thus, in Newman’s consideration, Levinas presents the paradoxical delineation that “the

404. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 70-71.

405. *Ibid.*

406. *Ibid.*, 72.

407. *Ibid.*

408. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 98.

409. *Ibid.*, 98-99.

ethical, is foundational of the other,” whilst inscribing no common ground or mediation between the ontological (being) and the epistemological (knowledge) that is deriving or circulating upon the ground of knowledge or being.⁴¹⁰ For it must be kept in mind, that it is precisely the ungrounding or rupturing of “being” and “knowledge” that permit the ethical to be prior to or before the consideration of a logical or reasoned encounter. Thus Newman notes what is “[a]t issue [in Levinasian thinking] is the possibility of a transcendence which, as ethical transcendence, *is not a knowing*.”⁴¹¹

It is in *Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence* that Levinas will rotate upon the body of the one that is called by the face of another and fold upon it the “immediacy or the proximity of the other”⁴¹² as a call or appellation upon the Same. Within this proximity it is the body that is “flesh and blood” as it is “skin” that is “the very locus of the-for-

410. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 99.

411. *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

412. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 74.

other,”⁴¹³ incarnating signification as “witness or martyrdom” that is of the appellation of the face.⁴¹⁴ For Levinas, this signification, which is a call that bears witness or martyrdom, upon the Other, forms an “intelligibility *before the light*,”⁴¹⁵ that is at the same time, outside logos, synchrony or being. A *before light* that effuses a subjectivity that is precisely the very sensibility that fathoms the *body* that is for-the-other. A body held “hostage”⁴¹⁶ to another than time, fastidious uncertainty that trembles upon Alterity, destitution, and Exile; Levinasian metaphysics effuses an exile that is of *the human* delineating the contemporary dilemma of the very *impossibility of returning home*.

3.2.2 The Excluded Middle of Non-Phenomenality

A notion of subjectivity independent of the adventure of cognition, **and in which corporeality of the subject is not separable from its**

413. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 77.

414. *Ibid.*, 77-78.

415. *Ibid.*, 78 (emphasis added).

416. *Ibid.*, 112.

subjectivity, is required if signification signifies otherwise than by the synchrony of being, if intelligibly and being are distinguishable, if essence itself signifies only on the basis of an ascription of meaning that devolves from the-one-for-the-other, the signifyingness of signification. Subjectivity of flesh and blood in matter is not for this subject a “mode of self-certainty.” The proximity of beings of flesh and blood is not their presence “in flesh and bone,” is not the fact that they take form for a look, present an exterior, quiddities, forms, give images, which the eye absorbs (and whose alterity the hand that touches or holds, suspends easily or lightly, annulling it by the simple grasp, as though no one contested this appropriation.)⁴¹⁷

The body is that which is flesh and blood, the cutting or denuding of its skin in pure impecuniousness and paucity, as if it were bleeding poverty and hunger. The body *that is more or less face*, that is the hunger that is face, then, is everything that *does not show itself*. It is *flesh* and *blood* and *skin* that is *something other* than its “phosphorescence”⁴¹⁸ or illumination. The “non-phenomenality of the face”⁴¹⁹ calls forth in

417. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 78.

418. *Ibid.*, 67.

419. *Ibid.*, 89.

“a trace of itself,”⁴²⁰ the stranger, and the foreign, of another place, of no country, evacuated and displaced, upon the heat and the gravity of the seasons, refugeless and source of *grace*. It is the appellation and call to the body of the Same, as it were, a “command”⁴²¹ held “hostage”⁴²² by the face that is the appellation of the “neighbor” stripping the body of the Same upon a turbulence that is no other than the “obsession” of the face of the “neighbor” that accuses the Same on the “hither side of my identity, prior to all self-consciousness, and denudes me absolutely.”⁴²³ So it is that the body of the Same upon appellation and commandment has become prior to its illumination, of a darkness and an other than time, *a disturbance in passivity that accedes to pure “exposedness.”*⁴²⁴ The Levinasian body, a body that is “for-the-other”, thus fore-folds pure *passivity* and the *before* of a body that “substitutes” for another;⁴²⁵ a “substitution,” as it were, of a non-exchange, for the other’s destitution. The Levinasian “for-the-other,” therein descends upon the site-lessness

420. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 91.

421. *Ibid.*, 147.

422. *Ibid.*, 112.

423. *Ibid.*, 92.

424. *Ibid.*

425. *Ibid.*, 110-111.

that is the exteriority of no longer returning. An exteriority that is no other than of a subjectivity and inwardness, naked and in ascendance to the not-at-home; a bleeding of body like a “hemophiliac’s hemorrhage.”⁴²⁶ A bleeding that is *speaking* no other than the disturbance of the appellation that is a profound Exile and delineated separation. An exteriority in which “the anarchy of what has never been present, of an infinite which commands in the face of the other, and which, like an excluded middle, could not be aimed at.”⁴²⁷

The body as the astonishing delineation of an indication that signifies its signifyingness, unfastens unconditionality, non-indifference and contact, the very proximity that marks its difference and distance. The body as appellation is *pure solidarity* for the *Other, the stranger*. The immemorial that is *body* or incarnation, the flesh of its bleeding, finds itself presciently disordered “*beneath the neutrality of things*.”⁴²⁸ And it is precisely this “beneath” of the body that is irreducible to the appellation that overflows every systematization or totalization and is “without a

426. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 92.

427. *Ibid.*, 97.

428. *Ibid.*, (footnote 26), 197.

beginning”⁴²⁹ and presciently anarchic. The body then in its signifyingness unsheltered motions towards that which “does not return”⁴³⁰ a recurrence of dis-location and exile of a pure withdrawal that persists upon non-identity, that is non-origin and older than time itself. The exile in oneself that is of the respiration of body that is prior to habit, expelled, Ancient and other than time.⁴³¹ It is the body of an ancient, irreducible and “absolute unrepresentable past”⁴³² that is no other past or present or future. Newman thus notes:

So, for Levinas to say that the relationship with the singular Other, *autri*, is “anarchic” has a double sense: first, it is not mediated by any principle or ground, including being; and second, it involves a temporality which is not that of a synchronization of the past and future with the present. Its temporality is of a “lapse,” of falling away, of an irrecoverability.⁴³³

429. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 135.

430. *Ibid.*, 138.

431. *Ibid.*, 180.

432. *Ibid.*, 122.

433. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 105.

The body thus permits a radical loss and displacement that in loosing itself of time finds itself in the face that is *Other*. The body *disordered* and *beneath* the horizons of History, is in its very inwardness the “infinitely exterior.”⁴³⁴ It is thus that the body marks an Infinite passing from the *secret* of the “*saying*” that is no longer of the “*said*”, delineating the *limitlessness* of transcendence.⁴³⁵

3.3 Exile, Ethics and Separation that is Ancient Other

...whereas, as infinition of infinity, it comes from a past more distant than that which is within the reach of memory, and is lined up on the present. It comes from a past that has never been represented, has never been present, and which consequently has not let a beginning germinate.⁴³⁶

434. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 147.

435. *Ibid.*

436. *Ibid.*, 144.

An ethics that is prior to its beginning marks the legacy that is of Levinasian metaphysics. Preceding the before is “the-for the other,” a beneath, and of an other than time, of a between, beyond and on the “hither side” of *being* and *nothingness*, the “command,” “*hostage*” in its appellation, that is of the speech that whispers or speaks of the Other to the subject that is I and the Same. Outside of every unrelation and exterior to itself, an exteriority that is precisely inwardness in itself, such is the human that is *face*, subject and *corporeality*, irreducible, a responsibility more ancient than *Other*. This “*null-place*” that is body *inspires* sorrow and regret in “expiation”⁴³⁷ and is “before all freedom and outside of every present” – an importunate accusation, an underlying exposure that is in recurrence and of another than place just as it is of another than body, a stranger in inflection that is “on this side of oneself” preceding its “indifference.”⁴³⁸ In considering ethics as that which is prior to its beginning, Newman delineates Levinasian metaphysics as that which dis-places (disturbs/shifts) the Same (subject), unraveling itself as of

437. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 145.

438. *Ibid.*

a before that is “always already broken open” (that is to say of that which is always “already broken” from being as presence, (self)-presence, and the present).⁴³⁹ And, furthermore, that which “is already broken open” is no other than an irrecoverable “immemorial” that fastens itself upon a “trace.”⁴⁴⁰ So it is that the “infinitely exterior” is that which is assignation and abnegation of the Same to the Other; a profound shaking of that which may be Truth, at once *secret* and *Infinitely Other*. It is face, bodie(ς), trace(lessness), and speech, the “saying” that precedes the said such is “eminent exteriority.”⁴⁴¹ Bearing the sign of the witness, Levinas will describe this inflection of the self as called or commanded as of a “substitution” for the Infinitely other.⁴⁴² A substitution that is “absolved from every relationship, every game, literally without a situation, without a dwelling place, expelled from everywhere and from itself, saying

439. Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 110.

440. Ibid.

441. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 147.

442. It should be noted that the Levinasian concept of “substitution” is by no means a “collapsing into identification,” but rather a “substitution” that is unrepresentable, irrecoverable and anarchic – outside or beyond being and knowledge. See Michael Newman, “Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial,” in *The Face Of The Other And The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas*, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, 110. The immemorial is thus always of an *interrupting* and (*existing existent*) *other speechless than subject* (ibid., 112).

to the other “I” or “here I am”⁴⁴³ as in the *Infinite passing in the “saying”* of the unsaid. The human is, then, that which is given to another; it is the human that is the *human of the Other* already *Infinite* “not in front of its witness, but as it were outside, or on the “other side” of presence, already past, out of reach, a thought behind thought which is too lofty to push itself up front.”⁴⁴⁴

443. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 146.

444. *Ibid.*, 149.

4. ***Between the Opening and the Totality*⁴⁴⁵ (the UnGraceful Speech that is Other)**

4.1 The Before, Already and Still to Come upon Philosophy

The courage of truth, faith in the power of Spirit, are the first condition of philosophy. Man, because he is Spirit, can and must consider himself worthy of everything that is most sublime. He can never overestimate the greatness and power of his spirit. And if he has this faith, nothing will be so recalcitrant and hard as not to reveal itself to him.⁴⁴⁶ – Hegel, 1816

That philosophy died yesterday, since Hegel or Marx, Nietzsche, or Heidegger – and philosophy should still wander toward the meaning of its death – or that it has always lived knowing itself to be dying (as is silently confessed in the shadow of the very discourse which *declared philosophia perennis*): that philosophy died *one day, within history*, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens history by opposing itself to nonphilosophy, which is its past and its concern, its death and wellspring; that beyond the death, or dying nature, of philosophy, perhaps even because of it, thought still has a future, or

445. “We shall not choose between the opening and the totality.” See Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 84.

446. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit* 1933-1939, vi.

even, as is said today, is still entirely to come because of what philosophy has held in store; or, more strangely still, that the future itself has a future – all these are unanswerable questions. By right of birth, and for one time at least, these are problems put to philosophy as problems philosophy cannot resolve.

It may even be that these questions are not *philosophical*, are not *philosophy's* questions.⁴⁴⁷

The thinking that turns philosophy is the *turning* that holds thought itself. In turn, the Speech that is language, that is body, that holds philosophy or _____ philosophy *holding* Speech, is the *question* that provokes the *silence*, that is of the essence of that which is itself *philosophy*. A silence that silences silence. It is the *silence of war* that is of a lingering and perennial peace. That is, it is the *deafening of war*, identically, and unfaithfully folding its silence, the silence that *is* of a violence that forces itself into Truth. Philosophy is thus aligned within a *philosophy of History* that marks Historicity, the very human that is philosophy, as in a silence that is thinking itself *violently*. So it is that *philosophy is haunted by History, by the Truth that is History, just as it is haunted by Truth itself; a haunting Truth that forms or thinks itself primarily.*

447. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 79.

Principally, cruelty, violence and Truth are delineated within *philosophy*, or of *philosophy*, as the discourse that ascends towards its *language* (that is towards the “said” and the *speech* that is philosophy). Philosophy thus may hold the ~~un~~*Graceful* that is of the language that delivers itself History, and that which delivers of philosophy, is not unLike the Hegelian notion of *Aufhebung* (suspension) that is of a “preservation and transfiguration”⁴⁴⁸ — a *deliverance* of a duplicitous and identical kind that is at once “*bringing to an end*” and equally “*maintaining*.”⁴⁴⁹ Such is the nature of *philosophy*, a *negation* liberating itself of a destruction that itself commences and ends upon the very possibility (the very question) that is itself inscribed upon philosophy.

Breaking upon a language that, as Derrida states, *has already arrived*, whilst, *identically*, of a language that is yet to come, Levinas, too, delineates and harbours an interference upon the delineation of the *language that is philosophy itself*, and which in turn may *no longer be* of

448. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with selections from The Philosophy of Right*, 81 (Hackett edition).

449. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 114, (emphasis added).

philosophy. The writing that is philosophies' writing(s), is of a writing that in *ending that which is philosophy itself, promises a future to philosophy*. The “unanswerable questions,” which Derrida refers to in *Writing and Difference*, are of a philosophy not to come, *that is “strangely” yet to come*, positing the question of the “unanswerable” of philosophy that is in writing upon that which is the “unanswerable” *itself writingwriting*.

The unanswerable itself, as philosophy, thus folds upon the unutterable and the “unsayable” of no essence that is of the unthinking of philosophy itself. Hence Levinas writes: “In language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at the price of a betrayal.”⁴⁵⁰ And further: “Everything shows itself at the price of this betrayal, even the unsayable. In this betrayal the indiscretion with regard to the unsayable, which is probably the very task of philosophy, becomes possible.”⁴⁵¹ That is to say, if *philosophy* is unpronouncement and indiscretion, the writing that is language may likely be of a silent and violent thinking that is the “said” and that which remains duplicitously unsaid; a silence that

450. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 6.

451. *Ibid.*, 7.

is separation, alterity, “the saying,” and the absolutely Other, as much as it is a silence which is still to come upon philosophy – *preceding* Logos and Being – that is the *silence* of Speech that is before language or *philosophy* itself. This silence, then, is of a *language*, a *language* that is *unspoken, whispered*, and duly “indiscretion” and “task”, penury, that effectively permits or surrenders itself as *philosophy* and to *philosophy* as the Speech that is the unsaid and “the saying.” And within this “*indiscretion*” that is philosophy, philosophy cuts itself to the ~~un~~*Graceful* of language. The *ungraceful* that breathes upon a violent peace that is its Truths; for as Levinas notes: “Truth is in several times, here again like breathing.”⁴⁵²

It shall hardly be of interest to ascertain that which is the false or the true in Hegelian or Levinasian metaphysics. To do so would be to do a disservice or dissimulate a question that need not to be proposed, let alone be answered. For that which Hegel professed to be History, Reason, and Freedom, Levinas professed to the Face, the Other, and Alterity;

452. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 183.

and that which Hegel brilliantly *ascertained* to be “Absolute Knowledge,” Spirit, and the Spirit of World History, Levinas ascertained upon the absolutely Other, delineating the very “interval” that motions towards *Infinity* and *puretranscendence*. That is, to say, Hegel and Levinas identically refer to a transcendence that is burdened upon that which is the *human* and that which delineates *difference*. Whether this transcendence or difference be of a metaphysics that in the dialectical method builds upon the foundation of a State and institutions that propagate the emergence of right and law and an “ethical life,” or whether it be by the “interval” or the “proximity” of *bodies* breaking upon the universality that is world history, in utter separation, preceding itself as an-archic and pre-original in the *face* of ethics, the movement towards *Infinity*, that is to say, the question of Transcendence and Truth, whether it move through *History* or the *Other* is effectively the *Same question*; for, in strength of mind, that which Hegel calls History, Levinas pronounces upon the *body-of-the-Same as of the face-of-the-Other*.

Invariably, it should be noted that Levinas enters upon philosophy *after Hegel*, as he does upon the time that is of (or after) Heidegger,

Sartre or Nietzsche, and numerous unmentioned others. “History,” “Being,” “Essence,” and “Being and Nothingness,” are notions that Levinas attempts to escape or disrupt, the latter three more successfully than the former, we may add. This having been said, it is undeniable that Levinas singularly creates an other metaphysics that in moving beyond Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre and others, *strangely* answers or replies to their call.

4.2 The Impossibility of Remaining at Home⁴⁵³

Therein lies *the question* – that is, after the return, there is “*the impossibility of remaining at home.*”⁴⁵⁴ Or, being refugee, homeless and stateless, *there be the impossibility of returning.* And this question is a question that nowise stems from the one who has remained at-home (*bei sich*), or persevered in the land of his/her birth. In contestation, Levinasian metaphysics is a metaphysics of *exile, haunting, poverty, and shame*, that pronounces severe, extreme, even, excessive responsibility. A

453. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 184.

454. *Ibid.*

responsibility that stems from homelessness, statelessness and the destitution of body; a metaphysics of no longer returning or *having ever returned*. And it is therein that the Levinasian philosophy delineates a profound shaking upon the very foundation of the ground of Western ontology that is of determined Historicity, Being, and Essence - the very return upon the self which Levinas will enumerate as the return upon the Same or that which we shall denote as the return upon History – which remains undisturbed and duplicitously appropriated in recurrent homecoming and being at-home (*bei sich*). In contestation, the Levinasian body is not only ontologically groundless, it is of an “uncommon time,” beyond or between being and nothingness, an other than death, exposed and in destitution, “proletarian;” of a body that is of no light or illumination, an other than presence or representation, a “*face*” that in radical separation gestures of an indication, “in signification of signifyingness,” as Levinas would say, that delineates of skin, flesh and blood, and on the *hither-side* of the bleeding that is Other.

The Levinasian *Language that is Other*, hence moves *beyond* the dialectic proposition of the negative subtracting the very notion of an antithesis, by inferring of an other, before, outside or on the “hither side” of the return

that is history, reason, freedom, or pure knowledge, and therein unfastening the very ground that is of the ontology of the Same. Yet it should be noted that Levinasian metaphysics by delineating the trajectory of the body that is called or inverted upon “the-one-for-the-other,” *nonetheless*, duly circulates upon the delineation of the Same as it gestures towards *Infinity* through an appellation or call to the *Same* (*from the face*), in contrast to, let us say, a metaphysics that would solely pertain to the absolutely Other in radical absence of the Same. This metaphysics would be infinitely exterior, perhaps, to the point of being *unreachable* by the Same. Yet would this not truly be a metaphysics of the *language of the other* if it lingered solely upon Alterity and not *to* or *of* the Same? Simply stated, at its most radical, such a delineation of the absolutely other or Alterity would forestall an ethical separation and preclude any notion of the possibility of “community” or “difference”⁴⁵⁵ underlying the very ethical proposition of the face in appellation or commandment to the Same. Thus the Levinasian concept of *Alterity* is pertinent upon the very relation that is an unrelation delineating appellation, call, and responsibility in the Same in *proximity* and *approach* to the Other. So it is that within the metaphysics of

455. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 154.

the-one-for-the-other, Levinas is able to gesture towards a fastidious delineation of the question upon *Alterity* or the absolutely Other in what appears to be a profound and persuasive proposition of a “responsibility,” as it were, that exhilarates and “inspires,”⁴⁵⁶ *for the first time* in the history of Western philosophy, the very pronouncement of Alterity that is of the absolutely and radically *Other*.

The absolutely *Other*, then, is unlinked, expelled, or exiled from History, the State, justice and the law. In Levinasian thinking, the absolutely other suffers precisely from the neutrality and injustice of the State that pronounces the *inhumanity* that is History. So it is that the Levinasian body ultimately unfastens as the gift, that is, of the very *unpronouncement of History*, which is of the announcement of ethics and the responsibility of the-one-for-the-other. Hence, it is by the face of another that the Same may *delimit its arbitrary freedom* in responsibility, desolation and substitution (un)gathering upon a delineation that motions toward that which is the very “infinite of *Infinity*,”⁴⁵⁷ a radical outside or beyond

456. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 141.

457. *Ibid.*, 144 (emphasis added).

of History, Time, Finitude, and the Same that is irreducible and irrecoverable, and, still, yet to come. Thus, Levinas states, “It is not the concept ‘man’ which is the basis of this humanism; it is the other of man.”⁴⁵⁸

It may be noted that the Levinasian delineation of History, the pronouncement of the State, its institutions, right and law, even the notion of *Aufhebung* (suspension), may have been denoted by Hegel, to be an appellation of a *false* history, an unaccomplished freedom, a maligned ethics that is an aborted suspension of a counterfeit State. For it is of import that, although Levinas is successful in disrupting the dialectical method, he nowhere denies the existence of *historicity or historical time*. In effect, throughout his writing, Levinas will designate a metaphysics that principally resists, interrupts or “works over”⁴⁵⁹ the very ground that is History, yet which nowise attempts to annihilate it. So it is that Levinas notes upon this disruption the following: “*The real must not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from interior intentions,*

458. Simmons, *An-Archy and Injustice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas's Political Thought*, 105.

459. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 52.

from the *secrecy* that interrupts the continuity of historical time.”⁴⁶⁰ Just as he further states: “*Though of myself I am not exterior to history*, I do find in the Other a point that is absolute with regard to history – not by amalgamating with the Other, but in speaking with him. History is worked over by the ruptures of history, in which a judgment is borne upon it. When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from history.”⁴⁶¹

To be “uprooted,” to “work over” and to judge History, then, is of import to Levinas, for precisely it is within the “rupture” that is *perpetrated upon* history that the responsibility towards the Other may be enacted or interrupted upon the history that is of the return of the Same. Levinas thus separates the notion of history from the interior figuration of the subject. Still, this *responsibility*, which is enacted as Levinas denotes through the “*proximity*” of “the-one-for-the-other” that is “face”, not only propounds an interruption upon history but paradoxically leans towards the time that is history as a lingering “proximity,” wherein it facilitates the very recovery of the ethical upon the State, its institutions, right and law, and

460. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, 58 (emphasis added).

461. *Ibid.*, 52 (emphasis added).

the “ethical life.” Levinas thus writes:

The judge is not outside the conflict, but the law is in the midst of proximity. **Justice, society, the State and its institutions, exchanges and work are comprehensible out of proximity. This means that nothing is outside of the control of the responsibility of the one for the other.** It is important to recover all these forms beginning with proximity, in which being, totality, the State, politics, techniques, work are at every moment on the point of having their center of gravitation in themselves, and weighing on their own account.⁴⁶¹

The-one-for-the-other, then, *that is bodiesface*, proposes a solidarity unpronounced not only beyond but in proximity and in approach of the time that is history as of an appellation and pronouncement which is no other than the *face* in “responsibility” and propinquity to history, wherein, furthermore, a proposition is delineated towards that which Levinas calls a “rationality of peace;”⁴⁶² a responsibility that ascertains its rationality and universality as in the proposition of the ultimate responsibility that is

461. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 159.

462. *Ibid.*, 160.

of the one for the other.

Yet History is of a provocation, in effect, of a diffusion and rushing that scatters itself about within the violence of the body (*the human and philosophy*). This violence, may likewise be denoted as *the Freedom that is Reason*, just as it may be denoted as Freedom and Reason that remains or *maintains* its unfreedom and unreason. This is the brilliance and *difference* that demarcates Hegelian thinking in resisting the notion of erasure and pure annihilation, in that it subsists on that which is *maintaining and ending* that which is ~~un~~History, ~~un~~Freedom, and ~~un~~Reason itself. So it is that the Hegelian body folds itself upon truth and untruth as *the-perfect-contradiction* that is identically the *truthlessness* that is (of) *truth* .

Extravagantly suspended, the bodies body falls upon the very site of a *monumental and profuse History*, just as it ascends to *another* than History that is precisely a prodigal History or ~~no longer~~History, such as it is of the *Time* that is the noTime of Time and the Reason of unreason that is Reason, of a delineation that is of no other than *the human forcing its freedom*; the purest meeting point of its determined historicity that is

the figure of an *inFiniteHistory*, duly irreducible, penury, and “substitution.” A duplicitous engagement that is of the *freedom that is History*, whilst circulating upon an *interruption* that is *secret* in nature, an appellation of/to another, in *perfectcontradiction*, circulating and ascending upon itself, within, before and on the “hither side” of another.⁴⁶³ A body that lives, dies and passes itself in several times, of several histories, and of an “uncommon time” that motions towards a “non-origin” that is of an excessive foreignness, and strangeness, a Destitution that is of a before itself for another in “expulsion,” the exile and recurrence of bodie(s) across the delineation of an “absolute difference”⁴⁶⁴ itself “without foundation, reduced to itself, and thus without condition”⁴⁶⁵ that is the *face* of the Other.

4.3. “We Shall Not Choose Between The Opening And The Totality”⁴⁶⁶

“We shall not choose between the opening and the totality,”⁴⁶⁷ writes

463. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being Or Beyond Essence*, 160.

464. *Ibid.*, 70.

465. *Ibid.*, 110.

466. Derrida, *Writing And Difference*, 84.

467. *Ibid.*

Derrida in *Writing and Difference*. And it is this very thought of a pronouncement, that, too, is forcing toward a turning, and at the “*turning point*”⁴⁶⁸ spoken and speaking its “dismantling and dispossession,”⁴⁶⁹ in passive separation, the “*opening itself*”⁴⁷⁰ *closing closure* unreflected saunters toward an escaping of history. This escape is, of course, questionable, even *impossible, never never possible impermissible*. Yet it has, precisely, *already secretly openly taken place, always in the very here and now that is herenow, that is, this very instant, tomorrow(s) anterior*. Such an *opening closing Unbarricading* of the totality, that is a leaving, or a *leaving taking and giving away of itself (and of Being)*, exterior to the *leaving leaving taking itself* may lament of a *disordered before and incoherence in the no spoken speech that is missing grace already broken, unsaid and unsaying yesterday’s coming erst while already*. So, it may be *unspoken breaking*, that if there is “the opening of opening”⁴⁷¹ that is the *closing faltering interstice, the interstice of the interstice*, as Derrida delineates, accordingly, of that which is *indescribable*, resisting of a

468. Derrida, *Writing And Difference*, 81.

469. *Ibid.*, 82.

470. *Ibid.*, 83.

471. *Ibid.*

“former speech,”⁴⁷² unspeakable and unspoken, *the unspeakable opening*,
“the opening of opening” ~~sealingitselfother~~ *passaging* and neither its
opposite ~~the sealing of sealing~~, then, *the opening of opening hiatus* forces
a falling *awaytime* of an ~~antecedencepastdistantlyremainingtransient~~.
This *awaynessscatteredremaining and spectre interstice* is just as likely,
and, identically, to be considered and denied *exiling, is nootherthan pure*
and absolute faltering outside incomprehensible. Yet, we may state, in
proximitylessness history itself maneuvers upon history. So it is, then,
that the *totality* may itself be *shifting* of a history and time that is
identically implicated within itself of a *negative*, that itself ungrasps “the
opening of opening,” indecision folding, and unfolding, unfolds itself of
an unbeckoned *otherbodiespectre nearing and away phantasm*. Is this,
then, the time that is *timeanother no longer time*? Has Hegelian
metaphysics itself shattered in to within its *time*? Has the *totality* itself
become in-finite or endingitselfbeginning, has it always been other than
itself other? Has it already Always scattered? We may here state that that
which is *immanence* and *(the) infinitetranscendenceof alterities other*
Already-profusely abounds and remainders within the *beyond, and*

472. Derrida, *Writing And Difference*, 84.

of the outside of the totality, that is (of a) totality itself. That is to say that *thetotality* itself already holds infinity at phantasm's length whilst it is and is *neither* infinities out *side*, the Solitude of the *outthere*. The totality therein interrupts interruption and breaksbroken shatters itself. We may thus state that philosophies' language, speaking its pronouncement and unpronouncement, holds the times, histories, bodies, infinities and totalities *scattered* themitselves onto the bodie(s) anterior, *scatteredStrangeness*, destitution and unpronounced unrelation and knowledgeunknowingknowledge*UnKnowing*. *Or*, is this a false assumption, *a_false_in_finity*? In response, we may state, that therein, within, in *that*, in *such*, in *such*, precisely, meet(s), convene(s), assemble(s), and *ungather*(s) the *totality*, the *infinitely* exterior of this (a) outside *inabrokenlanguage*. So it is that the death of*Time unhingedand broken with Levinas and inhHistory with Hegel gather and shatter* immanence and transcendence *themselves*, the *negativeoutside*, *outsidetheSecretnegation*⁴⁷³ are shifted or have and has continually shifted always already. Until we find that there is a breachingnot of "the neither this...nor that"⁴⁷⁴ echoing upon the *totality* and the *outside*

473. Schirmacher, EGS Seminar: Hegel's Dialectics: The Second Negation, November 2006, New York.

474. Derrida is in this instance directly quoting Levinas. See Derrida, *Writing And Difference*, 90.

as a totalitytotalyoutsideno longer. This would be to encourage the thought that allitselfnothing paradoxically exists simultaneously beforebeyond and (in)itself all the time and away from time, away from time; that is the always already there, having always already, everythingalwaysalready of bodieexiling, leavetaking, the bodyand language. It is as we live and die in an instant that falters itself eternally as it leaveslives incessantly of oureselvesitotherHistory. The nolongerSAME, excessively foreign, strange, exodus and exile, a cruel homelessness and world that is of the human, finally fragile, before, and in before dyingdeath. Infinity may thus just as likely be finite and the totality and outside are infintesimally scattered about one another.

The human stretches and thins out alongside *othertime*, history and that which woundsannihilates history, forgets it, and is heaved upon the *human* that ungathers upon one another. This “opening of opening” *interstice* is longwinded and shortlived. *That is to say that the scattering themselves embrace and falter wrecking and shirking time and history, eroding equilibrium and fostering an infinite and minute attainment of time, the time that is no longer of history, or the other, the faltering maddening spiral that is the human. A spiral that ascends and descends as if the*

interstice were no longer time(s) signaled a secret that neither you nor I lived to tell, to tell, the tale, the tale of its unwinding. So it is with history and the proximity that is the face scattered, the proleteriats, humanslaughter, humandyng, and humanotherbefore.

*Nature NoNature, too, accompanies this secret interstice that swallows knowledge whole as if it were the language of abundance and suffering, at once, veiling itself in the darkness of an unimagined and unthought of before time no longer, an ancient ungathering that fosters upon infinity, infinity's lament. Intemperance is then the slippage of time and of history, turbulentknowledgebroken, and freedom's enslavement. The human phantasm navigates and motions upon a suspension that falls in and beyond its own time, broken. History and the face *the other bodie(s)*, it is simply and briskly scattering "the opening of opening" neverbeginning.*

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