Moses Mendelssohn - Quotes
The task is to relate these pillars of social life to one another
in such a way that they are in balance, rather than becoming
burdens on social life or weighing down its foundations more
than they help to uphold it.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
But as soon as freedom dares to move any of the pieces in
this systematic structure, ruin immediately threatens on all
sides; and it's no longer clear what is going to survive all this.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Here's one who wants to settle
doctrinal differences without recognising a supreme judge.
Here's another who goes on talking about an 'independent
church', without knowing where it is to be found. Here's yet
another who defends 'power' and 'rights' but can't say who
should exercise them.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
There is basically a lot of truth in all Hobbes's assertions.
They do lead to absurd consequences, but those are due
solely to the extravagance of his formulations (Why the
extravagance?
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Locke, who lived during the same period of deep confu-
sion, tried to protect the freedom of conscience in a different
way. In his Letter on Toleration he works from the basic defi-
nition: A state is a society of men who unite for the purpose
of collectively promoting their temporal [see Glossary] welfare.
From this it naturally follows that the state shouldn't concern
itself at all with the citizens' beliefs regarding their eternal
happiness, and should tolerate everyone who
conducts himself well as a citizen—i.e. doesn't interfere with
the temporal happiness of his fellow-citizens.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
On the other hand, it is , in the strictest sense, neither
in keeping with the truth nor advantageous to man's welfare
to mark the temporal off so sharply from the eternal. The
rock-bottom truth is that man will never partake of eternity;
for him, eternalness is merely unending temporality.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The following considerations are presented as my attempt to clarify the concepts of state and religion—especially of their limits and their influence on •one another as well as on happiness in civil life.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The reasons that lead men to rational actions and frames
of mind have to do partly with how men relate to one another
and partly with how they relate to their Creator and Keeper.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
In a good many textbooks
of so-called ecclesiastical law there are solemn inquiries
relating to •Jews, •·outrightly defiant· heretics and •·merely
muddled· wrong-believers, the question being. . .
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
But you won't be surprised that to me the difference of
name doesn't matter. 'Church' is my name for any public
institution for the shaping men in their relations with God;
and 'state' is my name for any public institution for the
shaping men in their relations with one another. By the
'shaping' of men I mean the effort to steer both •actions
and •thoughts in such a way that they make for human
happiness—the effort to •govern men and to •educate them.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
But under all circumstances and conditions the infallible
measure of the quality of a form of government is the degree
to which it achieves its purposes by Sitten and ways of
thinking—i.e. the extent to which it governs by educating. In
other words, in the extent to which the citizen is enabled to
take in—·to 'get the picture'·—
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The man who avoids deception because he •loves
honesty is happier than one who •is merely afraid of the
punishments that the state has chosen to impose for fraud.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The laws of wisdom and goodness can't contradict each
other.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
In the state of nature, before any
contract had been enacted among men, there was common
ownership of goods produced by nature; but only of ones
produced solely by nature without any input from man's
efforts and care; so the common ownership did not extend
to the three classes of natural property that I have listed.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The natural relationship between parents and children isn't
in conflict with this universal law of nature.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
It's true that even in the state of nature parents are
externally obliged to do certain things for their children; and
you might see this as a positive duty that can be enforced
under the eternal laws of wisdom and goodness, without any
contract coming into it.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Whoever helps to bring into existence a being capable
of happiness is obliged by the laws of nature to promote
its happiness as long as it can't yet provide for its own
advancement. This is the natural duty of education.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Not so fast! I hope an emperor who is as just as he is wise
will also listen to the counterarguments, and not permit
the system of freedom to be misused to inflict oppression
and violence.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Now since both partners still professed the Jewish
religion, at least outwardly, when they entered into the
contract, it's obvious that they intended to manage their
household according to Jewish rules of life and to bring up
their children according to Jewish principles. . . .
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The husband has changed
his principles and adopted another religion. If the wife is
now forced to enter into a household that is contrary to her
conscience and to bring up her children on principles that
aren't hers—compelled to accept conditions of a marriage
contract to which she never agreed—that would obviously be
unjust; it would be obviously be a case of pleading freedom
of conscience in defence of the most preposterous coercion
of conscience.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
If in the state of nature I have
decided to whom, when, and how much I want to give up
of what belongs to me; if I have sufficiently declared this
free decision of mine, and my neighbour for whose benefit
this declaration was made has received the property; the
property stops being •mine and becomes •his.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The right
to decide, which was a part of my goods, i.e. was mine, has
become through this transfer a good of my neighbour's, i.e.
has become his; and I can't take it back from him again
without committing an offence.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Some part of my goods that I was formerly conscience-bound
to give up for the benefit of my fellow-men in general I am now
conscience-bound to grant to this individual in particular
because of the expectations I have aroused in him. But what
has transformed this •duty of conscience into an •enforceable
duty? To explain this, it seems to me, you have to bring in
the principles relating to •gifts in general and to •the rights
of deciding conflicts in particular.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
Only the savage, like
an animal, clings to the enjoyment of the •present moment.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The duty towards my neighbour is externally
satisfied if I give him his due, irrespective of whether my
action be enforced or voluntary. If the state can't achieve its
ends by means of interior motives,. . . .it at least operates by
external ones and helps my neighbour to get what is his.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The duty towards myself may come into
conflict with the duty towards my neighbour; likewise, the
duty towards myself may clash with the duty towards God.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
The system of our duties rests on a twofold principle: the
relation between man and nature, and the relation between
creature and Creator. The former is moral philosophy,
the latter religion.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
And yet from time immemorial men have acted in
opposition to these self-evident principles, and will probably
go on doing so for centuries to come.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
So the state can compel actions beneficial to the public;
it can reward and punish, distribute offices and honours,
disgrace and banishment, in order to get men to act in ways
whose intrinsic value doesn't have a strong enough effect on
their minds. That is why the social contract could and had
to grant to the state the most perfect •right to do this as well
as the •ability to do it. So the state is a moral person [see
Glossary] that has its own goods and prerogatives, which it
can dispose of as it pleases.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Religious Power and Judaism. 1782.
You have deemed it fitting to dedicate your translation of Mr. Bonnet's Inquiry into the Evidence
for Christianity1 to me, and in your dedication you have appealed to me most solemnly and
before the eyes of the public: “to refute this work, insofar as I find its essential arguments in
support of Christianity to be incorrect, but insofar as I find them correct, to do what wisdom, love
of truth, and honesty call upon me to do – what Socrates would have done, had he read this
work and found it irrefutable [ . . . ].
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
That is, abandon the religion of my fathers and profess the
one defended by Mr. Bonnet. For surely, even if I were so base as to counterbalance wisdom
with the love of truth and honesty, in this case I would certainly place all three on the same side
of the scale.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
My reluctance to enter into religious controversies has never been the result of fear or
weakness, however. I may say that I did not start examining my religion only yesterday. Indeed,
early on, I recognized it as a duty to examine my opinions and acts, and if, since my youth, I
have dedicated my leisure hours to worldly wisdom and the humanities, it was solely with the
intention of preparing myself for this necessary [self-] examination. I could have had no other
motives for this. In my situation I could not expect the slightest temporal advantage from such
studies. I knew well that I could not prosper in worldly affairs in this way. And as for pleasure? –
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
Therefore, as you see, had I lacked a sincere belief in my own religion, the result of my inquiries would have made itself visible in a public act. But because [those inquiries] strengthened me in my fathers' [religion], I was able to continue quietly on my way without having to account for my convictions to the world.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
I will not deny that I have perceived in my religion human additions and abuses which, unfortunately, do too much to dim its luster. What friend of truth can boast that
his religion is free from all damaging human embellishments? All of us who seek Truth
recognize the lethal breath of hypocrisy and superstition and wish we could expunge it without
doing harm to the true and the good.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
According to the principles of my religion, I should not attempt to convert anyone not born under our law. Some would like to attribute the origin of this spirit of conversion to the Jewish religion, but it is [actually] diametrically opposed to it. All our rabbis are in agreement in teaching that the written and oral laws that make up our revealed religion are binding only on our nation. Upon us, Moses bestowed the law, the inheritance of the tribes of Jacob.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
Our rabbis are so far removed from all desire to convert others that they even enjoin us to offer
serious counter-arguments to dissuade anyone who presents himself [for conversion] on his
own accord. We are supposed to give him pause because the step, though voluntary, entails a
very arduous burden.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
In his current [unconverted] state he need only observe the Noahide laws to achieve eternal bliss, but as soon as he accepts the religion of the Israelites, he would voluntarily submit to all the strict laws of the faith and have to obey them or expect the punishments that the lawgiver proscribed for their violation.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
Finally, we are to inform him honestly about the misery, oppression, and contempt in which the nation currently lives, in order to dissuade him from taking a hasty step that he might later regret.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
The religion of my fathers, therefore, does not wish to be disseminated.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
We send no missions to the Indies, East or West, or to Greenland to preach our religion to those distant peoples. The latter, in particular, according to descriptions of them, observe the law of nature better – alas! – than we do and are therefore, according to our religious teachings, an enviable people.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
But not all prejudices are equally harmful, and therefore all
the prejudices which we think we perceive among our fellow men ought not to be treated in the
same way. A few of them are directly contrary to the happiness of the human race.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
Sir, think this work sufficient to convert someone who, according to his principles, must take an
opposite position. You cannot possibly have put yourself in the position of a person who does
not bring his convictions with him but is supposed rather to seek to form them from this book.
But if you have, indeed, done this and still believe, as you have given me to understand, that
Socrates himself would have to find Mr. Bonnet's arguments irrefutable, then one of us is
certainly a remarkable example of the power that prejudices and education can exert over even
those who seek the Truth with upright hearts.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
However, I hope you will free me from this unpleasant step and rather let me return to my natural peaceful situation. Were you to put yourself in my place and see the circumstances from my point of view rather than your own, you would grant the justice of my inclination. I would not willingly be tempted to overstep the limits that I have imposed upon myself with all due deliberation.
Mendelssohn, Moses. Open Letter to Deacon Lavater of Zurich from Moses Mendelssohn. 1769.
A God is thinkable, therefore a God is also actually present.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Both state and church have as their object actions as well as convictions, the former insofar as they are based on the relations between man and nature, the latter insofar as they are based on the relations between nature and God.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Consciousness of myself, combined with complete ignorance of everything that does not fall within my sphere of thinking, is the most telling proof of my substantiality outside God, of my original existence.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
I am, therefore there is a God.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
I fear that, in the end, the famous debate among materialists, idealists, and dualists amounts to a merely verbal dispute that is more a matter for the linguist than for the speculative philosopher.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Instead, it appears to be a particular mark of beauty that it is considered with tranquil satisfaction; that it pleases if we also do not possess it and we are still far removed from demanding to possess it.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of eternal truths that are indispensable to salvation, of no revealed religion in the sense in which that term is usually understood.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Revealed religion is one thing, revealed legislation, another.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Socrates didn't care to visit the theater, as a rule, except when the plays of Euripides (which some think, he himself had helped to compose), were performed.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Socrates' fame spread all over Greece, and the most respected and educated men from all around came to him, in order to enjoy his friendly company and instruction.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
The analysis of concepts is for the understanding nothing more than what the magnifying glass is for sight.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
The principal axiom in their theory was: Everything can be proved, and everything can be disproved; and in the process, one must profit as much from the folly of others, and from his own superiority, as he can.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
The state has physical power and uses it when necessary; the power of religion is love and beneficence.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
We would be able neither to remember nor to reflect nor to compare nor to think, indeed, we would not even be the person who we were a moment ago, if our concepts were divided among many and were not to be encountered somewhere together in their most exact combination.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
When Socrates was about 30, and his father was long dead, he was still pursuing the art of sculpture, but from necessity, and without much inclination.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
You know how much I am inclined to explain all disputes among philosophical schools as merely verbal disputes or at least to derive them originally from verbal disputes.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Both state and church have as their object actions as well as convictions, the former insofar as they are based on the relations between man and nature, the latter insofar as they are based on the relations between nature and God.
Mendelssohn, Moses.
Consciousness of myself, combined with complete ignorance of everything that does not fall within my sphere of thinking, is the most telling proof of my substantiality outside God, of my original existence.
Mendelssohn, Moses.