Jürgen Habermas - Quotes

A threatened nation can react to uncertain dangers solely through administrative channels, to the truly embarrassing situation of perhaps overreacting.
Habermas, Jürgen.

After September 11, the European governments have completely failed. They are incapable of seeing beyond their own national scope of interests.
Habermas, Jürgen.

Each murder is one too many.
Habermas, Jürgen.

Historically, terrorism falls in a category different from crimes that concern a criminal court judge.
Habermas, Jürgen.

I cannot imagine a context that would some day, in some manner, make the monstrous crime of September 11 an understandable or comprehensible political act.
Habermas, Jürgen.

I consider Bush's decision to call for a war against terrorism a serious mistake. He is elevating these criminals to the status of war enemies, and one cannot lead a war against a network if the term war is to retain any definite meaning.
Habermas, Jürgen.

Since our complex societies are highly susceptible to interferences and accidents, they certainly offer ideal opportunities for a prompt disruption of normal activities.
Habermas, Jürgen.

Some of those drawn into the holy war had been secular nationalists only a few years before. If one looks at the biographies of these people, remarkable continuities are revealed.
Habermas, Jürgen.

The difference between political terror and ordinary crime becomes clear during the change of regimes, in which former terrorists become well-regarded representatives of their country.
Habermas, Jürgen.

Today's Islamic fundamentalism is also a cover for political motifs. We should not overlook the political motifs we encounter in forms of religious fanaticism.
Habermas, Jürgen.

The uncertainty of the danger belongs to the essence of terrorism.
Habermas, Jürgen.

No, nation-states remain the most important players on the international stage. They also constitute irreplaceable components of international organisations. After all, the international community is organised in the form of "United Nations." Who is to support and nourish the UN, and provide troops for humanitarian interventions, if not the nation-states? Who, if not the nation-states, will guarantee equal rights for all citizens? What must change – and has already done so in Europe – is the self-image of nation-states, which must learn to see themselves not so much as independent players but as members of a larger community, who feel bound to adhere to common norms.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Leadership and Leitkultur." NY Times. October 28, 2010.

First, that my criticism of the Bush government bears not the faintest whiff of anti-American sentiment. Here in Germany, anti-Americanism has always been part of the most reactionary movements. But the fact that my generation in particular admires and has learned from the political culture of the United States, which is rooted in the 18th century, does not oblige me to unquestioning loyalty. Rather, it obliges me to hold fast to the normative significance of the Federal Republic's orientation towards the West, even against the self-destructive policies of an American government which can be voted out of office.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Leadership and Leitkultur." NY Times. October 28, 2010.

But even in a Europe consisting of a core and a periphery, those countries which prefer to remain on the periphery for the time being would of course retain the option of becoming part of the core at any time.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Leadership and Leitkultur." NY Times. October 28, 2010.

The underlying reason for paralysis is rather that various governments have differing objectives to the Union. The obstruction we see today comes from the fact that our governments are avoiding the predictable conflict over this central issue.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Leadership and Leitkultur." NY Times. October 28, 2010.

It was not only the flag-waving and rather defiant "United We Stand" patriotism that had changed the climate, nor was it the peculiar demand for solidarity and the accompanying susceptibility to any presumed "anti-Americanism." The impressive American liberality toward foreigners, the charm of the eager, sometimes also self-consciously accepting embrace—this noble openhearted mentality seemed to have given way to a slight mistrust.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

The outbreak of World War I signaled the end of a peaceful and, in retrospect, somewhat unsuspecting era, unleashing an age of warfare, totalitarian oppression, mechanistic barbarism and bureaucratic mass murder. At the time, there was something like a widespread foreboding. Only in retrospect will we be able to understand if the symbolically suffused collapse of the capitalistic citadels in lower Manhattan implies a break of that type or if this catastrophe merely confirms, in an inhuman and dramatic way, a long known vulnerability of our complex civilization.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

If an event is not as unambiguously important as the French Revolution once was—not long after that event Kant had spoken about a "historical sign" that pointed toward a "moral tendency of humankind"—only "effective history" can adjudicate its magnitude in retrospect.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

The Bush administration seems to be continuing, more or less undisturbed, the self-centered course of a callous superpower. It is fighting now as it has in the past against the appointment of an international criminal court, relying instead on military tribunals of its own. These constitute, from the viewpoint of international law, a dubious innovation.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

The world has grown too complex for this barely concealed unilateralism.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

Even if Europe does not rouse itself to play the civilizing role, as it should, the emerging power of China and the waning power of Russia do not fit into the pax Americana model so simply. Instead of the kind of international police action that we had hoped for during the war in Kosovo, there are wars again—conducted with state-of-the-art technology but still in the old style.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

However, the asymmetry between the concentrated destructive power of the electronically controlled clusters of elegant and versatile missiles in the air and the archaic ferocity of the swarms of bearded warriors outfitted with Kalashnikovs on the ground remains a morally obscene sight. This feeling is more properly understood when one recalls the bloodthirsty colonial history that Afghanistan suffered, its arbitrary geographic cutting up, and its continued instrumentalization at the hands of the European power play. In any case, the Taliban regime already belongs to history.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

The monstrous act itself was new. And I do not just mean the action of the suicide hijackers who transformed the fully fueled airplanes together with their hostages into living weapons, or even the unbearable number of victims and the dramatic extent of the devastation. What was new was the symbolic force of the targets struck. The attackers did not just physically cause the highest buildings in Manhattan to collapse; they also destroyed an icon in the household imagery of the American nation. Only in the surge of patriotism that followed did one begin to recognize the central importance the towers held in everyone's imagination, with their irreplaceable imprint on the Manhattan skyline and their powerful embodiment of economic strength and projection toward the future. The presence of cameras and of the media was also new, transforming the local event simultaneously into a global one and the whole world population into a benumbed witness.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

In one respect, Palestinian terrorism still possesses a certain outmoded characteristic in that it revolves around murder, around the indiscriminate annihilation of enemies, women, and children—life against life. This is what distinguishes it from the terror that appears in the paramilitary form of guerilla warfare. This form of warfare has characterized many national liberation movements in the second half of the twentieth century—and has left its mark today on the Chechnyan struggle for independence, for example.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

I consider Bush' s decision to call for a "war against terrorism" a serious mistake, both normatively and pragmatically. Normatively, he is elevating these criminals to the status of war enemies; and pragmatically, one cannot lead a war against a "network" if the term "war" is to retain any definite meaning.
Habermas, Jürgen and Giovanna Borradori (Author). "Fundamentalism and Terror: A Dialogue with Jürgen Habermas." in: Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago University Press. 2003.

The task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible mutual understanding.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

I shall develop the thesis that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech act, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

The speaker must choose and intelligible (verständlich) expression so that the speaker and hearer can comprehend one another.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

Reaching and understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that are mutually recognized.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

In accepting a validity claim raised by the speaker, the hearer recognizes the validity of the symbolic structures; that is, he recognizes that a sentence is grammatical, a statement true, an intentional expression truthful, or an utterance correct.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

It is certainly legitimate to draw an abstractive distinction between language as a structure and speaking as a process.
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

Sensory experience is related to segments of reality without mediation, communicative experience only mediately...
Habermas, Jürgen. On The Pragmatics of Communication. MIT Press. 2000.

I must confess that, 50 years ago, the domestic question of nuclear arms for the West German army was of more passionate interest to me than the creation of the European Economic Community. I didn't realize back then that the EEC as a customs union had already been equipped with constitutional-like institutions and therefore offered the prospect of a real European Community, that is, a political unification of the countries of Western Europe.
Habermas, Jürgen and Matthias Hoenig (Interviewer). "What Europe Needs Now." Signandsight.com. March 23, 2007.

Let's take the example of the recent conflict between Israel and Hizbullah, carried out on Lebanese soil. Thanks to the Bush government's one-sided policy on the Middle East conflict, the USA has long been a partisan player. Many people pinned their hopes on Europe, which was regarded as neutral. But aside from sending its foreign policy spokesman Javier de Solana to Beirut and Jerusalem, the EU provided a laughable spectacle with its chorus of dissonant voices. At the same time certain individual countries, such as France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain, tried to stand out on their own, and outdo one another by putting forward home-grown initiatives.
Habermas, Jürgen and Matthias Hoenig (Interviewer). "What Europe Needs Now." Signandsight.com. March 23, 2007.

I must confess that, 50 years ago, the domestic question of nuclear arms for the West German army was of more passionate interest to me than the creation of the European Economic Community. I didn't realize back then that the EEC as a customs union had already been equipped with constitutional-like institutions and therefore offered the prospect of a real European Community, that is, a political unification of the countries of Western Europe.
Habermas, Jürgen and Matthias Hoenig (Interviewer). "What Europe Needs Now." Signandsight.com. March 23, 2007.

The key to this is an interlocking of two types of procedures: processes of moral argumentation get institutionalized by means of legal procedures. My reflections have a normative character. However, as the second lecture should make clear, I am developing them not from the perspective of legal doctrine but, rather, from the perspective of social theory.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

Law as a generalized medium is not only more widely utilized; the form of law also changes according to the imperatives of a new kind of requirement.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

The failed referenda simply turned a spotlight on the fact that our governments are stuck in adead-end and can move neither forwards nor backwards. Until now they have been able to rely on the "Monnet method" and have followed the imperatives which inevitably arose from economic integration. The Common Market was not a zero-sum game. It brought various benefits to every member-state. By contrast, a constitutional framework for common policies demands a common political will that goes beyond recognition of the benefits for each member-state. Obviously our governments cannot yet reach agreement about the ultimate goal, the real meaning of the 'European project.'
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

With the increasing mobilization of law, the question of the conditions of the legitimacy of legality gets intensified. W i t h the growing rate of change, positive law undermines its own basis of validity. W i t h every which, for example, affect laws dealing with housing, family, or change of government, new interests gain a majority, interests taxation. Paradoxically, this gets connected with the counter-vailing tendency to appeal to “correct” law in the name of a moralized law.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

An active state, intervening in the social status quo through a planning and service-oriented administration, would distort th e liberal state. That the legitimacy of legal domination will stand or fall with the semantic form of legal norms is a premise that Lon Fuller has analyzed in detail as the 'internal morality of the law.'
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

Thus, from our discussion there emerges the interesting desideratum of investigating whether the grounds for the legitimacy of legality can be found in the procedural rationality built into the democratic legislative process.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

As soon as abstract and general norms that rule out all indeterminacies no longer serve as the prototypical form of regulation in the welfare state, w e are left without a mechanism for transmitting any stipulated rationality of legislative procedures to the procedures of adjudication and administration. W i t h o u t the automatic operation of a strict legal tie, as is assumed only in the liberal model, it remains an open question how the procedural rationality established for the former could be translated into the procedural rationality of the latter.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

The clear hierarchy between basic norms and statutory laws has dissolved, as has the character of basic rights as clear-cut rules. There is scarcely any right that could not be limited by the consideration of principles.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.

Since moral principles are always already immersed in concrete historical contexts of action, there can be no justification or assessment of norms according to a universal procedure that ensures impartiality.
Habermas, Jürgen. "Law and Morality." The Tanner Lectures. Harvard University. October 1 & 2, 1986.