Gottfried Leibniz - Quotes

The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By 'simple' is meant 'without parts.'
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Thus it may be said that a Monad can only come into being or come to an end all at once; that is to say, it can come into being only by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple substances.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible: truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special way.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert Latta (Translator). The Monadology. 1714.

The conception of God which is the most common and the most full of meaning is expressed well enough in the words: God is an absolutely perfect being.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no principles of goodness or perfection in the nature of things, or in the ideas which God has about them, and who say that the works of God are good only through the formal reason that God has made them.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

For if comparative perfection were sufficient, then in whatever way God had accomplished his work, since there is an infinitude of possible imperfections, it would always have been good in comparison with the less perfect; but a thing is little praiseworthy when it can be praised only in this way.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

The general knowledge of this great truth that God acts always in the most perfect and most desirable manner possible, is in my opinion the basis of the love which we owe to God in all things; for he who loves seeks his satisfaction in the felicity or perfection of the object loved and in the perfection of his actions.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

It is necessary to act conformably to the presumptive will of God as far as we are able to judge of it, trying with all our might to contribute to the general welfare and particularly to the ornamentation and the perfection of that which touches us, or of that which is nigh and so to speak at our hand.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

Of all beings those which are the most perfect and occupy the least possible space, that is to say those which interfere with one another the least, are the spirits whose perfections are the virtues.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

Now it is evident that every true predication has some basis in the nature of things, and even when a proposition is not identical, that is, when the predicate is not expressly contained in the subject, it is still necessary that it be virtually contained in it, and this is what the philosophers call in-esse, saying thereby that the predicate is in the subject.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

It can indeed be said that every substance bears in some sort the character of God's infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as much as it is able to; for it expresses, although confusedly, all that happens in the universe, past, present and future, deriving thus a certain resemblance to an infinite perception or power of knowing.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

God's vision is always true, our perceptions are always true and that which deceives us are our judgments, which are of us.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

God is also a workman able enough to produce a machine still a thousand times more ingenious than is our body, by employing only certain quite simple liquids purposely composed in such a way that ordinary laws of nature alone are required to develop them so as to produce such a marvellous effect.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

Nothing can be taught us of which we have not already in our minds the idea. This idea is as it were the material out of which the thought will form itself.
Leibniz, Gottfried and George R. Montgomery (Translator). Discourse on Metaphysics. 1686.

Fate is the decree of God or the necessity of events. Fatal things are those that will necessarily happen. God either does not decree concerning everything or, if he does decree concerning everything, then he is the author of absolutely everything.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

Of all the questions that bewilder the human race, none is pursued with more passion, more often repeated, more dangerously and cruelly pressed than this point of contention: “how the free will of man, punishment, and reward can exist, given the omnipotence and omniscience of an all-ruling God.”
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

The German language, which has an abundance of meaningful terms for useful things belonging to common life, for things visible or intelligible, is the most convenient for that purpose; when applied to supposed philosophical chimeras, it can only seem false—it is violated. In contrast, the Latin language was robbed a long time ago of her virginity, and her daughters, the Italian and French languages, were all too inclined to take on the vice of the mother.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

Punishment belongs to the evil will—no matter whence it comes. Otherwise, no misdeed would be punished. There is always a cause of the will outside of the willing subject, and yet it is the will that makes us human beings and persons—sinners, blessed, damned.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

Happiness consists in the most harmonious state of mind. The nature of the mind is to think; therefore, the harmony of the mind consists in thinking about harmony; and the greatest harmony of the mind or happiness consists in the concentration of the universal harmony, i.e., of God, in the mind.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

Every opinion has two causes: the temperament of the one with the opinion and the disposition of the object of the opinion.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

Concerning the important question of the author of sin, it is commonly believed that one may avoid the difficulty by claiming that sin in its essence is nothing but a pure privation without any reality, and that God is not the author of privations.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

It cannot be denied that all of that is real, and it is even necessary to assert that the last determination of the will, after it has been balanced for a long time and it has examined all the circumstances, is a real act, which is in the category of action, just as much as the thought and the movement. Nevertheless, it is this final determination that renders us criminal.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

I claim that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated without this principle: nothing exists without a reason. This principle holds not only in mechanics, where it concerns whether from a given magnitude, figure and motion, another magnitude, figure and motions, follows, but also in matters that of necessity are not mechanical, which I show as follows.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

I reply first that all things are created ex nihilo, not from preexisting matter at any moment whatever, for even matter itself is created; and it is of no consequence that some other things might have existed already in the past for in that case they would have been annihilated later.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

We perceive things in three ways: through experience, through reasoning, and through a representation.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.

The immediate cause of sin is the man as he is then constituted with respect to intellect and will based on the external things that are posited. But the preceding or mediate cause of sin is the state of the man and of objects preceding the present. And the chain of these mediate causes is the series of things.
Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678.