And yet it seemed that most philosophers did their best to contradict Mach, even the few who shared his thirst for objective knowledge, as did Franz Brentano, Husserl and Wilhelm Wundt. Husserl’s teacher Brentano established psychology as the science of the soul that studies mental phenomena and inner consciousness. The express goal of this phenomenological approach was to discover the fundamental laws of psychology with the help of psychology as an autonomous descriptive science. Observations of disturbed mental states were to be considered as instructive as is indirect knowledge of the healthy person's mental activity in the attempt to describe inner perception, not to be confused with introspection. Husserl shared Brentano’s insistence on description instead of meaning and cherished his key concept of intentionality but he was unable to accept the primacy thesis that followed, namely, psychology as the basic discipline and precondition of philosophy. Husserl’s rejection of this view led to what is known as the Psychologism debate and helped clarify what a descriptive psychology can achieve. As the science of the inner experience and theory of the senses it deals with psychological facts but is not a critical theory of the psyche: logic cannot be proven psychologically. Granted that philosophy cannot be critical without having access to psychological insights, it is also obvious that philosophical thinking is the basis for psychology, at least in methodological terms. Nevertheless, the crucial impact of natural science, physiology and mathematics was felt in German psychology in 1900 when mental chemistry, neurobiology and statistics created interest as valuable fields of research. The crisis in psychology was decisive for the relation to philosophy and the natural sciences alike, a fierce battle in an arena rife with landmines, a struggle between the conscious and the subconscious for the claim of concept of the day.

Psychology as philosophy is neither simple nor reductive but meant rather to preserve the authentic intentions of both fields. The philosopher of life and founder of Geisteswissenschaft, Wilhelm Dilthey, was the standard-bearer of a philosophical psychology. Ideologically situated between German romanticism and scientific positivism, Dilthey’s ambitious aim was to bridge these two cultures and allow for analytic as well as synthetic methods. As a leading science a new psychology must of necessity incorporate understanding of others and their experience of life, allow for personal experiences and historical explanations. Dilthey was not principally opposed to objective knowledge but he stressed its limitations: The soul cannot be defined, it can only be experienced. Husserl proved to be stricter than Dilthey in his methodological requirements; the founder of phenomenology and author of the Logical Investigations (1900) employed the phenomenologically grounded method of observation to grasp the phenomenon in all its complexity and explicates it in theoretical terms. “To the phenomenon itself!” is an appeal for structural description through a phenomenological modus rather than a naïve trust in what is given. Clarification of the psychological origins of self-constitution is one of the main problems Husserl assigns to psychology. His contemporary, Wilhelm Wundt, an equally influential and controversial figure in German psychology, broadened the scope of philosophical psychology. A critic of Darwin’s biological determination of humanity, Wundt proposed a new view of subjectivity which includes scientific proof of psychological facts without jeopardizing the wholeness of the Ego experience. Wundt was praised for his experimental psychology but became a forerunner of Gestalt psychology with his credo “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” Wundt’s well received books covered a wide range of themes, from Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology (1894) to Ethics (1897) and his pioneering Folk Psychology (1916). In his psychological inquiries Eduard Spranger crossed over to pedagogy by paying close attention to the ideal-representative life forms in his "Types of Men" (1914). To his mind, the humanities must deal with objective knowledge in order to further cultural education. Understanding was his primary method but to the end of achieving an objective view: knowing the place a cultural phenomenon has in the order of things. Spranger rendered aesthetic-psychic structures visible in his book Psychology of the Youth Age (1925) in which he expanded Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy of life into a psychology of culture.

Nietzsche and his “educator” Arthur Schopenhauer were the two German philosophers with the most astounding and keenest knowledge of the human psyche, as divergent as their works may otherwise be. For Schopenhauer, introspection that faces the truth about the human condition was our only access to the thing-in-itself, and Nietzsche’s groundbreaking analysis of the herd mentality with its spirit of resentment anticipated today’s consumer culture and mass media events. Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, arguably the most popular form of philosophical psychology, owes these philosophers more than the "father of psychoanalysis" cared to admit within the context of an age under the spell of science. Schopenhauer destroyed our carefully wrought self-image as spiritual beings by stressing sexuality as the key nature offers us for an understanding of humanness, and Freud applied this basic insight to the treatment of his mentally ill patients. The dark nature of humans made from “crooked timber” (Kant), sentenced to a life ruled by Eros and Thanatos (vulgo sex and death), was at the core of Freud’s anthropology which he extended to Culture and its Discontents (1930). It is telling how such an overly optimistic culture as the American way of life enthusiastically embraced Freud's theories of psychoanalysis when the scholars and analysts fleeing from Hitler brought it to the United States. To the present day, these psychologists –philosophers in their own right - posing as therapists continue to explore together with their clients questions for which an answer is nowhere in sight - according to Jean-François Lyotard a signature of true thinking. Both cognitive therapy which seeks to change thinking patterns and behavior therapy which trains a different attitude are baffled by the stubborn existence of psychoanalysis – an oftentimes lifelong seeking and rejecting, non-hierarchical relationship with analyst and patient both on the same side, but which still cannot show a proven record of success. But the finality of an answer may not be the point at all, for according to Freud every psychoanalytic therapy is an effort to liberate oppressed love and provide enlightenment - both open-ended processes in themselves. Human action is a mingling of the subconscious with basic motivations and conscious intentions - not to forget the interaction with others and the environment. How can this complex and structurally autopoietic “production of subjectivity” (Felix Guattari) be pressed into cognition and behavior patterns without its being misjudged?

A psychology devoid of a soul capable of enjoying introspection is sterile. The cultural critic Arthur Koestler pinpointed the dilemma one faces: “Psychology between couch and Skinner-box.” Lying down and talking is the Socratic way, worthy of the animal rationale. Freud’s via regia to understanding life was neurosis, an indirect approach compared with the straightforward course of traditional philosophy, yet not so greatly divergent when one considers the pursuit: A good life achieved through genuine self-understanding. A life not examined is a life not worth living, this maxim was formulated two thousand years ago in Greece, the birthplace of philosophy. It is also typical of a philosophical disposition for which consensus is the last thing on its mind: Philosophers are the artificially born dissidents. It should therefore come as no surprise to anyone that the psychoanalytic movement is as much defined by Freud as it is by former disciples who broke with him and developed their own branches of psychoanalysis. Alfred Adler, Carl Gustav Jung, Wilhelm Reich, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm are among the most prominent critics of the traditional Freudian doctrine. Even Anna Freud, the youngest and faithful daughter, couldn’t help but correct her father’s limited insight into the role of the mother. Her work with homeless children and her contribution to the techniques of child analysis essentially followed Freud’s teachings on mental illnesses arising from infantile trauma, but she went to the source, the children in trouble. The Ego is probably not the master in its own house, conceded Freud’s daughter, but rather a place for nurturing self-observation and the ability to fight the Super-Ego as well as the Id in a surprisingly cunning manner. Children especially are good at this kind of creative defense, allowing them a certain degree of control over their own lives. There are many ways to liberate oneself from Freud’s rule. The breaking point for Adler was Freud’s pessimism with regard to the power of the individual to live a self-determined life. In comparison, Adler was optimistic about human nature and made character a key issue in his individual psychology. Character traits can be observed, he maintained, and the principles of psychology should be applied to the practice of everyday life. In childhood we prepare for life and must learn to deal productively with feelings of inferiority while we strive for recognition. For Adler the will to power, not sexual urges, is the driving force of humanity, and this will can be utilized for the good of the human individual as a social being. Adler addressed a basic feeling of community as the interface between individual psychology and communal life.

Reich was Freud’s most radical critic, and after his death in the Federal Penitentiary Lewisburg in 1957 he became one of the heroes of the student rebellion in the Sixties. Reich was as pessimistic as Freud when it came to our true nature, and his character-analytic experiences in Germany and the United States convinced him that the average person who appears to be reserved, polite, compassionate, conscientious, has in truth a dark secret. Beneath the surface of social cooperation there lies a deep biological core, and it consists exclusively of cruel, sadistic, lascivious, rapacious, and envious impulses. This sounds like the litany of a conservative culture basher but Reich turns the tables on Freud and promotes The Sexual Revolution (1966): It is the Freudian unconscious and our orgiastic potency which are truly oppressed. Theory and therapy of neurosis are necessary to help the children of the future prevent sexual pathology. According to Reich, The Function of the Orgasm (1927) is undervalued, and sexual repression has socio-economic, not biological causes. To this day Reich’s controversial life and his misguided biological terminology have diverted attention from his significant discoveries. In marked contrast, the social psychologist Fromm has always been in the public eye. He is a humanist who stressed the need for a “new soul,” for without a profound change in human character the survival of the species is threatened. Our fear of freedom must be overcome, and Fromm proposed a culture of being instead of having. His major work Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1973) rejected Freud’s notion of an innate aggressiveness, and The Art of Loving (1956) implored us to trust ourselves: Only the person who loves himself is able to love others. Trained as a philosopher, Fromm started out as member of the Frankfurt School, known for its non-traditional Marxism, but for his Revolution of Hope (1968) he also turned to Buddhism and to Christian mystics such as Meister Eckhart.

Among the founders of psychoanalysis who became dissidents are Horney and Jung. Karen Horney, admired for her genius in introspection, was friends with the “wild analysts,” among them Karl Groddeck, and she was a pioneering thinker regarding sexual difference. One of the first feminists, she critiqued Freud’s paternalism and his narrow-minded understanding of female sexuality. Horney pointed out that the role of the mother is as important as that of the father, for children of both sexes. Her own books The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) and Neurosis and Human Growth (1950) employed the concept of basic anxiety in elucidating psychological distress. The Swiss-born Jung was widely considered the crown prince of the psychoanalytical movement until the schism with Freud in the year 1913. What Freud called Ego was for the assistant medical director of the Burghölzli Clinic in Zurich only the tip of the iceberg. Jung’s analytical psychology made use of visions and dreams to explore the archetypes influencing psychic activity and underlying our worldview. Jung’s Psychology of the Unconscious (1916) established the collective memory of humankind as it is played out in the myths of most cultures: The psyche contains the wholeness of the world and becomes the primary life energy. Jung’s impressive body of work is a crossing-over, transcultural in its pursuits, extending the boundaries of his psychology into philosophy, as all philosophies are indebted to the activities of the soul. Through his depth psychology Jung aimed for the development of a self as psychic unity of consciousness and unconsciousness, able to tap into the collective soul and its archetypes to achieve wisdom. As mystical and all-encompassing as this path may appear, Jung's perspective was not without balance: "Philosophical criticism has helped me to see that every psychology – my own included – has the character of a subjective confession; it is only by accepting this as inevitable that I can serve the cause of man's knowledge of man." The other side however receives its due with his sarcastic remark in a letter to Arnold Künzli in 1943 “For all its critical analysis philosophy has not yet managed to root out its psychopaths.”

Gestalt psychology emerged as a theory with interdisciplinary appeal. In 1890 Christian von Ehrenfels contributed decisively to this new approach by defining specific Gestalt qualities, the first attempt to codify this significant development which made its mark dealing with the basics of human world perceptions. Taking as its point of departure the figure/ground contrast, Gestalt psychology acknowledged the concrete shape or form in which things, psychic and cultural events are recognized by us. A figure will emerge from the chaotic background, and qualities and facts of organization can be determined. The parts are not the Gestalt – this is the crucial phenomenon of all awareness and allows for the unity of human experience. Wolfgang Köhler, critical of Wundt and famous for proving intelligence in apes, was eager to heal the split between Geisteswissenschaft and the natural sciences with the help of Gestalt psychology. He suggested the Gestalt concept be applied to inquiries beyond the sensory experience, to processes of learning, of recall, emotional attitudes, thinking, and acting. According to Köhler it is philosophically naïve to remove consciousness from science and to reduce the psyche to behavior stimuli or reflexes. In his book Gestalt Psychology (1929) Köhler stressed the need for an understanding of order and structure in psychic life provided by the concept of the Gestalt or the whole that is never merely the sum of its parts and cannot be achieved in an additive manner. Gestalt was a basic term of aesthetics - especially as "beautiful Gestalt" - before it became the organizing principle for the human psyche. Our intentionally structured perception process is attracted by the "good Gestalt," and our life encompasses an infinite number of unfinished Gestalts. Distinctiveness, restructuring, goals, and the self are key concepts of Gestalt psychology. Ehrenfels further pointed out Gestalt qualities given in consciousness and not identical with the sum of relations between events. Incompatibility, for example, is a Gestalt quality, distinguished from elementary presentation not only in relation to memory but also in its creative impulse for our imagination. Kurt Koffka and Max Wertheimer are among the founders of Gestalt psychology and provided detailed experiments proving Gestalt recognition as a common occurrence. Kurt Lewin expanded Gestalt psychology to include a psychological life space as the dynamic connection between person and environment. His topological psychology explores what affects a person in a plurality of Gestalts.

Last but not least, German psychology in the 20th century was defined by a number of iconoclasts ready to rock the boat and challenge the dominant schools. Prior to his fame as existential philosopher, Karl Jaspers developed a General Psychopathology (1913), indebted to Dilthey and the sociologist Max Weber as inspirational guides. Jaspers was a trained physician who practiced psychiatry in Heidelberg, but poor health forced him to curtail his active theoretical work. It was from philosophy however that Jaspers gleaned his basic insight: Suffering, love and dying are borderline situations which allow us to experience freedom with its unending possibilities. Japers’ descriptive power proved helpful to his inquiries into the pathologies of the psyche but his critical sting lay in the insistence on methodology. What can we know? No psychology can be taken seriously which cannot answer to logic nor deal with questions posed by a theory of knowledge. How does the phenomenon show itself to us? This proved an equally difficult question, especially if one left the realm of theory and turned to the lifeworld. Ludwig Binswanger was a noted existential phenomenologist who transformed the abstract notion of Being-in-the-World into daring evidence of a life going wrong. His thesis Extravagance, Eccentricity, Mannerism (1956) exposed the neurotic undercurrent of daily life. Sharp powers of observation distinguished Erwin Straus, a psychiatrist in the tradition of phenomenology, who applied its principles to his anthropological psychology. Straus emphasized the wholeness of the world, unfolding in its sensory splendor. His fresh view of everyday life situations earned him respect despite his role as outsider. In style and method unique in the profession, Wilhelm Salber, a professor in Cologne, melds Freud, Gestalt psychology and his own brand of everyday life psychology and is known for his insightful references to current phenomena in media and art. The most respected iconoclast in post-war Germany was Alexander Mitscherlich who used his pulpit as director of the Sigmund-Freud-Institute in Frankfurt to fundamentally criticize West German society. His Medicine Without Humanity (1947) gave account of the gruesome medical experiments during the Third Reich, and The Inability to Mourn (1957) took issue with the way Germans dealt with their recent past - as individuals and as a nation. After the traditional German trust in authority had been so bitterly disappointed, post-war Germany became a “society without the father,” unspared the grave consequences. The psychoanalyst asserted the overriding importance of the primary family group to the process of socialization. Mitscherlich’s public influence was affirmed by such courageous books as The Inhospitableness of Cities (1965). His moral integrity made the social psychologist West Germany’s voice of conscience.

The affinity between psychology and philosophy typical of German cultural life is not only a matter of intellectual history but also holds a profound lesson for today. Undeniably, psychology as the doctrine of the soul and the mind is dedicated to discovering the core of humanity, whereas science has so far failed to satisfactorily explain what it is that makes us human. From an epistemological vantage, researching the Self is extremely tricky: What can we know about an object identical with the researcher? This kind of research hits home and it is impossible for us to remain indifferent if humans are treated as better-suited rats in experimental psychology. Further, it is by no means self-evident that we can best learn from the disturbed soul and the shattered mind what kind of mental powers we are capable of developing. Neither the lab rat nor the neurotic personality affords us insights that can be trusted and directly applied to the psychological project. The medical gaze of psychiatry and psychoanalysis which appears justified by the suffering of their patients is obscured by this very suffering and thus irrevocably blurred. By the same token, the mental actuality and virtuality of the soul is its nature missing from the stimulus-reaction scheme for which the behaviorists are notorious. The achievement of having demonstrated that our psyche is not merely a projection of the biological brain but an existential task best pursued by philosophical questioning is what constitutes the enduring relevance of German psychology in the 20th century.

I would like to thank my co-editor Sven Nebelung, who studied psychology in Cologne, for his invaluable help in selecting the texts included in this volume and for his advice in particular regarding the Gestalt psychology section.

Wolfgang Schirmacher